FROM KULTURMYSTIK TO DIALOGUE. AN INQUIRY INTO THE FORMATION OF MARTIN BUBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF I AND THOU

A Dissertation

Presented to
The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Brandeis University
Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements of the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

By
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June, 1973

This dissertation, directed and approved by the candidate's Committee, has been accepted and approved by the Graduate Faculty of Brandeis University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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FEB 1 1974

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing this dissertation, indeed throughout the course of my studies, I have been sustained by the spiritual and intellectual companionship of my friends. I hereby record my gratitude to: Klaus and Petra Affeld, Michael Fishbane, Jeffrey Jampel, Robert Koret, Philip and Judith Lam, Jehuda Reinharz, Yvonne, Galit and Freddie Rock, Arnold Schwartz, David Strassler and Daniel Swetschinski. My closest companion, again spiritually and intellectually, has been my wife, Ritachi. I am graced that she is my partner.

In clarifying issues dealt with in this study I have benefitted from my discussions with several scholars. I should like to thank Professors Michael Landmann and Jacob Taubes of Berlin; Professors Nathan Rotenstreich and Ernst Simon of Jerusalem; Dr. Robert Weltsch of London; Mr. David Heyd and Dr. Avishai Margolit of Jerusalem.

A special thanks is due Mrs. Margot Cohn, director of the Martin Buber Archive, Jerusalem. Without her generous assistance in locating relevant documents, this present study would have greatly suffered. I should also like to thank Mr. Raphael Buber for elucidating some biographical details regarding his father.

The very first lecture I attended as a graduate student at Brandeis University was given by Professor Alexander Altmann. In that lecture Professor Altmann manifested the creative possibilities of meticulous scholarship joined by passion. Enthralled, my eyes welled up with tears. After the lecture my single urge was to approach him and express my gratitude with a kiss. For obvious reasons I hesitated . . . . May he accept this dissertation as a token of my appreciation.

I am indebted to Professor Nahum N. Glatzer for his scholarship on Buber. Professor Glatzer has disclosed for me the inner world of text analysis. In his teaching, as well as his writings, he has displayed that respect for the sources also requires existential sensitivity, that we are not to divorce our humanity from scholarly inquiry. For this lesson I am ever so grateful to him.

Professor Kurt H. Wolff graciously agreed to read drafts of this dissertation. This pleased me exceedingly, for it meant I would benefit from the criticism of one who has made a singular contribution to our appreciation of Georg Simmel - Buber's teacher and one of the principal personalities discussed in my study. Indeed, he reviewed my manuscript with a critical eye and made numerous constructive comments. Professor Wolff has certainly contributed to the improvement of this dissertation.

My graduate studies, as well as this dissertation, have been supervised by Professor Ben Halpern. Under his tutelage I feel I have grown and matured. He exposed me to intellectual and logical rigor. More significantly, he encouraged my self-expression, and thus vindicated the maxim of George Elliot that "those who trust us, educate us." It is with a special humility and affection that I say thank you to Professor Halpern.

I pray that the academic standards and humanity of these gentlemen will inspire my scholarship and teaching.

To the memory of

my mother, Blanche Leah

And with love to

my father, William Ze'ev

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INTRODUCTION

Martin Buber (1878-1965) has referred to his philosophy of dialogue as "die Ontologie des Zwischenmenschlichen."[1] The latter term, das Zwischenmenschliche - a theme-word of Buber's philosophy -[2] was first coined[3] by him to clarify a conceptual problem in sociological theory. This fact suggests that a possible source of Buber's philosophy lies in sociology. His interest in the latter discipline reaches back to his years as a university student; in Berlin he studied the logic and methodology of historical and social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) with Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) and sociology with Georg Simmel (1858-1918). From 1906 to 1912 Buber edited an important series of monographs - with contributions by thirty-seven of Europe's leading intellectuals - in the then fledgling discipline of Gesellschaftslehre or sociology. It was in the preface to this series that the term das Zwischenmenschliche first appeared. Indicatively entitled Die Gesellschaft,[4] this series, conceived as well as edited by Buber, testifies to his early interest in sociology. Later, when he settled in Jerusalem in 1938, Buber served as a professor of sociology (social philosophy) and then as the first chairman of the department of sociology at the Hebrew University.[5] Buber, however, is justly not considered a sociologist - neither his style of exposition nor his thematic concerns formally suggest sociology. Moreover, his appointment at the Hebrew University was as much a matter of administrative politics as of his academic affinity to sociology; he would have preferred a chair in religious philosophy, but because of opposition from certain members of the faculty to his unorthodox approach to matters of Jewish religion he was obliged to accept a compromise position.[6] This compromise was not quite arbitrary, however, for Buber not only maintained an abiding interest in sociological theory, but his whole philosophical enterprise drew from such theory.

One sociological theory which seems to inform Buber's work in a most decisive way is that of his teacher, Georg Simmel.[7] The latter's philosophical analysis of the interpersonal structure of social life seems to have adumbrated; *mutatis mutandis,* the ontology of that which Buber defined as the I-Thou relation. According to Simmel, society is fundamentally a series of interactions between individuals; in that the structure of these interactions are determined by *a priori* forms of relation they are "ontic," as Heidegger later called them, that is, while essentially non-phenomenal, the structure of social interaction cannot be explained by referring to the psyches of the constituent *relata;* somehow the forms of social interaction have an objective quality. For Buber the primary reality of the I-Thou dialogue lies in neither of the subjects of the relation, i.e., the poles of the relation, but in the relation itself. This primary, or ontic reality is *das Zwischenmenschliche.* In Buber's preface of 1906 to *Die Gesellschaft* the latter term already enjoys an ontic status - on the other hand, it must be emphasized that in the 1906 essay the term hardly possesses the dialogical character it was later to acquire in Buber's mature thought, formally inaugurated with the publication of I and Thou in 1923. Here in the early essay "das Zwischenmenschliche" is clearly introduced as a descriptive designation of Simmel's realm of interaction. Simmel's - and the young Buber's - ontology of forms of relation, differ radically from Buber's dialogical ontology. For Simmel an infinite number of forms of relation are by definition ontic; for the later Buber only one form of relation, the dialogic, is so graced. Simmel's "formal sociology" would in any case seem to have had a seminal influence on Buber's "Ontologie des Zwischenmenschlichen."

This inference regarding "Simmelian" overtones to Buber's concept of das Zwischenmenschliche obliges us to explain the considerable lapse of time between the first and isolated appearance of that term in 1906 and its reemergence many years later in Buber's philosophy of dialogue.[8] Moreover, das Zwischenmenschliche as used in Buber's essay of 1906 is a term bereft of the ethical tone it was later to acquire. Indeed prior to his enunciation of the teaching of dialogue, Buber was only superficially interested in the relations, ethical or otherwise, between men. To be sure, the pre-dialogical Buber addressed social issues, but hardly with the sensitivity to the realm of the interpersonal that distinguishes his later thought. From the perspective of his pre-dialogical literary career,[9] Buber's interest in sociology as expressed in the 1906 preface to Die Gesellschaft seems episodic. Undoubtedly it was. Neither the problem of interpersonal relations nor social theory, while not altogether absent, play a significant role in Buber's pre-dialogical thought. It was only later - during the First World War, to be precise - that he recognized the primacy in human reality of interpersonal relations. It is at this point, we surmise, that he recalls his earlier essay of 1906 and Simmel's formal sociology.

Indeed, prior to his affirmation of the realm of the interpersonal Buber's intellectual and spiritual focus was singularly a-social. In his pre-dialogical period his central concern was the crisis of Kultur - the decline of spiritual and aesthetic sensibilities putatively wrought by industrial, urban Zivilisation. Such a "romantic discontent" with modernity was shared by many intellectuals ever since the rise of capitalist society.[10] At the turn of the last century, many intellectuals of this tendency enthusiastically discovered Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), for in him their discontent "found its most discipled and most lucid expression."[11] In 1895, at the age of seventeen, Buber translated Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra into Polish[12] - probably his first literary venture. As a young man Buber explicitly considered himself a disciple of Nietzsche; and even subsequently a strong trace of Nietzsche's influence can be discerned in all of Buber's thought, particularly in that of his pre-dialogical period. Aside from a shared discontent with bourgeois life, Buber's early affinity to Nietzsche was also marked by a common tendency to minimize or neglect questions of social and political dynamics in their critique of contemporary life. The crisis of *Kultur,* Buber felt, concurring with Nietzsche, is fundamentally one of spirit (*Geist*) and hence only through an assertion of his inner self - the ultimate sanctum of Geist - could modern man rescue his spiritual-aesthetic sensibilities. We may characterize this a-political, a-social critique of modernity - manifest in the writings of many intellectuals of romantic discontent - as *Kulturphilosophie.*

In spite of its a-social character, a thematic affinity between Kulturphilosophie and sociology in Germany may be noted. Many intellectuals discontented with modern life, committed themselves to "an illusionless affirmation of contemporary reality."[13] They confronted modern, urban society (*Gesellschaft*) - that unhappy creation of bourgeois *Zivilisation* - with resignation and rational inquiry. To be conquered, or at least tamed, the dynamics of *Gesellschaft* must be first comprehended. From this realism emerged *Gesellschaftslehre* or sociology in Germany. The aforementioned series of monographs, *Die Gesellschaft,* edited by Buber exemplifies the relation between *Kulturphilosophie* and the beginnings of German sociology. In his preface to the series, Buber observes:

> According to its conception, this collection [of monographs] will not render life easier. It bears no comfort for he who reads it. It does not rob the reader of his choice. Instead of narrowing the reader's choice, the collection enlarges it: with a new way of looking at things, with a new subject matter to consider. It indicates to the reader a new side of existence, it leads him to new aspects of his environment (*Umwelt*) and innerworld (*Inwelt*). It enriches his reality. Thereby [*Die Gesellschaft*] perhaps makes life more difficult; [*undoubtedly*] because it confers upon the reader himself the task of carrying out the search and discovery in the newly disclosed regions. Certainly, this collection serves to elevate life, that is: it serves *Kultur*.[14]

To further this goal both formal sociologists and literati critical of bourgeois Zivilisation contributed monographs to Die Gesellschaft.

In Buber's pre-dialogical writings we frequently find sociological motifs. Nonetheless, his relationship to sociology remained ambiguous. His obvious familiarity with developments in that field failed to modify the basically a-social thrust of his early thought. The sociological concepts that appear in his early writings are largely deprived of their social or interpersonal reference; they play but a secondary, rhetorical role in his a-social Kulturphilosophie. Clearly, at this juncture of his intellectual life, Buber was more concerned with the revitalization than with reorganization of society. The ills of modern life - he seems to say - lay not so much in the prevailing social relations and structures as in man's inability to maximize the spiritual and aesthetic quality of his life-experience. Urgently needed is a reform of man's sensibilities. With the effectuation of this reform all the ills attendant upon modern social life - we are led to believe - will be healed, epiphenomenally. This program of reform - sponsored by many of a kulturphilosophisch bent - is what was then called Kulturpolitik.[15] Thus, Buber's early Zionism, which envisioned the redemption of the Jew to lie in a "renaissance" of the Jewish spirit and "primordial" sensibilities, is perhaps best understood as a species of Kulturpolitik.[16]

Specifically, Buber ~~ascribes~~ the crisis of Kultur to modern man's faulty picture of the world (Weltbild). Beguiled by the promise of science and by positivistic epistemology - which, again, are associated with bourgeois *Zivilisation* - man mistakenly accepts the information provided by sense data as the only valid knowledge of the world. Positivism condemns as worthless information gathered by feeling and intuition, being as they are subjective and non-rational modes of perception. Buber's generation protested this conclusion,[17] affirming the world-in-itself or the presumed reality beyond the perceived phenomena of sense data as the "true reality"[18] and declared this reality as knowable, precisely through the non-rational categories of intuition and feeling. This "idealistic reaction against science"[19] was represented in the academy by Buber's teacher Dilthey who sought a radical revision of nineteenth-century epistemology, particularly with regard to the *Geisteswissenschaften.* Dilthey argued that *Erlebnis,* lived or inner experience (as opposed to *Erfahrung,* or cognitive experience) is the primary faculty of knowing the non-logical, dynamic events of the human spirit. Because it is "an elementary and immediate reality,"[20] *Erlebnis* is considered to enjoy an epistemological status (i.e., it possesses an apperceptive quality) not obtainable by *Erfahrung,* which mediates the data of sense perception through *a priori* categories of cognition. Although Dilthey did not suggest that *Erlebnis* was a *sensus numinus,* many of the more enthusiastic would make the extrapolation.[21]

Buber's friend Eugen Diederichs (1867-1930) established a publishing house to further "a return to the higher transcendent reality,"[22] eclipsed by scientism and positivism; many of his authors, undoubtedly encouraged by Dilthey's epistemology, pointed to the non-rational, inner world of feelings and instincts, as the faculties leading to that desired reality.[23] The *Eugen Diederichs Verlag* became the major forum for the sudden interest, produced by the "idealistic reaction," in mysticism and myth,[24] which as recordings of feeling and instinct were deemed to be expressions of the ultimate reality. Buber published with Diederichs *Ekstatische Konfessionen* (1909), a collection of testimonies by various European and Oriental mystics of the past. Buber also issued (with other publishers) studies and translations of myths - which he defined as "the image (*Sinnbild*) of that which the ecstatic experiences (*erlebt*), . . . that is, a revelation of the ultimate reality of being (*Sein*)"[25] - of the Chinese, Finns, Flemish, Hindus and Celts. At this time Buber also discovered a marked tendency for mysticism and myth among the Jews. His *Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman* (1906), *Die Legende des Baal Schem* (1908) and his *Drei Reden Ueber das Judentum* (1911) disclosed a dimension of Jewish religious life unknown to or ignored by his generation.[26] In his presentation of mysticism and myth - both Gentile and Jewish - Buber celebrated the mystic's ability to overcome the individuation - or the multiplicity for a mutual opposition of phenomena - that painfully characterizes the empirical world. This dual concern with individuation and mysticism is evidenced by Buber's doctoral dissertation of 1904: *Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems* - a study of the mystical thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) and Jacob Boehme (1575-1624). The unifying characteristic of mysticism, according to Buber, is the mystic's resolve to live his Erlebnis fully, that is, without reference to conditions imposed by social convention or by factors of time and space - the forms of cognition that govern the perception of individuation. In so doing the mystic achieves unity with "the primal experience (das Urerlebnis) of the world spirit."[27] Buber identifies this unity as that which is beyond individuation; heightening one's Erlebnis, one achieves both a unity with his inner self and the cosmic spirit. Clearly, Buber's formulation of the mystic's path to unity is a novel and free combination of Nietzsche's voluntarism (i.e., unconditional living) and Dilthey's "Erlebnis" epistemology.[28]

The a-social character of Buber's Kulturphilosophie became particularly manifest when he tried to extend its purview to the events of war. The heroic mood engendered by the First World War seemed to Buber to have initiated an epoch of unconditioned action in which one realizes his Erlebnisse in their fullness and thereby gains "a connectedness with the Absolute."[29] "Precisely" because now so many are driven to unconditioned action is this period - an age which seems to have been abandoned by God - one of the Unconditioned's revelation."[30] This manifest presence of the Unconditioned in the heroic actions of so many during the war has also led to the renewal, on a metaphysical plane, of Gemeinschaft or organic community corroded the growth of spiritually divisive Gesellschaft. Through their mutual relation to the Unconditioned, "the men of heroic or unconditioned action are - regardless of their views or locality, indeed they may be adversaries on the battlefield - . . . transcendentally united in Gemeinschaft."[31] Thus the injustice and tragedy of war are of marginal import compared to the war's metaphysical significance. The war is preeminently a "Sinnbild," a symbol of profound inner events. Yes, the war is, despite its murderousness, "a fearful grace, the grace of a new birth."[32]

A letter dated 12 May, 1916 from his dearest friend, Gustav Landauer (1870-1919) - a consistent opponent to the war - would seem to have affected in Buber a volte-face, not only as regards his attitude toward the war, but also with respect to the a-social orientation of his thought. In his long, detailed critique of the "Kriegsbuber," Landauer held Buber's "perverse" politics to be derived from his peculiar metaphysics:

> . . . Despite all your protestations, I am obliged to call [your attitude to the war] a species of aestheticism and formalism. Moreover, I say that you . . . have no right whatsoever to join the public debate over the political events of the present which is called the World War and to order this chaos into your beautiful and wise generalities; what emerges is something wholly untenable and revolting . . . I must admit, my blood boils when I read [what you have written].[33]

Buber's response is unknown. We have evidence, however, suggesting that Landauer's rebuke shocked Buber and evoked in him a spirit of contrition. In any case, from his first published statements subsequent to receipt of Landauer's letter we notice a dramatic peripeteia. Buber is now unambiguously opposed to the war. Furthermore, he now argues - in a fashion similar to Landauer's socialist teaching - that change in the quality of spiritual life must be preceded by a transformation of the relations between men.

Correspondingly, the axis of Gemeinschaft shifts for Buber from pathos to ethos. At first Buber had sought to integrate his new sensitivity to the realm of the interpersonal into the categories of his Kulturphilosophie. In time, what emerged was a radical modification of that philosophical system and a novel epistemology and social ontology (bearing, as it does, the imprint of Simmel's influence) which characterize Buber's dialogical thought. In light of this discussion, we gain a new perspective on Buber's I and Thou. As much as being the theological treatise it is often understood to be, I and Thou is also - and perhaps principally - a frammar for the ethical regeneration of Gemeinschaft.

CHAPTER I - SIMMEL'S PARADOX: SOCIAL INTERACTION AS AN 'OBJECTIVE FORM OF SUBJECTIVE MINDS'

Buber's introduction to sociology, as already observed, was through Simmel. For a semester in 1898 he studied with Simmel in Berlin. In the autumn of 1899 he returned to Berlin, attending Simmel's courses through the winter semester of 1900/1.[1] The influence of Simmel's thought on him was to register a few years later when he served as a consulting editor for the publishing firm of Rütten & Loening. He conceived of a project for the firm - a collection of monographs by various authors - to further the nascent discipline (and, we may add, Weltanschauung) of sociology, in particular, Simmel's conception of it as a study of the forms of interaction. Accordingly, Buber first approached Simmel and tried unsuccessfully to solicit his consent to edit the collection.[2] Undaunted, Buber remained committed to the project, to be entitled Die Gesellschaft, and assumed the editorship himself. The understanding of sociology Buber presents in the preface to Die Gesellschaft - as we shall observe in the following chapter - was singularly inspired by Simmel. The conceptualization, formulation and even the illustrations therein are clearly derived from Simmel's formal sociology. Buber did, however, contribute something novel - the concept of das Zwischenmenschliche. He seems to have introduced this neologism as a clarification of a problematic in Simmel's epistemology of social life - a problematic which we shall presently delineate.

Simmel's sociological concern evolved during a period when sociology in Germany was a fledgling discipline in search of self-definition.[3] Is sociology a science? Is "society," presumably the subject-matter of sociology, amenable to scientific inquiry as, say, biology is? More precisely, is society an objective reality? Or is it a heuristic abstraction? These epistemological issues dominated much of Simmel's sociological reflections.[4]

As a scientist, the sociologist need only "show that a concept [of society] is useful for his theory or research; the pragmatic justification requires no epistemological or ontological supplement."[5] German academicians, however, had peculiar philosophical sensitivities which inhibited them from unambiguously employing a pragmatic justification. The legacy of Kant's critical method insinuated into the German academy an abiding epistemological self-consciousness.

Furthermore, in historical and social studies - the Geisteswissenschaften or human studies[6] - this self-consciousness was reinforced by a quest, inspired by the romantic mood, for an alternative methodology to positivism, the putative corollary of the French Enlightenment and Revolution. In the academic circles of the fin de siecle this tendency received exemplary expression in neo-Kantianism and in Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie. Both inform Simmel's sociology.[7]

Simmel shares the concern of those neo-Kantians who sought to extend the principles of the critical method to human studies.[8] And like many others he struggled to overcome the epistemological agnosticism implied by these very principles. This struggle is most pronounced in his sociological writings. Prima facie "society," understood as an object of perception would seem to suffer from the liabilities that inhere in all phenomena: at best we know but apprehensions or mental representations of social life; therefore considerable, if not impossible difficulties are imposed upon any meaningful discussion of society.[9] The positivistic interests hidden in neo-Kantianism instructed him not to accept this conclusion. Yet it was Simmel the Lebensphilosoph who was convinced that social life qua affective experience (Erlebnis) was real and hence apperceptively knowable.[10]

Thus to Simmel an epistemological agnosticism vis-à-vis "society" was untenable, for it would lead to a solipsisism which is contrary to the lived experience. "In the real life of society as we encounter it in our experience," one is vitally aware of his life with others.[11] In our "every day life" (Alltagsleben) we are "absorbed in innumerable, specific relations and in the feeling and knowledge of determining others and of being determined by them."[12] Experientially we are certain of the "selfness" (Für-Sich) of the other. Whether we can account for it or not . . . we feel the [other] . . . as something that exists with exactly the same autonomy as does our own existence."[13]

This fact of the Alltagsleben, feeling bound to others, Simmel ascribes to Wechselwirkung - interaction and interdependence.[14] By virtue of this, men live in sociation (Vergesellschaftung).[15] Further, what one is wont to call society - permanent social structures - is but the cumulative effect of seemingly negligible, sub-institutional interactions between individuals.

> . . . there are an immeasurable number of minor forms of relation and of kinds of interactions among men (Zwischen den Menschen). Although each of these taken separately may appear trivial, it is one of a mass that can scarcely be estimated. By inserting themselves between the comprehensive, official, so to speak, social formations, it is really these minor forms of relations that bring about society as we know it.[16]

Interaction, or sociation (essentially synonymous terms) is thus society "in statu nascendi."[17]

Interaction does not occur in a haphazard or irregular manner; rather it displays specific patterns. Borrowing the Kantian dichotomy of form and content, Simmel contends that a priori principles or forms (Formen) structure the given expression of a particular interaction or sociation between individuals.[18] Form is an analytical construct designed to isolate the purely social from the content (interest, purpose) of a social situation, "content being in itself not social."[19] Justification for this distinction is the observation that the same content may be found with an endless variety of forms; and vice versa, the same form seems to be realized with an infinite variety of contents.[20] The identification and description of these forms, which proceed inductively and psychologically, Simmel avers, are the principal tasks of sociology as a science.[21]

The conclusion that Simmel draws from this observation is that a form of interaction possesses an objective, autonomous structure - a structure which transcends in its radical meaning both the actors in whom it is operative and the empirical circumstance of its expression. ". . . in spite of the great variety of [its] contents, . . . form maintains its identity and proves it belongs to a sphere which is governed by its own laws."[22] Further, Simmel emphasizes, "these forms do not make for sociation; they are sociation."[23] This is to say, that social life constitutes "a unique and autonomous form of existence."[24]

Simmel the Kantian is perplexes by this observation - and this perplexity remains recurrent throughout his sociological writings.[25] How could society - understood as fundamentally an interpersonal relationship or event, be said to possess objectivity if it is devoid of spatiality? To Kant only the world of temporal-spatiality could possibly qualify as objective.

In his Soziologie, Simmel argues that the individual's knowledge of sociation - knowledge that an Other stands against one in interaction and interdependence (in Wechselwinkung) - enjoys an epistemolo status, a facticity not ascribable to the world of nature or spatiotemporal objects. Knowledge of the other and our inter-relatedness lies in the "feelings of the existing ego," the locus of one's certainty of self-being.[26] This feeling by definition possesses an apodictic character not attainable by any representation of the material world. In sociation the certainty which inheres in the ego's self-awareness thus "extends to the you": ("Aber eben diese Sicherheit hat für uns . . . auch die Tatsache des Dus").[27]

Simmel seems to suggest that this knowledge is a priori, it inheres in the very consciousness of self.[28] The actual or manifest knowledge of sociation is not a matter of cognition, is not a product of a subject confronting and perceiving an object. This knowledge rather bespeaks an immediacy, an "inner significance" (innere Bedeutung).[29] It is the very process of interaction which constitutes (bedeutet) the fact of sociation. Indeed Simmel deems it more appropriate to designate this "consciousness of sociating or being sociated" as "knowing" rather than "cognizing" (besser Wissen als Erkennen).[30] This is to infer that the consciousness of the other and our interrelatedness is a noumenal knowledge, akin to apperceptive self-consciousness.[31] "Gesellschaft ist eine Wissenstatsache."[32]

The facticity of interaction does not eo ipso establish the objective structure of forms, however. It could be argued that interaction need not have an objective, meto-individual character. Being strictly a psychological event - occurring in the minds of men, interaction may be no more than a functional relationship of mutual affects and responses.[33] Although Simmel concedes that "sociation is [essentially] a psychical phenomenon,"[34] he rejects the psychological-functional model of interaction as inadequate. This model would imply that the response of one to another is merely a modification - conscious or unconscious - of one's psychic interests. To Simmel this could hardly explain the objective forms which men seem to adhere to in their relations between one another.

As an alternative model to the functionalist explanation of interaction, Simmel suggests the Kantian concept of synthesis. In synthesis primally disparate and incoherent elements are "connected" to form a unity of perception. This unification endows the constituents with a quality they do not possess in themselves. Kant of course confines this act of cognition to spatial objects. Here Simmel admits to a philosophical inarticulateness, so to speak. "Groping for the tangible, we find only individuals, in between only a vacuum (einen leeren Raum) . . . "[35] Conceptually it is difficult to discuss the realm of forms or sociation as an objective reality, for this realm is devoid of spatiality. "In the world of bodies, not even an analogy to the fundamental fact of sociation exists, to the fact, that is, that a plurality of elements become a unity. In the world of bodies everything remains fixed in its unbridgeable separation in space."[36]

Simmel sought to explain this sui generis character of interaction "in ever new and varying formulations . . . ;"[37] primarily by an appeal to analogy. (To wit, by reference to symbolic structures).[38] This ineluctably dragged him into the mire of imprecision and ambiguity. He attempts to overcome this epistemological impasse by ontological induction: by pointing to that "something which finds expression in practice, although we are not aware of it in its abstractness"[39] - that is, by inductively isolating sociological situations, forms of interaction, which point to the reality of sociation as "a unique and autonomous" dimension.[40] In the identification and description of these forms, Simmel is his most brilliant and engaging. Nonetheless, the original question, "How is society as such possible, as an objective form of subjective minds?",[41] never quite acquires a definitive answer.

This is the problematic which seems to engage the interest of the young Buber. In his introductory essay to Die Gesellschaft, he suggests the term des Zwischenmenschliche as a descriptive designation of the "region" of interaction:

> Das Zwischenmenschliche is that which occurs between (zwischen) men, in some ways it is not unlike an impersonal, objective process. The individual may very well experience das Zwischenmenschliche as his "action and passion," but somehow it cannot be fully ascribed or reduced to personal experience. For das Zwischenmenschliche can only be properly comprehended and analysed as the synthesis of the "action and passion" of two or more men . . .[42]

The fact that das Zwischenmenschliche re-emerges as a theme-word in Buber's philosophy of dialogue engages our interest, especially given the inference that the term has its source in Simmel's sociological theory. We shall now proceed to substantiate this inference.

CHAPTER II - BUBER'S "GELEITWORT" - AN ANALYSIS

Buber's introductory essay to *Die Gesellschaft* - "Geleitwort zur Sammlung" - has enjoyed no more than cursory discussion.[1] The "Geleitwort" is mentioned in the scholarly literature primarily as the first essay in which the term *das Zwischenmenschliche* appears. But scholars treat the essay as little more than a biographical item, for they assume that *das Zwischenmenschliche* is used here in a vague, social psychological sense, far removed from the ontological status that the term was later to enjoy.[2] We shall argue the contrary - in the "Geleitwort" the term already has *in embryo* its defining ontological character. This we attribute to the influence of Georg Simmel. Hans Kohn[3] and more recently Bernard Casper[4] and Grete Schaeder[5] have noted that the "Geleitwort" betrays Simmel's influence, citing some of Buber's obvious borrowing of the latter's terminology, viz., *Formen der Beziehung, Wechselwirkung, Vergesellschaftung.* Except for a glossarial comment by Schaeder,[6] the commentators have not even perfunctorily examined the essay with reference to Simmel's thought; nor have they attempted an analysis of the essay's pivotal concept, *das Zwischenmenschliche,* - a term unique to Buber.[7] This failure to treat the essay critically perhaps explains why it has been dismissed as an episodic interest of Buber's in Simmel and social psychology.

The "Geleitwort," aside from being more significant than its commentators have granted, is rather problematic. The leitmotif of the essay is referred to by Buber as "social psychology" (Sozialpsychologie). Yet precisely this discipline was explicitly and polemically rejected by Simmel.[8] His strictures against this discipline were primarily methodological: social psychology, with its tendency to reduce social phenomena to psychological factors, obscures the extra-mental, ontic character of sociological formations.[9]

Social psychology was then a fledgling science. Alfred Vierkandt's Naturvölker und Kulturvölker. Ein Beitrag zur Socialpsychologie, 1896, apparently marks the first appearance of "social psychology" in the title of a German scholarly publication.[10] But as suggested by its full title, Vierkandt's study was essentially a version of Völkerpsychologie.[11] The discussion of social psychology in Germany as a new scientific subject matter - i.e., a psychological discussion of social facts which disassociates itself from all organismic assumptions such as Völkerseele or Sozialseele - seems to have been inaugurated by Franz Eulenburg's monograph of 1896, Über Methoden in der Sozialpsychologie.[12] Rudolf Eisler, the lexicographer of philosophic literature and terminology, describes Eulenburg's monograph and Buber's Die Gesellschaft as the founding efforts to establish social psychology as a scientific study in Germany.[13] Simmel in his rejection of social psychology, although he mentions neither Eulenburg nor Buber - or anybody, for that matter - was principally referring to a species of that subject sponsored by Eulenburg.

Eulenburg's social psychology is itself clearly inspired by Simmel's conception of social interaction. Social psychology, as Eulenburg defines it, "comprehends those psychical processes which are determined by the existence of a social group" - a social group being characterized by two or more individuals in interaction (*Wechselwirkung*).[14] Accordingly, social psychology includes in its purview not only natural communities (*die naturelichen Gemeinschaften*) - "family, clan, horde, tribe, race and perhaps also nation (*Volk*) . . . " but also and preeminently cultural communities (*die kulturellen Gemeinschaften*), those social groupings which arise out of "common interest, similar taste and so forth" - from social or business organizations to the casual relationship between a grocer and his customer.[15] *Völkerpsychologie,* because of its preoccupation with *Volk,* considers the "natural communities almost exclusively and thereby fails to say anything meaningful about "cultural communities" or what Eulenburg alternately describes as social psychological processes not limited to *Volk* or *Sozialseele*. A "Socialpsychologie ohne Sozialseele"[16] which focuses upon the dynamic or social interaction, should then be able to render understandable not only "cultural communities" but also such hitherto inexplicable social phenomena as sympathy, competition, respect for authority and honor, social values and taste. "The common feature of these [phenomena]," it will be observed, "is that they are a specific type of psychical process, which could not come to be without reciprocal effect (*wechselseitige Wirkung*) between individuals."[17]

Eulenburg draws his model for the explanation of interaction from Gabriel Tarde's (1843-1904) notion of imitation.[18] The French sociologist, who was perhaps the first in Europe to propound the idea of a social psychology as opposed to a Völkerpsychologie,[19] taught that social facts arise through imitation - an "inter-mental" activity in which the action or value of one individual is duplicated by that of another.[20] The mechanism of imitation is affective. Individuals influence each other much in the manner that a wave motion is distributed: an innovative motion (act, value) is distributed (socialized) through a series of assimilative, monadic (human) reactions.[21] In a less mechanistic version, Tarde suggests that a social process is initiated by an innovative act which is an adaptation to a given situation; others "intuitively" acknowledge the genius of this act and imitate it.[22] Significantly, Tarde later supplemented this scheme with a notion of "opposition." The "radius of imitation" is blocked by a contrasting value or act which is, nonetheless, comparably adaptive to the same situation.[23] Occasionally, of course, opposing systems may seek a compromise and synthesize.[24] Eulenburg hesitates to endorse the details of this scheme - probably because it fails to account for the dynamic reciprocity of interaction.[25] He does, however, tacitly accept the extensive implications of the scheme: the societal process is an affective system in which "individual action systems" are modified by the potential or efficient action of another.[26]

Eulenburg would then regard interaction (as opposed simply to "societal processes") as a system of reciprocal modifications. Simmel would characterize this system as psychologistic.[27] Furthermore, he would argue that when social psychology inclines toward such an understanding of interaction it too is psychologistic. The psychological references of social psychology, by definition, direct its attention to individual action systems. In rejecting social psychology, Simmel points to this psychologistic explanation of interaction as the crux of its inadequacy.

Simmel does not wish to intimate that the psychologistic model is mistaken or false; indeed it is the only intelligible way of explaining the cause and content of social inter-action: "That people influence one another . . . is, of course, a psychological phenomenon, and the only way to grasp the historical emergence of each particular instance of each is to re-create it psychologically . . . to interpret the externally observable by means of psychological categories."[28] It is quite "legitimate" to focus upon the problem of "which modification the individual psyche experiences when one undergoes particular influences from the social environment."[29] But because its focus is primarily on the individual action system, such a psychology is little more than a variety of individual psychology.[30]

In an account of sociological formations, however, individual psychology or more precisely questions regarding the modification of individual action systems, of cause and content of social action, are not immediately relevant. The configurations of social life, Simmel avers, are determined by formative principles which are independent of the individual action systems; although, again, these configurations "are nothing but psychic concatenations."[31] Thus sociology, in contradistinction to social psychology, can, indeed should, avoid referring to individual action systems per se.[32] Simmel quickly extends this precept to all the human studies: ". . . it is of extreme methodological relevance - even of decisive importance - to the principles of human studies in general to note that the scientific treatment of psychic data is not thereby automatically psychological."[33]

This latter comment is undoubtedly directed in substance at Dilthey, who forcefully argued for the establishment of a psychology which would serve as the epistemological basis of all the human studies.[34] But as Simmel's caveat concerning the general extension of the purview of psychology was first expressed in 1908 - in an excursus, included in the revision of an essay from 1894, "Das Problem der Soziologie"[35] - it may have been occasioned by the appearance of Buber's Die Gesellschaft.

To Die Gesellschaft some of Central Europe's most distinguished intellectuals contributed monographs, in which they were to deal with a particular social or historical issue from the perspective of "social psychology." The majority of these contributors[36] as we shall observe in a later chapter, tended to psychologize, in a rather impressionistic and uncertain manner at that. Moreover, the role assigned to psychology in Buber's "Geleitwort" indicates Dilthey's influence. In his call for a "descriptive psychology" (eine beschreibende Psychologie), Dilthey emphasized that "an empiricism which renounces the attempt to ground what happens in the mind [im Geiste] on [psychology] is necessarily sterile. This can be shown in each of the human studies. Each of them needs psychological knowledge."[37] We read in Buber's "Geleitwort": "None of the human studies if they wish not to detach themselves totally from the roots of the lived life can dispense with psychology."[38] Buber then, in patent allusion to Dilthey, expresses the hope that Die Gesellschaft will constitute "a preliminary work toward a descriptive social psychology" (eine Vorarbeit zu einer beschreibenden Sozialpsychologie).[39]

From the perspective of the history of ideas, Dilthey - with whom Buber studied and whom he later, in retrospect at least, considered his principal teacher in philosophical studies[40] - may also be included among the founders of social psychology. For psychology to make a meaningful statement about man, Dilthey taught, it should seek to understand man as a social and historical being:

> Man as a fact prior to history and society is a fiction of genetic explanation; the man whom sound analytical science has for its object is the individual as an element in society. The difficult problem which psychology has to solve is that of obtaining an analytical knowledge of the universal characteristics of man so understood.[41]

When Dilthey later encountered "social psychology" he indicated interest but hesitated to endorse the new discipline,[42] probably, as Rene König has suggested, because he construed it to be a species of sociology[43] - a study at which he looked askance. Dilthey denied sociology's claim to be a scientific discipline. Here he was thinking of the synoptic sociology of Comte and Spencer, both of whom viewed their enterprise as providing the formula which would explain all of human reality - social and historical. This assumption, Dilthey suggests, is rather pretentious:

> My rejection of sociology . . . applies to a science which aims at comprehending everything which happens de facto in human society in a single study. . . . This is no more allowable than it would be to say that, since in nature mechanical, physical, chemical, and vital processes are bound up together and take place within the same material physical world, therefore they must be comprehended in one science.[44]

Human reality is far too complex to be comprehended by any one formula, by any single ground of explanation. For the derivation of its unitarian principles, Dilthey observes, "sociology" is thus obliged to go beyond the precincts of the empirically given and appeal to a hypothetical scheme. "Sociology" must then be judged a non-science, a metaphysical pretension.[45]

Dilthey did nonetheless indicate some appreciation of Simmel's sociology. The latter's restriction of sociology to an examination of the forms of interaction met with his approval. A discussion of the forms of interaction, Dilthey argues, is akin to what he himself, even "earlier than Simmel," had suggested as an analysis of "the outer organizations of society" (die äussere Organisation der Gesellschaft).[46] This task, however, Dilthey assigned to political science.[47] Simmel's "sociology" does not therefore constitute a legitimation of sociology as a new and special discipline.[48]

In his reference to outer organizations Dilthey has in mind the phenomenon of fidelity, that is a compelling sense of obedience to a social grouping and, correspondingly, its ramified infra-structure, both formal and implied.[49] The grouping itself may have evolved for a variety of reasons: the subjugation of a collection of individuals by a dominant personality, by their response to common needs and interests, or perhaps simply by virtue of a social consciousness of, say, those occupying a common territory.[50] The group as such, if it is effective, inevitably evokes fidelity, in the sense defined, from its constituents.[51] Usually this group sentiment is defined by and expressed in objective organizations: "Above all, however, in family, state and church, in corporations and formal institutions . . ."[52] These "organisations" which command obedience - essentially, by appealing to one's fidelity to the social grouping - become, in time, so complex and comprehensive "that the life of the individual down to its smallest details is circumscribed and controlled."[53] The analysis of these "outer organisations" Dilthey places, as we noted, within the competence of political science (Staatswissenschaft). True, these organisations in their multifariousness embrace relations which one would not ordinarily consider political, e.g., familial relations, relations of rank, division of labor, bonds determined by common descent. But having dismissed "sociology" as a non-science, Dilthey argues that Staatswissenschaft is the only discipline methodologically capable of treating such phenomena. Furthermore, the State assures the functioning of "lower" organisations and often has incorporated these into its own juridical organisation.[54]

If we examine Buber's understanding of "descriptive social psychology" in light of the above, we will note that his affinity to Dilthey is largely terminological, whereas the conceptual substance of his idea of social science clearly remains dependent on Simmel.

Dilthey's "outer organisations" are then "political" principles or, in contemporary sociological parlance, institutional conventions; they are for the most part historically and culturally determined - for instance, the medieval Church organisation[55] - and are realized volitionally, by a compliance ultimately inspired by fidelity.[56] In contradistinction, Simmel's "forms" are, as we have had occasion to note, ontological principles, whose dynamic transcends both history and the individual action system.[57]

The conception of social psychology presented by Buber in his "Geleitwort" is - we maintain - influenced by Simmel's understanding of the forms of interaction. It is certainly perplexing, therefore, that Buber speaks of social psychology while Simmel rejects it as not useful in a discussion of interaction. But to understand Simmel to be himself suggesting a "social psychology" was apparently a common misreading. Following an elaborate presentation of the "formal sociological" perspective of social phenomena, we read in "Das Problem der Soziologie" (1908 revision): "This turn in the discussion seems to make the following investigations into chapters in psychology or, at best, in social psychology, rather than sociology."[58] Simmel thus acknowledges that he could be misunderstood. Eulenburg for one construed Simmel as pointing to social psychology.[59] Modern commentators, we may parenthetically note, often regard Simmel as a precursor of social psychology.[60] A comparison of citations from Eulenburg and Buber with a corresponding passage from Simmel will illustrate how the former confounded the latter's "formal sociology" with social psychology.

> [The study of] these processes of a psychical nature [i. e., interaction] . . . we wish to designate "social psychology."
>
> Eulenburg, op. cit., p. 216.

> The problem of [interaction] is . . . fundamentally one of social psychology: its object is social life, which is to be regarded as a psychical process.
>
> Buber, "Geleitwort," p. XII.

> Certainly there is no doubt that all societal processes and instincts have their seat in minds and that sociation is [thus] a psychical phenomenon.
>
> Simmel, "The Problem of Society," p. 329

Given the psychological flavor of Simmel's sociology, Eulenburg and Buber would seem to have made an understandable error. Indeed on at least one occasion Simmel refers to aspects of "form" as a social-psychological process. In his "Philosophie der Mode" (1905) - an analysis of fashion as a form of social interaction - Simmel notes:

> It is one of the strangest social psychological phenomena . . . that many fashions tolerate breaches of modesty which, if suggested to the individual alone, would be angrily repudiated. But as dictates of fashion they find ready acceptance.[61]

XUM

As early as 1889 Simmel offered a lecture course entitled "Einige Kapitel der Psychologie, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung soziologischer Probleme"[62]; from 1895 through 1900 he gave annually a course which bore the title "social psychology" - the course was repeated in 1904 and in the winter semester of 1905/06.[63] Unfortunately we do not possess any record of these lectures.[64] Presumably they were more or less identical with his courses on sociology.[65] In any case, Simmel's inductive determination of the forms of interaction as an exercise of psychological insight is strongly suggestive of social psychology. Furthermore, in his early essays he tended to bifurcate the task of sociology, generally without notifying the reader, into an analysis of the forms of interaction and the identification of the historico-psychological genesis of a particular incidence of a form.[66] Clearly the ambiguity seems to rest with Simmel. Not until the 1908 revision of "Das Problem der Soziologie," did he offer a clear distinction between the study of forms an sich and their psychological and historical analysis. Nonetheless, Simmel's fundamental approach to the study of forms was consistently non-psychologistic.

The apparent contradiction between Buber's and Simmel's position vis-à-vis social psychology is, it seems, largely terminological. Simmel would no doubt endorse the conceptual substance of Buber's social psychology as an accurate summary of his sociology. The social-psychological process, as defined by Buber, corresponds to Simmel's paradoxical definition of the process of sociation: ". . . an objective form of subjective minds."

In defining the social psychological process, Buber, like Simmel, rejects the notion of a Sozialseele - the view which reifies society and considers it an autonomous organism, a being, as it were, independent of individual psyches. On the other hand, Buber continues, it is unnecessary "to regress to the fact of individuation - the incontrovertible existence of individuated being - and to raise it anew as a problem . . . . [Admittedly,] what one could comprehend and analyse in his own sphere of existence, without having to postulate the existence of another intentional being, is simply the self. This is the consequence of individuated being."[67] Social psychology, however, "assumes the existence of diverse, distinctly constituted intentional beings who live with and affect one another."[68]

This assumed interrelatedness and interaction of individuals is, accordingly, the social-psychological process. It is "obviously," Buber observes, that this process "takes place in those complexes we call individuals," but it is likewise obvious that "the entire process is not realized in each individual."[69] Here Buber seeks - in a fashion similar to Simmel's then novel approach - to steer his thinking between the Scylla of methodological individualism and the Charybdis of organismic reification:

> Two or more men live with one another, that is to say, they stand to one another in a relation of interaction [Wechselwirkung]. Every such relation . . . may be designated as an association or a society [Gesellschaft].[70] . . . The process of [interaction or association] does not, however, consist of many similar happenings, each having a human soul as its subject. Rather the process combines dissimilar happenings which when combined, complement each other and form the social-psychological process.[71]

This social-psychological process, "the interaction and community of these dissimilar happenings," is "none other than das Zwischenmenschliche."[72]

For the German reader the term, das Zwischenmenschliche as said, a neologism of Buber's as was indicated, has a semantic and philosophical character that is strikingly apparent. The substantization of an adjective has the effect of hypostatizing its qualifying or attributive aspects; we may note the examples of the substances das Gute, the Good, and das Schöne, the Beautiful - derived respectively from the adjectives "gut" and "schön." Das Zwischenmenschliche - especially given the fact that it was a neologism first in the "Geleitwort" - is therefore to be read as an emphatic denotation of a special, self-sufficient status.

This self-sufficient status enjoyed by das Zwischenmenschliche implies that social interaction or the socialpsychological process is an autonomous realm transcending individual action systems. This Buber renders explicit:

> . . . das Zwischenmenschliche is that which occurs between [zwischen] men; in some ways it is not unlike an impersonal, objective process. The individual may very well experience das Zwischenmenschliche as his "action and passion," but somehow it cannot be fully ascribed or reduced to individual experience [to wit, the individual action system]. For das Zwischenmenschliche can only be properly comprehended and analysed as the synthesis of the "action and passion" of two or more men . . .[73]

Das Zwischenmenschliche is thus a psychical process sui generis: its locus is in the psyches of individuals; however, it is a process not defined by the individual per se; rather it receives its definition from the "impersonal" dynamic of social interaction.

Nonetheless, Buber seems to insist that das Zwischenmenschliche must be understood psychologically. The social scientist, if he does not wish "to detach" himself "from the roots of lived life [cannot] dispense with psychology . . ."

> Only when one grasps society as essentially the experience of the soul, does he advance to its abiding existential basis. . . . Social life arises out of feelings and urges, which beget, in turn, new feelings and urges. This all elapses within a psychic cycle and is regarded from [this perspective] as nothing but psychical [nichts als Seele]. . . . What happens between men, happens between psychic units; only as such is it understandable.[74]

A parallel citation from Simmel's "Das Problem der Soziologie" (1908 revision) reads as if it were intended to correct Buber on this point.

> [Social interaction] always arises on the basis of certain drives or for the sake of certain purposes. [These] cause man to live with other men, to act for them, against them, and thus to correlate his conditions with theirs . . . [All this] is, of course, a psychological phenomenon . . . Yet from the particular scientific viewpoint conceived by the notion of sociation, this psychological phenomenon as such can be entirely ignored.[75]

Buber does, however, accept Simmel's non-psychological conceptualization of sociation:

> . . . the psychic processes considered here [i. e., das Zwischenmenschliche] are only possible if the individual is in a state of sociation [Vergesellschaftung]; indeed these processes are only observed in this state . . . . Das Zwischenmenschliche occurs in specific forms and produces specific objectified structures [Gebilde]. The forms of das Zwischenmenschliche are

> super- and sub-ordination, cooperation and non-cooperation, groupings, social rank, class, organisations and all types of economic and cultural associations, both natural and normative . . . . Sociology is the science of the forms of das Zwischenmenschliche.[76]

Furthermore, in consonance with Simmel's sociological viewpoint, Buber rejects in favor of a synthetic the psychological-functional model of interaction: "The individual experiences not some sample [Exemplar] of das Zwischenmenschliche] - but only a part of it."[77] This "fundamental situation" (Grundverhältnis) challenges the explanation which would attribute the observed pattern and regularities of social behavior to imitation - the principal and indeed quintessential version of the psychological-functional model of interaction. As an alternative to this model Simmel hypothesized a synthetic unity of social action. Individuals in sociation "experience a synthesis which gives them the unity of society which relates one existing individual to the other in certain forms and according to certain laws."[78] In sociation, then, individual action systems are synthesized, according to certain a priori forms, into social action. Buber, as we have noted,[79] considers das Zwischenmenschliche as the "synthesis" of two or more individuals' "actions and passions." Furthermore, such syntheses are realized according to "specific forms."

Are, however, Buber's forms a priori? Included in the "forms of das Zwischenmenschliche" listed by him are "organisations - all types of economic and cultural associations, both natural and normative." This is undoubtedly an allusion to Dilthey's "outer organisations of society," which embrace the "seemingly"[80] natural associations of family, race and territory, and artificial associations as, say, a joint-stock company.[81] These natural and artificial associations, epistemologically speaking, are radically different from Simmel's forms. The latter are abstract, analytical perspectives of social reality. The former are structural real entities, analogous to forms of culture.[82] Moreover, Dilthey's "organisations" - in diametrical contrast to Simmel's a priori "forms" - ultimately, as we have previously observed, command adherence by an appeal to individual action systems. Is then Buber misreading Simmel in the same fashion that Dilthey did? Unfortunately, Buber is not explicit as to what he understands by forms. Contextually regarded, however, his conception of forms would by logical implication conform with Simmel's.

As our exposition of Buber's "Geleitwort" indicates, Simmel's influence upon Buber was not only terminological but also philosophical. He accepts both Simmel's definition of society and his conceptualization of interaction as a process transcending individual action systems. This latter point, which amounts to claiming for the realm of interaction an extra-mental or ontic status, would logically commit Buber to regard the forms which govern this realm as a priori categories - i. e., the forms of interaction not being defined fully by the constituent action systems must necessarily receive their definition from a principle other than experience per se.

That Buber was indeed thinking of Simmel's "forms" is further suggested by the fact that his list of forms - apart from mention of "organisations" - conforms, despite the theoretically infinite variety of social forms, to that prepared by Simmel.[83] Furthermore, Buber assigns the study of forms to sociology, whereas Dilthey, of course, would place forms qua outer-organisations within the purview of political science. Granted then the assumption - which cumulative contextual evidence suggests - that Buber's forms follow Simmel's a priori conception, the inclusion of "organisations" in his list of forms is logically inconsistent, Or, perhaps, one may read Buber as a student trying to render his teachers compatible.

Indeed Buber's "Geleitwort" strikes one as a balance between Simmel and Dilthey: whereas the philosophical conception of Buber's social psychology is derived from Simmel's sociology, its function within the human sciences follows Dilthey's program for a descriptive psychology. Social psychology is presented by Buber as a Grundwissenschaft - an epistemological basis for all the human studies. This Buber argues in a somewhat circular manner. He first defines the human sciences as fundamentally being studies of various aspects of das Zwischenmenschliche:

> Sociology is the science of the forms of das Zwischenmenschliche. The objective structures of das Zwischenmenschliche are dealt with by ethics, national economy, political science or the philosophy of law. The actions of das Zwischenmenschliche are the subject-matter of historiography: that is, of economic, social and cultural history.[84]

"None of these disciplines - if they do not wish to detach themselves from the lived life [erlebtes Leben] - can dispense"[85] with a knowledge of social psychology. "The actual psychological problem of das Zwischenmenschliche," however, lies outside the competency of the various established human studies and "thus requires separate consideration and treatment."[86] Social psychology is then a special investigation of social life, "in all its forms, structures and actions," examined from the viewpoint of das Zwischenmenschliche.

Following Dilthey's program for a Grundwissenschaft, Buber calls a systematic presentation of social life so regarded a "descriptive social psychology." Actually Dilthey's "descriptive psychology" has a methodological character different from Buber's "descriptive social psychology." Rather than eschewing all hypotheses and adhering to the procedure of descriptive recording of empirical or experientially given data, as Dilthey requires of his descriptive psychology, Buber employs social psychology as an abstract point of view (Note: a hypothetical construct) - "Anschauungsweisse,"[87] as he calls it - for the re-interpretation of subject-matter generally examined by the established human studies. This is somewhat akin to what Simmel later called a "general sociology":[88] the "sociological method" is a "specific category" - among many possible categories - for examining afresh "the facts of politics, religion, economics, law, cultural styles, language . . . ."[89] "With this qualification, however, it can, in principle, offer a possibility of cognition in front of the totality of human existence."[90] The "descriptive" aspect of

Buber's "descriptive social psychology" therefore does not refer to the methodological empiricism Dilthey wishes to connote by "description." For Buber "descriptive" is merely an allusion to the general epistemological function of Dilthey's psychology - a function Buber also conceived for his own social psychology.

Dilthey's descriptive psychology thus seems to inform Buber's conception of social psychology only in its programmatic design. Our justification for excluding the possibility of a more substantive or philosophical influence has been largely inferential: Buber's social psychology is non-psychologistic, therefore Dilthey's psychologistic position is not a contributing factor in its formation. This inference, however, is seemingly challenged by the psychologistic tone of the "Geleitwort" 's peroration, which reads:

> The social-psychological problem can be considered and treated from two different approaches: either as the various basic forms of the social-psychological process - that is, the usual classification is applied, and the social ideas, feelings and urgings are systematically ordered and analysed. "The analytical social psychology [die zergliendernde Sozialpsychologie] which is achieved in this manner can by its very nature be the work of a single individual only. The other way of approaching the problem, however, is to present the various forms, objective structures and actions of das Zwischenmenschliche and demonstrate the essential social psychological process in them. Since these aspects belong to the most varied realms of life, a collection [Sammlung] which marshals the efforts of experts from various fields, suggests itself as the most appropriate . . . Should this succeed, the series may be considered as a preparatory work to "a descriptive social psychology" [eine beschreibende Sozialpsychologie].[91]

The principal reference, again, is to Dilthey's then controversial essay, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie.* When one considers the above citation in light of this reference, he immediately encounters a blatant confusion. Contrary to Dilthey, Buber presents the descriptive (*beschreibende*) and analytical (*zergliedernde*) aspects of social psychology as procedurally separate. Furthermore, he suggests that these aspects are each of a fundamentally different order: analytical social psychology is confined to the labor of one individual, descriptive social psychology is a cooperative effort of many; the former is pedestrian, the latter a new and fruitful departure. This is not what Dilthey wishes to indicate by *"eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie."*

"Descriptive" and "analytical" are nearly synonymous adjectives characterizing the type of psychology[92] Dilthey deems is required for the human studies - practically speaking, he might very well have designated it a descriptive-analytical psychology. This psychology is to effect a methodological transformation of psychological investigation.[93] Hitherto such investigation was dominated by "eine erklärende Psychologie" - an explanatory psychology which seeks to determine the causal mechanism of various psycho-physiological facets of mental life (e. g., sensations, primal instincts).[94] To achieve such a causal explanation it is necessary to go "behind" one's data and construct a series of hypotheses - which because they appertain to mental facts are never quite amenable to absolute verification.[95] "Hypothesenpsychologie" hence remains unproductive.[96] In contrast, a descriptive and analytical psychology limits itself to a descriptive analysis of the "observable" - that is, data provided by *das Erlebnis*, "immediately lived experience"[97] - eschewing the introduction of facts or processes not verifiable by "observation." Parenthetically, Dilthey argues that, by confining itself to the descriptive analysis of *das Erlebnis*, psychology discovers a layer of mental life undisclosed by "explanatory" methods - the inner life of man [*das Gemütsleben*], his "ramified realm of imagination, thought and moral action."[98] The data of a psychology so conceived, which are *Erlebnisse*, first become an object of scientific discourse through introspection. That is, we concentrate on an aspect of our inner life which is, by its very nature, a chaotic cascade of experiential processes. This focusing of introspective attention upon a single facet of inner life is designated by Dilthey as *Zergliederung*, analysis - which, as is etymologically implied most emphatically in German, is the breaking up of the whole into its constituent elements; the articulation of this "analytical" introspective act is, by definition, descriptive psychology.[99]

Buber, of course, is entitled to employ the terms "descriptive" and "analytical" as he pleases, for he is discussing "social" psychology, and not simply "psychology" as Dilthey does.[100] Or if we care to consider Buber as misrepresenting Dilthey, the impropriety of presenting descriptive and analytical (social) psychology as procedurally separate - the latter being the task of one and the former, which is preferred, of many - may be dismissed as an editorial device to explain the design of *Die Gesellschaft*, a series of monographs each to be contributed by a different author.

This apology for Buber's "misuse" of Dilthey still leaves the apparent psychologism found within the "Geleitwort" 's peroration unexplained, however. Buber observes in the "offending" passage, that one approach to the "social-psychological problem" - the analytical - is that which considers "various basic forms of the social-psychological process - that is, the usual [gebräuchliche] classification is applied, and the social ideas, feelings and urgings are systematically ordered and analysed." The ideational function of the qualifying adjective "usual" finds a parallel in a statement by Dilthey criticizing "explanatory psychology":

> [The] task for psychology . . . involves a widening of its range. It must go beyond what has hitherto been its habit of investigating the regularities of mental life . . . [101]

Read in the perspective of this "parallel," one gets the impression that "analytical social psychology" is not only "usual," in a negative sense, but, perhaps like "explanatory psychology," also epistemologically mistaken. The "usual" social psychology could be a reference to say, Wilhelm Wundt or William James - contemporary precursors of social psychology.[102] But perhaps it is even a reference to Dilthey.

Unlike Wundt and James, Dilthey ~~in~~ his psychological studies did not lend primacy to any one of the so-called Platonic trichotomy of psychic faculties: affection (feelings), conation (urgings) and cognition (ideas).[103] Rather he treated this trichotomy as an interrelated functional system. In every "Erlebnis" or conscious attitude all three psychic factors co-exist to form the mental structural system (Strukturzusammenhang)[104] - cognition flows into the affective and thence to the conative.[105] In every Erlebnis one factor tends to dominate, and accordingly a particular Erlebnis may be characterized as either cognitive, affective, or conative.[106] Because this system is constitutive for individual character and, in turn, social ideas and institutions, it is "the primary object of psychological description and analysis."[107] In that the structural system is "acquired" (erwoben), it bears the imprint of history and society.[108] Accordingly, psychology - which amounts to a morphological description of the structural system - may be construed as an analysis or classification of social ideas, feelings and urgings.

If this be Buber's understanding of Dilthey's "descriptive psychology" (which, for that matter, though not incorrect, rather misses much of its intricate subtlety), the peroration of the "Geleitwort" may be read as an elliptical critique of Dilthey. In any case, there is an implied deprecation of the "psychologistic" approach to social psychology. Buber's "descriptive social psychology," in contradistinction to this approach, intends to demonstrate the social-psychological process at various levels of das Zwischenmenschliche. We have seen that his understanding of this process - inspired by Simmel's sociology - is that it is essentially ontic, non-psychologistic, that is, insofar as the process cannot be reduced to matters of ideas, feeling or will.

In summation: we have argued that Buber's conception of *das Zwischenmenschliche* follows his teacher, Georg Simmel's, understanding of the sociological character of interaction. It has been noted that *das Zwischenmenschliche*, like Simmel's realm of forms, points to an ontic reality realized in sociation, men in interaction. Philologically viewed, then, the term *das Zwischenmenschliche* may be construed as an original verbal conceptualization of the realm of forms - a realm Simmel could only articulate, as we have seen, by inductive example of a particular form, by analogy, or by the paradox "an objective form of subjective minds."

The "Geleitwort," so understood, takes on a striking significance when read in light of a statement on *das Zwischen* (an alternate version of the term *das Zwischenmenschliche*),[109] a principal category of his philosophy of dialogue, which Buber made in 1947.

> . . . The view which establishes the concept of "between" [das *Zwischen*] is to be acquired by no longer localizing the relation between human beings, as is customary, either within individual souls or in a general world which embraces and determines them, but in actual fact *between* them.
>
> "Between" is not an auxiliary construction [*Hilfskonstruktion*], but the real place and bearer of what happens between men (*des zwischenmenschlichen Geschehens*).
>
> . . . What happens here cannot be reached by psychological concepts, it is something ontic [*es ist etwas Ontisches*] . . . the dialogical situation can be adequately grasped only in an ontological way [,] . . . as that which has its being between [*zwischen*] [two personal existences], and transcends both. . . . *On the far side of the subjective, on this side of the objective*, [*Jenseits des Subjektiven, diesseits des Objektiven*], on the narrow ridge, where I and Thou meet, there is the realm of "between."[110]

The enduring impress of Simmel's sociological theory upon Buber is again rendered evident by the latter's description of "meeting" or the moment of das Zwischen.

> This face [of das Zwischen] can be found even in the finest and most transient events which scarcely enter the consciousness. In the deadly crush of an air-raid shelter the glances of two strangers suddenly meet for a second in astonishing and unrelated mutuality [Gegenseitigkeit]; when the All Clear sounds it is forgotten; and yet it did happen in the realm which existed only for that moment.[111]

Simmel, mutatis mutandis, describes sociation (cf. "meeting") in a remarkably similar fashion:

> Two people who for a moment look at one another or who collide in front of a ticket window, should not on these grounds be sociated. Yet even here, where an interaction is so superficial and momentary, one could speak with some justification of sociation. One has only to remember that interactions of this sort merely need become more frequent and intensive and join other similar ones to deserve properly the name of sociation.[112]

For Simmel the fleeting moment of interaction is elemental sociation; for Buber, the philosopher of I and Thou, the evanescent moment of meeting is "one of elemental dialogue,"[113] or of elemental Gemeinschaft, for the "reality" disclosed by meeting points to "the life decision of future generations": to use this knowledge effectively in order to bring about the genuine person again and to establish genuine community (echte Person wiederzugewinnen und echte Gemeinschaft zu stiften).[114] This is to say, that, for Buber, interaction qua meeting is an ontic category defining a special dimension of interpersonal relations, namely gemeinschaftliche relations; for Simmel (and for the author of the Geleitwort) interaction qua sociation is an ontic category defining all human association. What has transpired here is a radical transformation in meaning: from a sociological designation denoting the zone of interaction, das Zwischenmenschliche has become a term of ontological ethics,[115] describing the realm of "authentic" interhuman relationship.

That this transformation was inspired by ideology or spiritual quest, as much as by philosophical ratiocination, seems evident - especially when one recalls that the renewal of Gemeinschaft was the intellectual or rather the romantic and ethical concern of Buber's generation.[116] Simmel's novel definition of society as essentially a series of interactions, "der zarten Föden, der minimalen Beziehungen zwischen Menschen,"[117] provided Buber with a new focus on the question of social reconstruction. "Gesellschaft" and "Gemeinschaft" are no longer simply a matter of organic structures, of historical, diametrical oppositions - but of trans-historical forms of relation: in Das Problem des Menschen, Buber attributes the crisis of modern man - his "social and cosmic homelessness" - to two factors:

> The first is predominantly sociological in nature. It is the increasing decay of the old organic forms of the direct life of man with man . . . Such forms are the family, union in work, the community [Gemeinschaft] in village and in town. Their increasing decay is the price that had to be paid for man's political liberation in the French Revolution

> and for the subsequent establishment of bourgeois society. . . . The second factor can be described as one of the history of the spirit, or better, of the soul . . . . I should like to call this peculiarity of the modern crisis man's lagging behind his works. Man is no longer able to master that which he has himself brought about . . . [However] the man who wants to grasp what he himself is, salvages the tension of solitude, and its burning problematic for a life which is renewed in spite of all, and out of this new situation proceeds with his thinking. Of course this presupposes the beginning of a new process of overcoming the solitude - despite all the vast difficulties - by reference to which the special task of thought can be perceived and expressed . . . . [Actually] I am speaking of living actions; but it is vital knowledge alone which incites them. Its first step must be to smash the false alternative with which the thought of our epoch is shot through, that of individualism or collectivism . . . [contemporary] thought erroneously supposes that it has to choose between an individualistic anthropology and a collectivist sociology.
>
> . . . [False because] the fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such.[118] Each considered by itself is a mighty abstraction. The individual is a fact of existence insofar as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence insofar as it is built up of living units of relation [Beziehungeinheiten].[119]
>
> The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man. What is peculiarly characteristic of the human world is above all that something takes place between one being and another the like of which can be found nowhere in Nature. . . . Man is made man by it, but on its way it does not merely unfold, it also decays and withers away . . . . I call this sphere which is established with the existence of man as man, but which is conceptually still uncomprehended, the sphere of the "between." Though being realized in very different degrees, it is the primal category of human reality. This is where the genuine third alternative must begin.[120]

Simmel's "formed sociology" thus proves to have furnished Buber, the philosopher of Gemeinschaft, with a seminal insight.[121]

This insight first came to fruition some fifteen years after the composition of the "Geleitwort." The hiatus, of course, could be explained as a period of incubation. In this period, however, Buber as a Kulturphilosoph had little intrinsic concern with social issues. The pre-dialogical Buber does not seem to have returned to the questions broached in the "Geleitwort." Rather he submerged his interest in sociology in his overriding quest for heightened sensate and affective experience and mystical unity beyond the phenomenal and ergo social world. To a discussion of this quest and its ambivalent relation to sociological theory, in which Buber had an abiding interest, we now turn.

CHAPTER III - BUBER'S ERLEBNIS-MYSTICISM

Buber's pre-dialogical though is dominated by an interest in mysticism, particularly, in the unitive Erlebnis. This interest was, as we have observed, a correlate of his concern with the putative decline of man's spiritual and aesthetic sensibilities attendant to the rise of bourgeois Zivilisation.[1] Buber attributed this decline to the contemporary acceptance of the individuated, phenomenal world as the single and ultimate reality. Prompted by empiricism and positivism, the bourgeois has permitted his external senses, especially that of vision, to dominate his perception of the world. Thus he exclusively perceives the world as a series of individuated phenomena, all facts of being are locked in eternal separation from - and perforce are in opposition to - one another. From this sorry situation follows ineluctably a distortion and qualitative decline of man's spiritual and aesthetic sensibilities. Here, mutatis mutandis, the echo of Schopenhauer is clarion. In modern thought, Schopenhauer was the first to define individuation as a function of visual, that is, phenomenal perception and, further, to discuss the problem in terms of its deleterious implications for human culture.

In Buber's approach to das Individuationsproblem as posed by Schopenhauer we find a strong trace of Nietzsche's novel answer to it.[2] As a correction of the individuated world perceived by visual sense data, Nietzsche invokes a Heraclitean Weltbild: the world is in a constant flux of becoming. This is to say that the world is not, as the phenomenal knowledge would suggest, a plurality of fixed, discrete beings. Rather as "constant flux," it is, in essence, a unity. From the perspective of flux all is one. This ontological reality, however, to become real *for* man, must be lived *by* him. Here Nietzsche introduces his twin doctrine of the over-man and the eternal return. As subject to constant nonteleological change, to an "eternal return of the same," each moment of the world is endowed with an independent, unique value. Thus one should live each moment without regard to any teleological system of norms and, correspondingly, respond with the uniqueness of his person to the uniqueness of the moment. Every sequence of the eternal flux requires a unique response. Having so lived, one finds his life to be in accordance with ontological reality.

This scheme served as the basis for the Weltanschauung of a club, the "Neue Gemeinschaft," in which Buber was active during the years he attended the University of Berlin (1899-1901).[3] The "Neue Gemeinschaft" gave this scheme an epistemological grounding by associating it with *Erlebnis*, a category denoting affective, experiential knowing. The "Neue Gemeinschaft" also affirmed *Erlebnis* as a *sensus numinus*:[4] each *Erlebnis*, which varies in content with the flux of becoming, is unique; thus if the individual responds to each *Erlebnis* with the uniqueness of his person, both the *Erlebnis* - residing in the "I" of the individual - and the corresponding moment of the eternal flux are realized as one. This oneness, bearing man beyond individuation, is nouminous consciousness.

The "Neue Gemeinschaft" and its Weltanschauung proved, as we shall presently see, formative in shaping the pre-dialogical Buber's approach to epistemology and mysticism. Furthermore, we shall note that in consonance with the general tendency of the "Neue Gemeinschaft"[5] and of many of his contemporaries involved in mysticism,[6] Buber understood social facts to be phenomena, that is, he assigns these facts to the world of individuation. His desire to reach a unity beyond individuation thus led to an ontological deprecation of social life.

Schopenhauer and das Individuationsproblem

For Schopenhauer the empiric world is principally a fact of individuation - a plurality of discrete and autonomous units, all of which are eternally separate from one another.[7] An irremovable barrier of separateness lies between all empiric facts of existence, between man and man, between object and object, and of course between man and object. Such an individuated world is a function of the perceiving mind, however. The a priori structure of the consciousness prescribes that the world be apprehended by the formal principles of time and space,[8] principles which because they seek to specify or measure relatedness - "succession of moments" and "position of parts"[9] - perforce imply a cognitive finiteness or individuation of that which is perceived:

". . . it is only by means of time and space that something which is one and the same according to its nature . . . appears as different, as a plurality of coexistent and successive things. Consequently, time and space are the *principium individuationis.*"[10] Time and space are the sole and defining principles of the phenomenal world, the world of individuation.

We cannot be satisfied with mere knowledge of the phenomenal, however. This assertion contradicts Kant, who taught that since the thing-in-itself was forever beyond our cognitive grasp, knowledge provided by sense data or experience (*Erfahrung*) - given its conformity to the principles of transcendental analysis - would have to suffice. Schopenhauer, on the contrary, argued that we indeed have access to noumenal knowledge: the thing-in-itself is experienceable and hence can be known.[11] Self-reflection readily indicates that stirring behind our every action is will - will reveals itself as the "in-itself" of our phenomenal self.[12] Each of us, in other words, is *experientially* aware that he is eminently more than just a phenomenon - an object among objects, possessing space and time, and responsiveness to stimuli; each of us has intimate knowledge of ourself as will. And since solipsism is patently absurd, one is obliged to assume that his noumenal consciousness of self is true for all human beings.[13] Schopenhauer is so certain of the validity of this extrapolation that he feels no hesitation in extending it beyond the sphere of the human to all phenomena - animate and inanimate:

> The reader who with me has gained this conviction [that he possesses noumenal will], will find that of itself it will become the key to the knowledge of the innermost being of the whole of nature, since he now transfers it to all those phenomena that are given to him . . . He will recognize that same will not only in those phenomena that are quite similar to his own [phenomenal self], in men and animals, as their innermost nature, but continued reflection will lead to recognize the force by which the crystal is formed, the force that turns the magnet to the North Pole, the force that shoots and vegetates in the plant . . . ; all these he will recognize as different only in phenomenon but the same according to their inner nature.[14]

The phenomenal world then enjoys a certain metaphysical unity: a unitary, all-pervasive will. This will as the thing-in-itself is logically transcendent of the defining properties of phenomena, that is, will an sich is bereft of time and space:

> . . . will as a thing-in-itself . . . is free from all plurality, although its phenomena in time and space are innumerable. It is itself one, yet not as an object is one, for the unity of an object is known only in contrast to possible plurality. [The will] is one as that which lies outside time and space, outside the principium individuationis, that is to say, outside the possibility of plurality.[15]

This observation permits Schopenhauer to declare individuation to be a "veil of Maya" - a terrible illusion fraught with pain.[16] Pain because individuation means an endless conflict of insatiable, rapacious wills.[17] In consonance with Vedanta, from which he borrowed the image of the veil of Maya, Schopenhauer counseled that individuation be overcome by a negation of individual will - that we withdraw into volitional passivity and silence.

Nietzsche and das Individuationsproblem

Nietzsche adopted Schopenhauer's characterization of the phenomenal world and undoubtedly did much to popularize the notion of individuation.[18] In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche even more emphatically than Schopenhauer notes that the world governed by perceptual knowledge - the world of space and time - is a source of horror and suffering. The empirical world is "a medley of different worlds . . . [all of] which are right individually, but, which because they exist separately side by side must suffer that very individuation."[19] Individuated, existence acquires a horrific fortuity and ephemerality.

Borrowing from pre-Socratic Greece, Nietzsche notes two typologically variant responses to the "weight and burden of existence,"[20] the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The former, inspired by the deity of plastic art, accepts the world of perception or appearance (Schein) and refines it with an aesthetic sensibility.[21] The lines of the phenomenal world now seem delicate and graceful. The "ambrosial vapor"[22] which thus envelopes appearance transforms man's anxious "reflections on the terror and absurdity of existence into representations (Vorstellungen) with which [he] may live . . . The sublime is the artistic conquest of the awful."[23] Apollo presents, on the other hand, but an "appearance of appearance (Schein des Scheines),"[24] for he has left the principium individuationis inviolate, and indeed has glorified it: " . . . we might say of Apollo, that in him, the unshaken faith in this principium and the calm repose of the man wrapt therein receive their sublimest expression; and we might consider Apollo himself as the glorious divine image of the principium individuationis, whose gestures and expressions tell us of all the joy and wisdom of appearance, together with its beauty."[25] Apollo, a comforting god, ennobles individuation not only with a beatific grace but also endows it - as, say, the sculpture does his vision - with a fantastical eternity. The cruel fortuity and ephemerality of individuation are no longer apparent.

In contrast, Dionysus, the god of dithyrambic music, does not celebrate the apotheosis of the principium individuationis, but its overcoming. ". . . by the mystical triumphant cry of Dionysus the spell of individuation is broken . . . and the way is open to the innermost heart of things."[26] For the Dionysian ecstatic "the ordinary bonds and limits of existence"[27] are removed; for him "the veil of Maya has been torn aside and [is] now fluttering in tatters before the mysterious Primordial Unity."[28] This primordial unity is fundamentally different from Schopenhauer's metaphysical unity which precedes not only multiplicity but also natural existence: the noumenal will an sich is pre-existent and incorporeal.[29] Dionysian wisdom, on the other hand, amounts to a special order of awareness of natural, corporeal existence; to be sure, an awareness that goes beyond individuation - yet Dionysius' focus remains bound to the substantival world.[30] Dionysus

> wishes to convince us of the eternal joy of existence; only we are not to seek this joy in phenomena, but behind them. We are to recognize that all that comes into being must be ready for a sorrowful end; we are forced to look into the terror of this individual existence - yet we are not to become rigid with fear: a

> metaphysical comfort tears us momentarily from the bustle of transforming figures. We are really for a brief moment Primordial Being itself, feeling its raging desire for existence and joy in existence; the struggle, the pain, the destruction of phenomena (*Erscheinungen*), now appear to us as a necessary thing, . . . [I]n Dionysian ecstasy [we anticipate] the indestructibility and eternity of this joy. In spite of fear and pity, we are happy living beings, not as individuals, but as the *one* living being, with whose creative joy we are united.[31]

The Apollonian illusion is absent here, the precariousness and pain of *individual* life is not denied. Dionysus affirms the transience of existence - but not as a cruel and capricious process. All is in a perpetual state of organic flux. Through Dionysus "nature cries out to us with its true, undissembled voice: Be as I am! amidst the ceaseless flux of phenomena I am the eternally creative primordial mother, eternally impelling to existence, eternally self-sufficient amid this flux of phenomena."[32] The metaphysical comfort and joy derived thereby is the knowledge of "the fundamental oneness of everything"[33]- the knowledge that as part of the primal oneness each of us is an integral aspect of the dynamic process of becoming.

This Dionysian wisdom - a sort of naturalistic ontology - was, according to Nietzsche, to find its philosophical expression with the pre-Socratics, in particular Heraclitus. In "die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen,"[34] - a series of lectures contemporaneous to the composition of *The Birth of Tragedy* - Nietzsche refers to Heraclitus with the revealing adjectival phrase "appolonisch feindselig."[35] The sixth century Greek philosopher's thought is summarized in this equally revealing manner:

> The multiplicity of perceptible qualities are neither eternal substances (Wesenheiten), nor fictions produced by our senses . . . ; neither are they fixed, self-perpetuating being (Sein), nor are they ephemeral, protean apparitions in the minds of decapitated men. There is a third possibility - which [hitherto] remained a possibility alone for Heraclitus, and surely no one will be able to point to it with the same dialectical flair as he did, for what he discovered is a rarity, even in the realm of mysticism, with its unanticipated cosmic metaphors: the world is a game for Zeus, or physically expressed, a game for Fire with itself. The One (das Eine) is only in this sense coessential with multiplicity (das Viele).[36]

Individuation is only apparent, a function of man's defective vision. "Do not let yourselves be deluded," Nietzsche quotes Heraclitus, "for your myopic eyesight allows you only to perceive permanent land within the sea of becoming . . . "[37] Dionysus is not mentioned in this exposition, but the parallel to Nietzsche's presentation of the epistemological content of the bacchanalian experience suggests to us the lapidary "Heraclitus, the philosopher of Dionysian wisdom." Even when Nietzsche was later to abandon many notions and expressions found in The Birth of Tragedy, Heraclitus remained one of the few philosophers whom he continued to admire as a representative of profundity and wisdom.[38] Indeed, in one of the many marginalia of Nietzsche's Nachlass, Heraclitus is lauded as Zarathustra's predecessor.[39]

The "Neue Gemeinschaft" and das Individuationsproblem

Nietzsche's Dionysian-Heraclitean Weltanschauung[40] found a distinct echo in the "Neue Gemeinschaft." The "Neue Gemeinschaft"[41] - "ein Erkenntnis- und Lebensgemeinschaft"[42] - founded by the brothers Heinrich and Julius Hart (1855-1906, 1859-1930), proclaimed "the overcoming of the spirit of disunion, of duality . . . "[43] A spirit of dualism, it was contended, pervades all aspects of life - a spiritual malaise which receives its most representative expression in the existential separation of one's "I" (das Ich) from the world. Lamentably, man experiences life as an incessant conflict between the perceived multiplicity of things and a desired unity, an intuited ideal. This unity - ". . . be it called God, Nirvana, absolute substance or bliss . . . "[44] seems to be "forever beyond"[45] the existent. The conflict, according to the "Neue Gemeinschaft," is to be ascribed to a mistaken "Weltbild" - to be sure since time immemorial: in conforming with the a priori structure of perception men insist on viewing the world as a plurality of static and indeed conflicting entities. But since the birth of modern science in the fifteenth century we have "a new Weltbild,"[46] which should permit us to transcend the limitation of phenomenal knowledge and correspondingly to overcome the old Weltbild.

Modern science has discovered infinitude. The telescope has revealed the world's infinite size, the microscope has led us to behold the world's infinite minuteness. "Infinity everywhere, in that which is most distant, and even more so in that which is most infinitesimal."[47] The discovery of infinitude has also disclosed the world to be a process of interminable change.

> . . . the immeasurable cosmos is not whatsoever a rigid, stationary entity, . . . to be forever grounded into fixed categories. It is not a machine brought to life by a creator (Schoepfer), bearing down constantly, with the same daily routine (Tagewerk) with its drone. Rather the cosmos is an eternal producer (ein ewig Zeugendes), it is in eternal transformation, in eternal self-development. It is a cosmos in which everything, stage by stage, can become everything: protozoa - plants and animals; gas - spirit (Geist); the world - God; and vice versa.[48]

In the perspective of this dynamic process of becoming, the oppositeness that inheres in plurality must be considered a fluid, rather than the rigid fact that phenomenal knowledge suggests. "The flux of the cosmos eliminates all rigid antagonisms."[49] Moreover the supposed antithesis between plurality and unity is disputed by the new Weltbild. For in the process of becoming "every unity is always at the same time a plurality, and every plurality is always also a unity."[50]

Logic and philosophy (concepts, values) have not kept pace with the development of natural science, however.[51] Ratio has, regrettably, remained enslaved to the "Denkorgan"[52] - the structure of the mind which restricts thinking and judgment to the phenomenal or individuated, static world. This continued enslavement of ratio, is "the greatest obstacle to the progress of Kultur."[53] It is thus imperative that we adjust our ratiocination to the knowledge provided by the sciences, that we cease to limit our thinking to rigid, non-fluid conceptualizations of reality. "Everything is in transformation. Accordingly, we must learn to understand the world as an entity of flux (Verwandlungswesen)."[54]

Adjustment of ratio to the Weltbild of the natural sciences should beget what Heinrich Hart calls a "Vieleinheitsanschauung."[55] Given the eternal flux (Verwandlung) of the world, multiplicity and unity cannot be considered as antinomies, but rather as dialectical coefficients. Implied here is a unity of substance, multiplicity being merely manifest attributes. An alternate way of expressing this fact is noting that the thing-in-itself (the ideal, the unity) and multiplicity are essentially the same: "The world is a Vieleinheit and it is [thus] everything, nothing is beyond it; behind it is no substance, no thing-in-itself."[56] Correspondingly, the Vieleinheitanschauung instructs man to cease his immemorial quest for unity in the metaphysical. "Why do you seek the thing-in-itself and then declare it inscrutable, unfathomable? You are the thing-in-itself! You are God - the hub of the universe - the center of the sun - the core of matter - substance!"[57] Realizing that we ourselves, as part of the eternal flux of nature are Ding an sich, we have overcome time and space: "He who appreciates this and knows - unshakably knows this - he has overcome time and space, and has become the universe, indeed eternity. His I has become the great axis about which infinity spins."[58] With this realization of the dialectical unity of substance we have also bridged the abyss between our "I" and the world, for if substance is singular and all-comprehensive, we obviously are one with the world:

> . . . for the One is always also the other, continually transforming into [my field of perception], into that which is about me, into part of my I. The entire world is then nothing but my I, and my I is nothing but the world which is external to me.[59]

Now as a "Welt-Ich" we partake in the joy of eternal becoming.[60]

What the "Neue Gemeinschaft" was proclaiming here may be described as a substantival monism. Such a monism was implicit in our exposition of the Dionysian-Heraclitean wisdom sponsored by Nietzsche.[61] Both the "Neue Gemeinschaft" and Nietzsche sought to stress the ontological correlativity of plurality and unity. Philosophically, this is tantamount to a critique of Idealism with its ontological depreciation of the hic et nunc, Schopenhauer's world of individuation. Substantival monism obviates such a depreciation, for if plurality is correlative of unity, the former gains new axiological significance. Indeed for the "Neue Gemeinschaft" and Nietzsche the existent world of plurality is the exclusive realm of human reality. This is ultimately the source of Nietzsche's enthusiasm for Heraclitus, as is readily apparent from his comparison of the thought of the 'dark' sage and Parmenides:

> Plurality, which is according to Parmenides an illusion of the senses, is for Heraclitus the vestment, the phenomenal form of the One, never an illusion, however the One can never manifest itself otherwise [than through plurality].[62]

And herein lies the basis of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati: ". . . a man should wish to have nothing altered, either in the future, the past, or for all eternity."[63] Julius Hart espouses a similar naturalistic ethos:

> The land [in which plurality merges into unity] is not a metaphysical realm, it is not a supersensory (*übersinnlich*) land. This earth is [the reality], it is nature and it can be nothing but nature.[64]

The existent life - in which, to be sure, plurality is not a scheme of rigid individuation but a dynamic principle - is the sole arena in which the desired unity is to be realized.

For Nietzsche and the "Neue Gemeinschaft" the doctrine of *amor fati* does not mean a passive acceptance of our existence as a "thoughtless accident"[65] within the flux of nature. On the contrary, Nietzsche summons us to become creators, rather than mere creatures of the flux. This challenge - glorified by Zarathustra as the "joy of overcoming"[66] the eternal return - postulated that man possesses a "creative Eros."[67] This inner force, which differentiates man *in potentia* from other creatures, is only realized, however, when one dares to assert his individuality. "Sei du selbst," cries Nietzsche.[68] In a similar vein Julius Hart teaches that as the thing-in-itself we are creative subjects:

> You should know that you are not created spirits, but rather you are creating spirits; you are not born and imperishable [*unvergänglich*]. We are always nature, and in that we create, we reveal and disclose the essence of matter - and the wine of substance flows into the goblets of creative action [*Gestalten*] . . . In that we [create], we need not seek truth, for we are truth.[69]

Gustav Landauer, a founding member of the "*Neue Gemeinschaft*,"[70] argues that only as a creative subject is one a "Welt-Ich," only by asserting one's uniqueness does one overcome individuation: "I am the cause [Ursache] of my own person, because I am the world. I am the world when I am totally myself."[71] The "Welt-Ich" is thus defined by Landauer in a Heraclitean-Zarathustran manner: "Indeed we find infinity of existence in ourselves when we ourselves are infinitude - i. e., we become entirely ourselves, drawing forth from within the utter depths of our being our innermost selves."[72]

Buber and das Individuationsproblem

In a lecture sponsored by the "Neue Gemeinschaft," the twenty-three-year-old Buber gave particular attention to the experiential aspects of Dionysian wisdom.[73] He likens the Gemeinschaftsgefuehl - the unity of the "I" and the world[74] - to those moments when one is overwhelmed by the feeling of the sacred. The mundane rhythms of the everyday, which toss man into a web of "conflict and doubt"[75] are interrupted and, suddenly, the "ineffable meaning of life" becomes manifest.

> . . . in quiet, lonely hours all our endeavors seem meaningless. There appears to be no bridge leading from our being to the great Thou [das grosse Du] - the Thou who we felt was reaching out to us through the infinite darkness. Then suddenly came this Erlebnis - and like a mysterious nuptial festival we were freed from all restraints and we found the ineffable meaning of life.[76]

In these sacral moments, attended by a liberation of our sensations, we realize in ourselves the primal unity of all:

> In the hours of consecration - in the crystallization of an instant, in a short festive communion - we met in a feeling of co-essentiality (Wesensverwandtschaft), of blissful, blessed fusion with all things in space and time.[77]

The ideal, Buber argues, is to extend this experience from these blessed, but infrequent moments to the everyday - to endow all of life (das Leben) with a new meaning derived from the experience of the "endless unity of becoming."

> A few of us want to live the ideal - to extend the inner commonality (Gemeinsamkeit) [of the cosmos experienced in those sacred moments] to [existential] particularity (Eigenheit). I believe they will be able to live it. According to the ideal, they will live . . . the meaning of the universe, the endless unity of becoming.[78]

Concomitantly, the "meaning of human life" will be enhanced by "the free growth of the creating personality."[79] The rhythms of the everyday are now marked by a creative-cum-hallowing energy.

> A life is established in which creative energy glows and throbs. Existence has become a work of art . . . , a new kind of art which creates from the sum of everything an integrated totality, and renders each day a divine sacrament.[80]

The "Neue Gemeinschaft," Buber concludes, has dedicated itself to this ideal.[81]

Three years after this lecture, Buber presented to the University of Vienna a doctoral thesis entitled, Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems.[82] This monograph consisted of two chapters from a projected larger work "that will treat the history of das Individuationsproblem from Aristotle through Leibniz and also modern philosophy, including a critical comparative discussion of the problem."[83] The present essay was limited to a discussion of the treatment of the problem in the thought of two Renaissance theologians whom Buber deemed to be the founders of "the new metaphysical individualism"[84] - Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) and Jacob Boehme (1575-1624).

Common to both thinkers, Buber contends, is a concern with "the question regarding the origin and meaning of plurality and diversity of things (Dinge)."[85] Both represent a point of view, namely, the revival of neo-Platonism, characteristic of Renaissance philosophy: "The concept that out of the unity and simplicity of the Idea develops the plurality and variegation of the sensuous world (Sinnerwelt)."[86]

Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa has been acclaimed by scholars as the first to make a radical departure from the medieval conceptions of the universe and of science. The Cardinal's claim to honor as "the first modern thinker," lies, however, primarily in the fact that it was he who initiated the on-going discussion of the problem of individuation, a discussion which was concomitant to rediscovery of the infinite value of the individual. "By virtue of posing das Individuationsproblem and of broaching the question of individual difference and the uniqueness of the individual Cues is to be considered the first modern thinker."[87] True the Stoics and later the neo-Platonists had some appreciation of the problem, but during the Middle Ages the fact of individuation was totally ignored or trivialized. The existent plurality of the world was first reasserted as a problem by Nicholas of Cusa who gave the issue its "modern formulation": "The persistence of single things in their separateness and the absolute irreplaceable worth of each single thing . . ."[88] Buber avers that this is the defining concern of all of Cusanus' thought.

The individual is a particular conjunction within the endless world process: elements of this process coalesce within the contiguousness of the individuated being and then, in time, disperse to rejoin the eternal flow. Here - Buber notes - Nicholas of Cusa is proclaiming "the great and modern Weltbild . . . , to which Bruno was first to give adequate expression: every entity belongs to an endless network of connections."[89] Parenthetically, the Hart brothers also associated the first expression of "the new Weltbild" to Giodano Bruno (1548-1600).[90]

The intrinsic relationship with infinitude graces the individual with an "infinite worth"[91] and, moreover, summons each individual not only to maintain his individuality, but to realize it to the utmost. Any conflict which might thereby arise between self-actualizing individuals is to be viewed as part of the eternal and dynamic process of becoming. "It may be that this self-persistence leads also to strife, but it is precisely this fact which is the source of all actualization (Entwerden), as well as becoming."[92]

Furthermore, "only in that each thing energetically unfolds its being, is the harmony of the world process assured."[93] According to Buber, Nicholas of Cusa explains this harmony by an appeal to pantheism or more precisely, to "a relative monistic system."[94] The world is the *deus sensibilis,* God is in all things: "In [God] all things, even the most antagonistic are included: He is the *complicatio contradictorum.*"[95] To facilitate His self-revelation, which is a continuous process, God seeks an individual world; every being (*Wesen*) is "a *contactio* of God."[96] It is therefore incumbent upon each being to give fullest expression to his individuality, thereby furthering God's self-revelation.

Boehme explicitly confronts the problem of individuation only toward the latter part of his life. Then his understanding of it parallels Cusanus'. Boehme affirms individuation as not merely a fact of empirical time and space but also as a quality belonging to eternity. "This separateness of things Boehme conceives not as temporal and actualized, but rather as beyond all time, residing in eternity."[97] And like Nicholas of Cusa, Boehme celebrates the singularity and uniqueness of all things. The innate goal of each thing is correspondingly to maintain its uniqueness.

Boehme is much more anxious than Cusanus to develop a theological system which would explain these insights. Again like Cusanus, he seeks this explanation in a pantheistic cosmology.[98] Boehme's God, before the act of creation, was neither a corporeal nor a substantive being, but "a dynamic, irrational potentiality."[99] As such God is absolute unity, containing no multiplicity. "One may indeed define Boehme's God as a potential infinity of powers. These, however, do not at all constitute a plurality, but an irrational unity, a unity within which dwells a striving to be actualized."[100] This desire of God for actualization is both "cosmic and noetic"[101] in intent: He desires movement and self-revelation. Both these aspects, in turn, require an individuated world. Firstly, for God's manifest movement individuation is a conditio sine qua non.[102] Then as pure irrationality God is beyond ratio and thus seeks individuation as a way of rendering himself knowable: "The absolutely irrational [God] cannot be comprehended by His own reason . . . . [God] succeeds in becoming known first through His actualization in individuation . . . "[103] Buber seems to be (elliptically) suggesting here that Boehme anticipated Schopenhauer's definition of individuation: movement and knowledge are coordinates of time and space.[104] Be this as it may, Boehme's God, actualized, "remains in nature the dynamic principle of individuation." In the world of multiplicity the actualized God remains the unifying principle. Pointing to this principle, Boehme emphasizes even to a greater extent than Cusanus, that God's actualization is an endless process: "a ceaseless becoming (Werden)."[105] Furthermore, each individuated being (Wesen), as a formative vessel, as it were, of God's actualizing energy contains, in a microcosmic fashion, all of God; each quantum of God's energy, although presumably unique in form, is substantivally identical with every other. Buber ascribed a similar thought to Nicholas of Cusa. In a related essay, "Über Jakob Boehme,"[106] published in 1901, referring to "the great Renaissance doctrine of [man as a] microcosm," Buber speaks of "das Welt-Ich."[107]

With individuation the cosmological process retains its dynamism as each individuated being now seeks to maximize its own self-realization. Boehme recognizes - as Nicholas of Cusa previously had - that, given the oppositeness that abides within plurality, this could result in a divisive clash, indeed a "mutual annihilation."[108] But co-existent with oppositeness, Boehme notes a counter-tendency toward reconciliation (einen Verbindungsprocess) - a tendency which is derived from the universal urge to return to the primal unity of "der vorweltliche Gott."[109] This movement toward reconciliation counterbalances and tempers the would-be ruthlessness of self-actualizing being; and in fact serves to enhance the effectiveness of individuation. "These processes of reconciliation, however, lead not to dissolution, but to an intensification and broadening of individuation."[110]

It is in this perspective that Boehme's oft-misapprehended notion of "God's twofold will" is first properly understood. One aspect of this will, which Boehme on occasion referred to with the simile of "light," is God's eternal striving toward individuation-revelation; the second aspect, which Boehme was wont to compare to "fire," is the desire of nature (i.e., God actualized in individuation) to return to its primal source, "die wesenlose Einheit." The relationship of the two aspects is like that of light to fire. In a footnote Buber draws our attention to the similarity of this imagery to Heraclitus' notion of "the plurality of things which strive to return to the unity of the primordial fire (Urfeuer)."[111]

Whether the sources legitimately yield such an understanding of Nicholas of Cusa and Jacob Boehme does not, of course, immediately interest us. We may note in passing Grete Schaeder's observation that Buber almost totally disregards the Christian (i.e., theological) tensions clash, indeed a "mutual annihilation."[108] But co-existent with oppositeness, Boehme notes a counter-tendency toward reconciliation (einen Verbindungsprocess) - a tendency which is derived frôm the universal urge to return to the primal unity of "der vorweltliche Gott."[109] This movement toward reconciliation counterbalances and tempers the would-be ruthlessness of self-actualizing being; and in fact serves to enhance the effectiveness of individuation. "These processes of reconciliation, however, lead not to dissolution, but to an intensification and broadening of individuation."[110]

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What is of interest, however, is not Buber's scholarship per se, but rather the thorough compatibility of his presentation of the thought of Nicholas of Cusa and Jacob Boehme with the Weltanschauung of the "Neue Gemeinschaft." This would suggest that Buber regarded his dissertation as an exercise in "ideological" hermeneutics, that he sought to read the sources through the prism of the "Neue Gemeinschaft." Nietzscheism is most apparent from the aforementioned draft of his dissertation. After stating that Boehme's cardinal concern was that of individuation, Buber declares that it still remains our most urgent existential problem: "Boehme's Grundproblem . . . ist auch für uns wesentlich, der Knotenpunkt unserer Selbstbestimmung."[115] Boehme, as presented in this draft, is unambiguously a herald of Dionysian wisdom:

> For Boehme God and nature are one, much like soul and body, or better yet, as energy and organism are one . . . . What we call God is nothing other than the eternal energy of the natural powers, the eternal energy, the effective principle of [existence]. Because

> the unity of all the powers is revealed in nature . . . , the world is not being (Sein), but becoming (Werden). Hence with each day reality is born de novo. And with every tomorrow reality presents itself once again to our formative hands. Thus we are not slaves, but the beloved of our world. (So sind wir nicht Sklaven, sondern die Geliebten unserer Welt.)[116]

Buber compares this Dionysian wisdom with the knowledge acquired by cognition:

> Cognition [Erkennen] . . . constitutes not an inner relation to the movements of world and psyche, but only one of classifying [Einordnen] perceptions: forming, grouping and architectonic evaluation of that which grasps the One (das Eine) from the outside . . . . Whereas the essence (Wesen) of all lies in becoming . . . , cognition by its very nature has nothing to do with becoming, but only with that which has become (das Gewordene).[117]

Cognizing man (der Erkennende) is opposed by Buber to the experiencing man (der Erlebende) - who has experienced within himself the overcoming of the separation between his "I" and the world. For the latter all barriers suddenly collapse. He is, however, quickly gripped by emotional chaos, indeed madness. Der Erlebende experiences the overcoming of plurality

> . . . as a chaotic, equivocal emotional event in which he is gripped by an organic complex of [emotional] possibilities: he is affected by an entangled confusion of dreams, visions and insanity. The so-called unclarity of the mystic means precisely this rare amalgamation. A propos to all mustics is what Maeterlinck said of the mystic Ruysbroeck when he compared the latter's writings with the convulsive flight of an inebriated, blind and bloodied eagle over a snow-crested peak.[118]

The alternative to this dithyrombic madness, was "anticipated" by Boehme - but presumably because of his Christianity never quite realized. This alternative or "new form of living" (neue Lebensform),[119] which assures a wholesome and sustained overcoming of individuation, is the individual's affirmation of his uniqueness and the hic et nunc. Such an affirmation marks a creative tension which binds the "I" to the world: "Our only world is the region of our creativity, for this world does not remain distant from us, rather at every moment this world weds itself to us."[120]

Buber's Einheitslehre

This Nietzschean "Einheitslehre" - the doctrine which teaches how unity is brought to a world of individuation - remains the leitmotif of Buber's predialogical thought. Until 1916 - when we note the beginning of his dialogical period - all his literary activity, be it as an interpreter of mysticism and folk myths, as a speculative philosopher or as a Zionist publicist, can be viewed as an elaboration and refinement of his "Einheitslehre."[121]

In his introduction to his collection of "ecstatic confessions,"[122] Buber describes the experience of the ecstatic as that of transcending individuation, of having achieved oneness. The ecstatic's experience, transcendent to time and space,[123] is extraordinary - that is, his experience is beyond the familiarity of the phenomenal world. Hence the tendency to describe ecstasy as in the sphere of divine encounter: ". . . es gibt fast keinen Ekstatiker, der nicht sein Icherleben als Gotterleben gedeutet haette."[124] The divine character of the experience is explained by its basis within the non-phenomenal self. The oneness experienced by the ecstatic is not achieved by forging a unifying bridge between the I and the phenomenal world, but rather is realized within the depths of the "primal self." Here, totally withdrawn into the precincts of the self, one is free from "the play of the senses and cognition"[125] and ceases to be conscious of an internal or external reality; indeed, the delimitations of an "I" and a "World" are no longer. "He who knew but differentiated life . . . now enjoys an undifferentiated experience,"[126] the experience of the primal I (das Urselbst).[127]

Here within the primal self one acquires a new freedom, he is liberated from the conditionality of time and multiplicity - this is why ecstasy is usually accompanied by an exuberant excitement: "The ecstatic is overwhelmed by a tempest, by an exuberance, by infinity."[128] The ecstatic is no longer a fragmented self - a self subject to discontinuous sensations and cognitive representations; the ecstatic is "fire" - subject and object are one in the singular embrace of his primal I. "Now he is no longer a 'bundle' (Bündel), he is fire. Now the contents of his cognitive experience (Erfahrung) and the subject of this experience - the world and the 'I' - flow together."[129]

Because his experience is beyond time,[130] the ecstatic cannot communicate his experience, for language is an instrument of the spatio-temporal world.[131] Yet he has an urge to proclaim his oneness to the world. The ecstatic "wishes to create for the traceless ecstasy a remembrance, he wishes to pull the timeless over into time. He wishes to render the unity without plurality into a unity of all plurality."[132] This is the dilemma of every great mystic. If he should succumb to his urging, his language would perforce be mythopoeic. "Is not the myth of the Vedas and the Upanishad or the myth proclaimed by the Midrash and the Kabbala, by Plato and Jesus but a symbol (Sinnbild) of that which the ecstatic experiences (erlebt)?"[133] Thus myth reports, symbolically, the experience of the ecstatic - who experiences in the oneness of his I "the primeval experience of the world spirit."[134]

The oneness attained in ecstasy is not a relative unity - an impassioned unification of the self with an aspect of the world. Rather the ecstatic's oneness is absolute, in his experience of the unity of his I he has experienced the primal unity of the world, a unity which promises the unity of all phenomenal experiences.[135] In Daniel (1913) Buber continues this discussion. Here he explicitly rejects an ecstasy which is solely a surrender to passion - a submission to hypertrophic emotion which leads to a blurring of individuation, "a merging with the Other."[136] This was Dionysus' fatal error. In order to save himself "from the cruel laws of isolation (Vereinzelung),"[137] Dionysus made a frenzied leap into the mother's lap, "the manifold Other"[138]; he dove into "the boundless . . . from the shore of limits in order not to perish in contradiction."[139] But Dionysus was consumed by his ecstatic passion: ". . . the Titans enticed him . . . and tore him in pieces and devoured him."[140] This is the sad fate of all who surrender themselves "to ecstasy with an undirected soul."[141] Orpheus, in contrast to Dionysus, embraced ecstasy with a directed soul, that is, while strumming on a lyre. "He enters into ecstatic death with a lyre. Not enticed: decided and with a lyre."[142] Orpheus has avoided Dionysus' fate, for "music is the pure world of the directed soul . . . The directed soul alone rules here. It sets the inborn direction, sets the melody in the abyss; and the forces of the deep arrange themselves around it as the 'wild beasts' around the playing Orpheus . . . "[143] Moreover, Orpheus with his lyre has anticipated that "passionate image of the free enduring in the unity (die Einheit) that is denied us."[144] By giving emphatic expression to the soul's melody, we become a microcosmic I: we have realized the cosmic oneness in ourselves, by permitting what is uniquely ours to direct us we have become our own first-mover, subject neither to time and space nor to social convention.

> Direction is that primal tension of a human soul which moves it to choose and realize this and no other out of an infinity of possibilities. Thus the soul strips off the net of directions, the net of space and time, of cause and ends, of subject and objects; it strips off the net of directions [imposed on it both by the phenomenal and normative world] and takes nothing with it but the magic of its own direction.[145]

The world's multiplicity and otherness are not ignored and obliterated by the directing soul, however. Direction permits one to transcend the psychological and spiritual boundaries of individuation; nonetheless, its existential dimensions endure and are accepted:

> Not over the things, not around the things, not between these things - in each thing, in the experience [Erlebnis] of each thing, the gate of the One [das Eine] opens to you if you bring with you the magic that unlocks it: the perfection of your direction.[146]

With passion and direction together we are enabled to experience the uniqueness of a thing or an event, "its unity, the unity"[147]; from the "core" of our being a "bridge" has been flung into the core of the world.[148] Thus we find what was sought in vain "in the track of connection (der Spur des Zusammenhanges),"[149] namely sufficient reason. Rather as "the manifold Other [is] set before the simple One, [so] the connection is set before the experience (das Erlebnis)."[150]

The unity realized here is the cosmic truth of "eternal beginning and eternal becoming."[151] To respond to the world with one's direction and, correspondingly, to fasten upon the uniqueness of an occasion is to live "creatively"[152] - which is homologous with the eternal process of cosmic creation. The reference here to Heraclitus' ontology is patent, though not explicit. In Buber's earlier essay, "The Teaching of the Tao," it is. The cosmic Tao is equated with the Heraclitean logos, but this logos is first rendered manifest by man when each individual realizes his personal Tao.[153] Unfortunately, most men, especially in the contemporary world, live uncreatively, that is, without Tao, without direction or decision.[154] They treat experience by reference to the laws of individuation - time, space, and sufficient reason;

all events and things are registered in the structure of phenomenal experience (Erfahrung) and categorized according to kind, cause, and effect. The "core" of an event or object is thus injured, indeed emaciated, and the creative potential (both the existential and the cosmic) of the occasion is lost.[155] But to have relinquished creativity is to have gained security:

> A soul meets the shore of the world. Immediately the whirlpool of happenings plunges over it like an endless sandstorm that threatens to destroy it. It braces itself to withstand it . . . . [The soul that] thinks only of protection . . . surrenders itself entirely to the inherited powers, the traditional art of self-defense which educate its senses to perceive in place of the whirlpool an ordered world conceived within the framework of basic principles of experience (Erfahrungsgrundsätze). And indeed this is protection. For to the benumbed soul the divine force of the whirlpool is also benumbed.[156]

On the other hand, to live creatively, to realize one's direction, is to forego security. To accept what every moment presents without referring to that which is familiar, to meet the whirlpool "unarmed" - aside from "the magic of [one's] direction" - is to entertain danger.[157] But herein is the kingdom of God: "the kingdom of danger and of risk of eternal beginning and of eternal becoming, of open spirit and of deep realization, the kingdom of holy insecurity."[158] For like the primitive man who with magic and myth "conquers separateness and unites himself with God, so he has direction . . . . celebrates an ever-new mystery in his realizing: to live so is to realize God in all things."[159]

Parenthetically, this talk of God does not disqualify Buber as an apostle of Nietzsche, in whose thought atheism was central. In a rhapsodic summary of Nietzsche's thought[160] - written more than a decade prior to the publication of Daniel - Buber presents Nietzsche as a prophet of the "God of becoming," the god who is realized through the actions of heroic, creative men; Nietzsche "erected before our eyes the statue of the heroic man who creates himself. Nietzsche placed against the comfortable, painless life the life of passion and danger . . . Against the God of Genesis he brought a great adversary: the God of becoming, in whose development we may share (mitschaffen).[161]" Such a pantheistic twist to Nietzsche's thought was common among his disciples of the fin de siècle - we may mention Stefan George, Rainer Maria Rilke, Karl Wolfskebl and Karl Joel, all in their own fashion pantheistic Nietzscheans.[162]

In Daniel, the realization of "the Kingdom of God" by the directed soul may also be understood as a process of transformation:

> For as the youth in the Bacchus play transforms himself into the God and realizes him, so the knower transforms himself into the world and realizes it. He cannot perceive its mystery with the senses nor inquire of it with thought; he can only penetrate it through transformation. Transformed, he executes with the movements of his existence the secret movements of the world: he lives the life of the world, he does its deed, he works its work - and so he knows it . . .[163]

This imago dei is achieved in the confrontation of the manifold and by grasping the "essential line of tension."[164] Despite its infinite variety of manifestations this tension or duality is always the same: the tension of being and becoming.[165] He who embraces the tensions of the world and lives them "experiences world-wide its own stillness and its own movement, its own fixity and its own whirl, its own continuance and its own transformation . . . Thus the world lives its duality from within: in the man who wills to creat the unity."[166] By bearing the tension, one realizes its unity - he awakens the I, the unifying subject of the tension:

> There is in reality no I except the I of a tension. No pole, no force, no thing - only the polarity, only stream, only unification can become I . . . . Can the ebb tide say I? Or the flood tide? But imagine the sea to have a spirit that comprehends in itself the unity of ebb and flood: it could say I.[167]

Thus the I which lives the tension of existential experience is the "I of the world. In it unity is fulfilled."[168]

The Einheitslehre as the Leitmotif of Buber's Early Writings

This Einheitslehre was recapitulated frequently in Buber's early writings. Its persistence in his thought is perhaps best seen in his short essay on Mathias Grünewald's altarpiece at Isenheim - a series of murals depicting the story of Christ.[169] Buber notes that before the martyred Christ stands Mary - her eyes closed, and her pale hands tightly clenched together "without individuality." She is robed in a "deathly white" mantle. At her side, kneeling and with opened eyes is Magdalene; her hands, "the blood glimmering through, are so savagely entwined that each finger sticks forth like a fierce young animal."[170] She is clothed in a brilliant red garment, a "deep red" sash girdles her waist. Magdalene is "vowed to manifold colourfulness as Mary is to the simple absence of colour."[171] Both are archetypal souls, "neither of them is the spirit of the world,"[172] however.

In the central mural high above the "crystalline" mountains, which denote the glory of creation, bursts forth a band of angels. "Their glory is above color, united in radiant light, but as they undulate downward into the immediate realm of becoming, each angel gleams forth in color . . . This is the miracle of the becoming of color, the emanation of the many out of the one: that is the first mystery. This mystery is only revealed, not allotted to us."[173] For not being celestial, man cannot abide above color: "we cannot penetrate behind the multiplicity to find the living unity."[174] Mary sought to transcend the colors, but beheld not the light, "only darkness, be this darkness ever so intoxicating and full of enchantment."[175]

> Are we, then, like Magdalene, abandoned to the manifold? If we do not strive to turn away from the actual and to deny the fullness of our experience, must we be dispersed in things and exiled to the conditioned? Must we forever stray, then, from being to being, from happening to happening, incapable of grasping their unity?[176]

But there is the Resurrection. In the Isenheim altarpiece, the Risen One is draped "in a mantle composed of the red of the morning, violet thunderclouds, lightening flashes, and the light distant blue of heaven, he himself is aflame with color from his sunlit countenance to the humble red of his feet."[177] Jesus embraces all the colors and glorifies them, he bears multiplicity heavenward. "This is the miracle of the coming to be of the glory, the becoming of the one out of the many."[178] This second mystery is ours, "it is allotted to us." Christ is of the here and now, he loves the world and rejects none of its colors. "But he can receive none of them before it is pure and intensified. He loves the world, but fights for its unconditionality against all that is conditioned. He loves the world towards the Unconditioned, he bears the world upward to its Self."[179] In this manner, Jesus both perfects himself into the I of the world and creates "a living unity out of the manifold."[180] Jesus' glory and the glory of the world is not that of the primal unity - "but that of a unified glory achieved out of becoming and out of deed."[181]

Individuation and the desired unity are also the principal concepts in Buber's "political" thought, in particular his Zionism. The Jewish question, as conceived by him, is not simply a matter of ameliorating the situation of the Jew - rather it is foremost a question of the Jew's "salvation,"[182] his overcoming of duality. The Jew more than any other is aware of duality - of the soul, of the world. "No one knows the abyss of inner dualism so well as the Jew . . ."[183] Indeed consciousness of duality is a specific Jewish vocation. The founding of the monotheistic faith was an articulation of this consciousness. The biblical Jew, in order to free himself from duality (Entzweiung) dedicated himself to the non-dualistic (nicht-entzweiter) God, the unitary God.[184] "And this God Himself had emerged from the striving for unity, from the dark, impassioned striving for unity . . . . The believing Jew had drawn Him not out of reality but out of his yearning . . . . [The Jew] had established Him as a unity above his own duality, as salvation above his own suffering."[185] Ever since, authentic Judaism or rather Jewish religiosity was marked by a striving for oneness. Jewish religiosity is an expression of the Jew's "longing to establish a living communion with the unconditioned, his will to realize the unconditioned through his actions, transposing it into the world of man."[186] Religiosity is that exalting feeling that one has transcended conditionality - that bursting forth from the "very core" of one's being "is something that is unconditioned."[187] Religiosity is born of "decision" - of decision to act according to one's unconditioned essence: " . . . the act of decision is conceived as God's realization through imitatio Dei . . . , [to] be determined by nothing, removed from all conditionality."[188] Jewish religiosity

> . . . is man's will to realize the unconditional through his deed, and establish it in his world . . . [Jewish religiosity] wants to sculpt the unconditionality out of the matter of the world . . . To engage in this work means to be religious - nothing else. Man's life, open to our influence as no other thing in the world, is the task apportioned to us in its most inward immediacy. Here, as nowhere else, multiplicity is given in our hands, to be transformed into unity . . . .[189]

The Jew's "inordinate consciousness of duality (extremes Dualitätsbewusstsein)"[190] is to be attributed to his primordial psychological disposition. This disposition prompts a unitary instinct, which in turn inculcates a sensitivity to the existent duality of the world. Being an "Oriental," the Jew's world image (Weltbild)[191] is radically different from the European's. The latter is fundamentally a sensory man - his senses, separated from the "undifferentiated base of organic life,"[192] in a non-integrated fashion assimilate static impressions (Eindrücke) gathered from the world; in this psychic situation, sight, the most detached and objective sense, tends to predominate. To the sensory man, consequently, the world appears "as a multiplicity of things, which is spread before his eyes and to which he and his body belong."[193] In contrast, the Jew, as the Oriental in general, is a motor man: his senses - coequal and interrelated and all integrally connected to "the dark side of the organism"[194] comprehend the world dynamically. Hence to the Jew

> . . . the world appears as a limitless motion, flowing through him. Though he perceives individual things, he does not perceive them as separate entities, each reposing and complete in itself, but only as an aggregate of nodal points for an infinite motion, which flows through him as well . . . He views the world, naturally and primarily, as something happening to him; he senses (spürt) rather than perceives (wahrnimmt) it . . . [195]

The Jew's world image thus is anchored in his total self - all received impressions from the world diffuse throughout his being and lock-up with "the undifferentiated base" of his organic life: he experiences the dynamic "inwardness" of the world in his own inwardness. Yet his inwardness lacks the dynamic character of the world. Rather it lies

> . . . in repose within him . . . , primevally exempt from all multiplicity and all contrast, perceiving the womb giving birth to and devouring all multiplicity and all contrast, the nameless essence and meaning. And just as he comprehends the motion through his sensations, so are the essence and meaning of the world disclosed to

> him through his comprehension of the essence and meaning of his life; the one is revealed through the other, and ultimately the two are one.[196]

This is the source of the Oriental's, and in particular, the Jew's - may we say: Heracletian-unitary instinct.[197] This also explains the Oriental's inveterate dissatisfaction with the world. He profoundly, rather viscerally feels "that the full manifestation and disclosure of the world's inner substance is thwarted, that the primally intended unity is split and distorted . . . "[198]

The Chinese, the Indian, and the Persian experiences duality to be a conflict between the authentic self and the world. The Jew, in contrast, understands the duality of the world to rest within himself, within his I. The Indian redemptive idea, for example, seeks to release the soul from its entanglement in the world. The Indian thus demands the soul's "awakening." The Jew, on the other hand, celebrates involvement in the world and, correlatively, commands the self's "transformation"[199]: "The unified world - yet to be built - exists within man himself . . . "[200] For, in essence, "the world is not divided. Nor is man divided, he is rather separated; he has fallen, he has become inadequate and unlike God (gottungleich) . . . . Subjective being is split, but the external world is split as it is the subjective being's symbol."[201] A Jew, Paul, gave eloquent expression to this insight: "For I do not that good which I will, but the evil which I hate to do" (Romans, 7:15).[202] "When man is so beset," Buber comments, "he is in a state of bondage, of duality, of conditionality, of division, of 'sin' . . . He is the bearer of the world's division."[203] Sin, "Judaism's great symbol of the inner duality,"[204] prevails when one's deepest self lies unexpressed, subject as it is to conditionality. Thus one's 'darker' energies - which can only be truly vitalized by the directed soul - stir chaotically within the individual and tend to conflict with the precepts of conditionality. This contradiction within the self, this duality the Jew designates as sin. But sin - "the separation of good and evil"[205] - may be overcome. In "direction," the desire to serve God - to realize His will, which is unity - and "the undiminished force of passionate drives"[206] are united.

With the unity of the soul that direction establishes, man also becomes the bearer of the world's unity. This notion that cosmic unity is the responsibility of man distinguishes the Jew from the Greek, i.e., Occidental man. "For the Greek the world exists, for the Jew it becomes . . . The Greek apprehends it under the aspect of measure, the Jew as intent."[207] For the Jew the world's inner destiny depends on man's decision, his unconditioned deed. When the soul "remembers its divine goal, unity, when it extricates itself from all conditionality and walks by its own light of God - it is free and powerful, in covenant with the deed of God."[208] The Jew Jesus gave terse expression to the cosmic truth: "Eins tut not" (Luke 10:42). "One thing above all is necessary"[209] - to decide. "With this saying [Jesus] expressed Judaism's soul which knows that all meaning - contents are null and void unless they grow into a unity (Einheit), and that in all of life this alone matters: to have such unity."[210]

Judaism gives the act of decision the name *Teshuvah*, return - to return from sin or from the bondage of being acted upon. "This is the intent of the teaching of return: that everyone, *alone and from his own depth*, must strive for divine freedom and unconditionality; . . . nothing already accomplished by another, can facilitate his own deed, for all depends on the shattering force of his own action . . ."[211] It is thus utterly false to view this teaching of *Teshuvah* as an ethical precept. "It is a religious act, rather it is *the* religious act, for it is God's revelation through man."[212]

Exile exacted a severe toll on the Jew's spirit and his pristine unitary impulse. The exigencies of the dispersion forced upon the people of Israel an extreme conditionality, which all but smothered Jewish religiosity; ". . . robbed of its natural context, the power of unconditionality, lived on only in heretics . . ."[213] Official or normative Judaism was obliged to assume a strictly defensive posture. The continuity of the Jewish people in exile was to be assured by rabbinic legalism.[214] In this situation the uncreative, the direction-less, the undeciding, were to rule Israel and to determine the nation's spiritual contours.[215] Paradoxically perhaps, this tendency was not halted by the decline of rabbinism in liberal western Europe. For with their emancipation, western Jewry impulsively sought to integrate itself into the "sensory" civilization of the Occident - either by adopting the insipid rationalism of the Enlightenment as a basis of religious reform or by choosing the path of assimilation, which is a pusillanimous covering to the prevailing social forces.[216] Both of these options presented to the modern Jew clearly reenforce the millennial conditionality wrought by the dispersion. "Thus for centuries, indeed for thousands of years the eternal task of Judaism has remained stifled (blieb . . . ertötet) . . ."[217]

The Jewish question is then only superficially the problem of anti-semitism. Furthermore, "there is more at stake here than the fate of a particular people . . . ; at stake are archhuman (urmenschliche) and universally human matters."[218] The Jewish question is a "human (menschheitliche) question."[219] Biblical Judaism had raised before man his cosmic responsibility - it confronted mankind "with the demand for unity, a unity born out of one's own duality and redemption from it."[220] From the Jew of ancient Israel mankind was to learn that "in man's decision, the divided world decides for unity."[221] But now, in the period of exile, the Jew's unitary spirit lies dormant and, untutored, mankind and the world-spirit listlessly stand divided.[222]

Zionism, which seeks to renew the Jew's primal energies, should not then be construed as a "confrontation between nationalists and non-nationalists, or the like; these concerns are superficial, non-essential. [The renewal of Judaism] means a confrontation between men who make choices and men of complacent laissez-faire (Geschehenlassen); . . . . between the creative and the corrosive - between elemental Jews (Urjuden) and galut Jews."[223] The solution to the Jewish question thus lies in the rebirth of the elemental Jew - the Jew of the unconditioned deed. Ultimately, however, this process of renewal can only be fully realized with the reestablishment of Jewry in its ancient homeland.[224] With the regained unity of the Jewish people and the re-awakening of the Jew's pristine spirit Judaism will be set free "for its deed within mankind."[225] The return of the Jews to their Land and unconditionality marks a new dawn for humanity and the divided world. Zionism has cosmic import.

Buber's Epistemology

Epistemologically, Buber's Einheitslehre is based on the distinction of das Erlebnis - affective-apperceptive experience - and die Erfahrung - rational-phenomenal experience.[226] This distinction, which we encountered in our discussion of Simmel, was first introduced by Dilthey.[227] Both for him and Simmel das Erlebnis is the source of social knowledge; for Buber it is the venue of noumenal knowing, that is, of unitive and authentic living.

Fundamentally, each occurrence in life which confronts us is initially ein Erlebnis. We may respond to a particular Erlebnis in either of two ways: "What you experience (erlebst), doing and suffering, creating and enjoying, you can register in the structure of Erfahrung . . . or you can grasp it for its own sake in its own power and splendor."[228] If one chooses to deal with a particular Erlebnis as an Erfahrung, the given occurrence (be it a thing or event) is cast into the pale of the principium individuationis.

> Insofar as you fit (das Erlebnis) into the Erfahrung, you elaborate (bearbeitest) it according to the forms and laws of Erfahrung. It no more occupied space than the new heaven which John saw at Patmos; but you make it into a thing in space, fix it in its place . . . with an unshakably fixed relationship (Beziehung) to each other point of the world. It was no more temporal than the last . . . double-directed glance of the dying man; you make it into an event in time, expand it into a sequence . . . and then shove it between a before and an after which squash it flat. It was no more causal than the majesty of the first dream; you force it into a chain where it represents just as much meaning as every other link in the chain . . . [229]

Like coordinate points on a map, the knowledge obtained herein is a "truth." "Only one shall not speak of reality (Wirklichkeit) in all this."[230]

Ein Erlebnis either becomes "a mere Erfahrung or [it becomes] reality,"[231] reality being realized Erlebnis. The realization or the rendering an Erlebnis real (es zu verwirklichen) can be effected only by the "undivided man." He who brings to ein Erlebnis his unconditioned direction perforce relates the Erlebnis to nothing else but itself."[232] For the undivided man - "not concerned with the manifold and the individual"[233] - the unique splendor of the hour becomes manifest and real. Furthermore, in realization the undivided man enjoys authentic knowledge.

> What men call knowledge rests on the sundering of the senses and the powers of the mind . . . . What is called knowledge by men is no knowledge . . . . There is no perception (Wahrnehmung), since things incessantly change. There is no knowledge in space because only relative and not absolute extension is accessible to us. . . . There is no knowledge in time because duration (Dauer) exists for us relatively . . . . In separation is no knowledge. Only the undivided man

> knows; for only in him in whom there is no division is there no separation from the world, and only he who is not separated from the world can know it . . . .[234]

Unity with one's direction, thus, with the Erlebnis, is knowledge.

The realized Erlebnis thus constitutes a higher form of knowledge, indeed a noumenal knowledge. Yet it would be erroneous to consider the realized Erlebnis as a penetration, as it were, to the secret "layers" of being. "The unknowableness"[235] behind the realized Erlebnis must remain undefined, for it is utterly inaccessible to the language of concepts - constructs of Erfahrung.[236] Of this unknowable "no thing further can be said than that it is unknowable. Unity is the only way to realize it and to experience it in its reality."[237] What is experienced is "neither nature nor reason nor energy, but the unity of the path, the unity of the genuine human way that rediscovers the united in the world and in each thing: the path as the unity of the world as the unity of each thing."[238] The unknowable is not some being or principle that is reached by abstract or pure ratiocination - both these mental exercises being, as they are, functions of an individuated universe. "If we seek [the unknowable] in heaven and earth, in space and in time, then it is not there, rather heaven and earth, space and time, are grounded in it alone . . . "[239] Only to the undivided person is the unknowable known.[240] "The unknowable and the united human life touch one another."[241] God cannot "realize himself in man otherwise than as the uttermost presence of an Erlebnis . . . "[242] What the undivided man beholds in this Erlebnis is the Tao, the unity of the world. The Tao or the Heraclitean logos "appears in the becoming of the world as the original undivided state, as the primal existence from which all things sprang . . . "[243] In its eternal renewal the Tao appears as "the personal undividedness of things."[244] And in the undivided man the Tao appears as "the completing force that heals all that is sundered and broken . . . "[245] Thus he who acts undividedly or unconditionally "restores both things and himself to the primal existence"[246] - and in so doing he knows the secret of the world. This arcane knowledge is his because he "executes with the movements of his existence the secret movements of the world, he does its deed, he works its work."[247] ". . . the secret of the world is the kinesis of the infinite, the union of [direction or the Tao][248] and being, and no one comes near it who reflects upon it: only he comes near it who does it; and he is the knower."[249] This is noumenal know-ing - or perhaps more correctly, the noumenal situation of authentic life.

Buber's Erlebnis-mysticism

Noumenal knowing is, by definition, not a function of sense perception and a priori mental structures. Rather this knowing involves the "wholeness of being"[250] - the emotional, non-rational faculties also participate in the process of perception. Thus in realized Erlebnis each thing is regarded inwardly, "from the inside out, not from its appearance (Erscheinung), rather from the essence of this thing, from the unity of this thing that it possesses from its own unity."[251] Noumenal know-ing thus has no "object" other than the Erlebnis itself - information about objective contents (i.e., Erscheinungen) belonging to the exclusive province of phenomenal and reflective knowledge.

It then follows that the Erlebnis - being an affective modality of experience - can have gradations of realization; a particular Erlebnis may be realized with varying degrees of intensity. ". . . the reality of the experienced world (der erlebten Welt) is so much the more powerful the more powerfully I experience it and realize it (ich sie erlebe und sie verwirkliche). Reality is not a fixed condition but a quantity that can be heightened. Its magnitude is functionally dependent upon the intensity of our experiencing (von der intensität unseres Erlebens)."[252] To be sure, "there is an ordinary reality which suffices as a common denominator for the comparison and ordering of things. And how can I give this reality to my world except by seeing the seen with all the strength of my life, hearing the heard with all the strength of my life, tasting the tasted with all the strength of my life?"[253] Thus the "orienting man" - he who compares and orders things - is said to live "with only part of his being . . . ; and those who work without being . . . [are] the pet children of appearance (des Scheins)."[254]

In Buber's allegorical essay, "The Demon of the Dream,"[255] desire - the catalyst of all passion - is personified by demons. One of the latter appears to Buber in a dream and addresses to him some contemptuous remarks about man's emotional inhibition. Nonetheless, the demon begrudgingly admits that he and his kind are utterly dependent upon men: ". . . you [men] are more important to us than anything else . . . . For we live off you. We receive the strength of the world only through you. We enjoy all things only through you. Your experience (Erlebnis) is our food, and we have no other."[256] "The more forcefully you live," the demon continues, "the more avidly do we enjoy ourselves. The content of your living does not much matter to us; your joy and anger, sin and holiness, heroism and despair are all the same to us. But whether you live fully or faintly that does concern us."[257] Unfortunately, men fear their passion, and they, the demons, waste away from undernourishment. The demons, do not stand by passively, however. They seek to tempt man's violent energies. "We rustle your passion out of its hidingplace. We inflame your feeling to feel. We actualize you."[258] By exciting man's passion the demons not only serve their own selfish interest but induce men to realize the possibilities they are wont to neglect. "If it were not for us [demons], you would sleep through all of your opportunities."[259] Some men mistakenly believe that the demons' enticements are malicious stratagems designed to beguile men into sin. "But in reality we [demons] are not at all so specialized: we desire that out of your potentia should come actus, nothing more."[260]

There are demons who are especially determined in their attempts to entice man's passion. These have learned to appreciate the creative power that lies within the human soul. This power - direction driven by passion - "is a dangerous activity. . . . It lures men into madness and destruction, but it transforms the uttermost into eternity."[261]

Indeed this power creates "modes of being, essence (Wesen), immortality."[262] And herein lies the deeper significance of the demons' enticing play - they hope that, should they succeed in prompting man's creative power, they might also achieve immortality with the resulting creation. But, alas, demons are doomed to evanescence - with each adventure a demon suffers inevitable exhaustion and vanquishment. For as Buber's nocturnal companion acknowledges, demons (i.e., desire and, by extension, passion an sich) are not part of the creative essence. "What I enjoy is not essence, the essence is beyond my reach; the essence is given to this little man with whom I play. While I play with him I evoke in him the essence, I make the essence in him alive."[263] Only the soul of man possesses the requisite direction and vision necessary to create. And a "demon can see as little as he can create."[264] True, direction "is only perfect when it is fulfilled with power: the power to live the whole experience (ganz das Erlebnis zu erleben)."[265] Yet power or passion - although assuring the fullness of an Erlebnis - unaccompanied by direction is ultimately sterile; only "power and direction together allow you to penetrate into [a given Erlebnis'] substance, that is, into the unity itself."[266]

Buber and Sociology

In the elaboration of the schema we have just outlined, Buber frequently employs sociological concepts. However, such concepts, which essentially serve Buber as rhetorical props for his Nietzschean-Heraclitean vision, are deprived of their sociological content. This is perhaps best illustrated in his lecture "Alte und neue Gemeinschaft." Here "Gemeinschaft" is treated in a pseudo-sociological manner. The "neue Gemeinschaft," which is presently emerging in Europe, Buber explains, will differ radically from all previous societal arrangements. The "alte Gemeinschaften" were all instrumental in intent, serving either religious or political ends (Nutzzwecken).[267] "All the old Gemeinschaften were subjected to utilitarian aims (Nutzzwecken); all old Gemeinschaften wanted only to be a wave in the storm of humanity which was driven by utilitarian aims."[268] The "neue Gemeinschaft" will be subject to no end, but life itself. (In his subsequent writings, Buber tended to employ the distinction of Zwecke, instrumental aims, and das Ziel, the single, intrinsic goal, e. g.: "Religiosity has only its Ziel, religion its Zwecke."[269]

The "alte Gemeinschaften," regimenting men to common instrumental aims, stifled the immediacy of the life-experience, and hence constricted "free creativeness."[270] In contradistinction, the "Neue Gemeinschaft," free from all instrumental aims, will permit life to achieve its foreordained fullness. In explicating this proposition, Buber introduces the term interaction (Wechselwirkung) - the dynamic which according to Simmel defines every social process; the term is here given a Heraclitean twist, however. "The new Gemeinschaft is the vital interaction (Wechselwirkung) between complete and thoroughly resolute men, men who are just as blissful in giving as in taking - because both these actions are part of the same movement, in one instance it is viewed from the perspective of the mover, in another from that of the moved."[271] This "vital interaction" is referred to as "a stream of giving and creative surrender."[272] Moreover, such a Heraclitean interaction witnesses the unification of man's energies, for "true community" is paralleled and indeed preceded by "the community (Gemeinschaft) and harmony of opposites in the individual."[273]

It thus follows that the "neue Gemeinschaft" is not confined to a collection of men in social propinquity. "Many belong to the 'neue Gemeinschaft' whom we have never seen. Even if they have different visions and thoughts from ours, the bond uniting us is far greater and deeper than that which we have with men we see every day and with whom we may share opinions on this or that issue."[274] What joins these men is a common Erlebnis - an Erlebnis which has increasingly (despite disparate ideologies and social situations) gripped many Europeans. This decisive Erlebnis - or rather epiphany - is realized when one steps into the depths of the world, and withdraws into his deepest self - and there the world's obsession with instrumental aims suddenly betrays itself as utter madness. Concomitantly, one is graced with an insight into the ineffable meaning (Sinn) of life: the primal unity of the cosmos and the human community.[275] ". . . viele hatten sich auch in Stunden der Weihe im Gefuehle der Wesensverwandtschaft und des seligen Tausches mit allen Dingen in Roum und Zeit zu einer Augenblickskrystellisation, zu einer kurzen Festgemeinschaft zusammengefunden."[276]

A desire to endow the "neue Gemeinschaft" with a social dimension follows ineluctably from this revelatory Erlebnis. Since the "infinite unity of becoming"[277] embraces the world of man, all who share the Erlebnis compellingly feel that human fellowship must be included within the realization of this unity. "Wir koennen unser Lebensgefuehl, das uns die Verwandtschaft und Gemeinschaft alles Weltlebens zeigt, nicht anders als in Gemeinschaft voll betaetigen."[278] This social community that is to arise is to be founded on a revolutionary basis - it will be absolutely free of all instrumental aims.

Buber is aware that this vision of human community is in conflict with current sociological opinion concerning the nature of social life. The manner in which Buber rejects this opinion reflects a rather ambiguous attitude towards sociology. With ironic deference he cites definitions of society proposed by Ferdinand Toennies (1855-1936) and Rudolf Stammler (1856-1938) who both hold that all "mature" social life is a collection of men governed by imposed rules and conventions.

> In a well known sociological study[279] it is stated: 'a society (Gesellschaft) which bases the regulation of collective life on external conventions, no matter how rudimentary, may rightly be called a social formation.' In still another work[280] we read: 'social life is an externally regulated collective life of men.'[281]

Buber's response is simply a quick rejoinder: if this be social life, then we are "anti-social."[282] External regulation - i.e., a regime of instrumental aims[283] - is antithetic to authentic human Gemeinschaft, which can only define itself in the immediacy of each moment. The form of such an association (Zusammenleben) "muss in jeder Zeit und an jedem Orte von innen heraus geboren werden."[284]

> Only when the jubilant rhythms of life have conquered the rule (die Regel) only when the eternally flowing, eternally self-transforming inner law of life (Lebensgesetz) replaces the dead convention - only then can mankind be considered free from the coercion of vacuities and untruth. Only then could mankind be said to have found truth. The Neue Gemeinschaft fervidly seeks to pave the way to this truth.[285]

Accordingly, the Neue Gemeinschaft is obliged to reject Toennies' contention that the life of instinctual immediacy is pre-social[286]; if one should insist that it is, then perhaps it is best that the "Neue Gemeinschaft" - which envisions the renewal of "the instinctive unity of existence of primordial man (Urmensch)"[287] - be designated as "post-social."[288] And if one should protest that all human culture has, ultimately, been a product of some instrumental value, Buber would defiantly retort that all suppositions about the nature of man and society are of no particular relevance to one who is dedicated to the vision of a community of "creative consciousness."[289] "We are not concerned with 'whence,' but only with 'whither.' Our truth and our might derive not from 'whence,' but only from 'whither.'"[290] If by sociology one understands a view which presumes that social action is subject to at least some degree of determinism, such a voluntarism as here espoused by Buber betrays an essentially non-sociological attitude.

Buber's tendency to emasculate sociological concepts is again observed in the function he assigns Simmel's term "religiosity"[291] - a term which plays, as we have seen, a central role in the former's early thought. By religiosity - in contrast to religion - Simmel refers to an attitude or mood which need not be expressed in formalized ritual associated with the worship of a deity. It is rather an incoherent feeling "of exaltation, devotion, and fervency"[292] which is frequently and principally engendered in so-called secular situations. This

> . . . mood is informed by a strange mixture of selfless devotion and desire, of humility and elation, of sensual immediacy and spiritual abstraction . . . Placing a subject in a higher order [religiosity] produces in the individual a particular degree of emotional tension, a specific tenderness and firmness of the inner relation, which he recognizes as belonging to him personally and intrinsically.[293]

Simmel emphasizes that the religious mood, although certainly an individual psychic disposition, is a function of social life. Religiosity as a form of social life occurs with a "change in the intensity" of a given social relation, such that the relation acquires "a pathos, a dedication, a sincerity."[294] The world of religion "has its roots in the spiritual complexity of the relation of the individual to his fellow man or to a group of his fellow men . . . "[295] Thus religiosity is not specifically a "stable form of behavior vis-à-vis the gods . . . "[296] Indeed religiosity is to be noticed in an innumerable variety of secular situations.

> The relation of a devoted child to his parents, of an ardent patriot to his fatherland or a similarly enthusiastic cosmopolitan to mankind; the relation of a worker to his class, which is pressing onward, or a nobleman conscious of his rank to the aristocracy; the relation of the vanquished to the conqueror, or the good soldier to his army - all these relations with their infinitely manifold contents can indeed have a general tenor as far as their psychic aspect is concerned - which must be called a religious key.[297]

Religiosity is then on the same plane as all sociological phenomena for Simmel. For Buber, however, it is a metaphysical fact - "a unique relationship to the Absolute,"[298] exemplified by the biblical Jew.[299] The source of religiosity, Buber avers, is beyond the principium individuationis, and a fortiori, beyond community.

> Religiosity is man's sense of wonder and adoration, an ever anew becoming, an ever anew articulation and formulation of his feeling that, transcending his conditioned being yet bursting from its very core, there is something that is unconditioned. Religiosity is his longing to establish a living communion with the unconditioned . . .[300]

Buber emphatically distinguishes the religious mood so defined from religion: "I said and mean: religiosity. I do not say and do not mean: religion."[301] Religion is antithetical to religiosity. With its superstructure of dogma and ritual prescription, religion tends to pinion religiosity to a conditional universe, and thereby undermines its very essence.

Aside from this effect, Buber tells us little more about "religion," especially as regards its origin and function.[302] Simmel, on the other hand, dwells on this latter question at great length. In brief, he discerns in religion an overriding desire, on the part of society, to sustain the religious mood. Religion is born with the exaltation of the source of religiosity to a transcendential, providential focus, which, in turn, is hypostasized as an "independent substantiality."[303] "From [religiosity] there develops an ideal content . . . or gods, who protect those who sustain these relations [e. g., through the ritual] who brought the emotions which they experience into being . . . "[304] Although the thrust of Simmel's thesis is that "religion does not condition religiosity, but religiosity begets religion,"[305] nowhere does he intimate that religion, with its dogma and cult, is a corruption or debasement of religiosity. On the contrary, religion assures the continued inspiration of the religious mood. "When [the] identification or substantialization of religion has been accomplished, it, in turn, has its effect upon the direct psychical relations of men among themselves, giving them the now well-known and so-called quality of religiosity. But in so doing it merely gives back what it originally received."[306]

Buber's aetiology of the idea of God, God of unity, may also have been derived from Simmel's analysis of religion. And here again we note the divestiture of an analytical construct of its original sociological content. Simmel states that "it is the deepest significance of the God-idea that the manifoldness and contradictoriness of things finds in it their relation and unity . . . "[307] God as the coincidentia oppositorum is a sublimation of the perceived unity which inheres in all social life. Every associative situation "is based on reciprocity and that means unity. For what is unity if not the mutual union of the many and the correlative effect of the fate of every element of the group upon all others?"[308] Thus Simmel observes that as a unifying principle it is of no relevance whether the reference is to "the absolute unity of the one God, or the partial unities of polytheism."[309] We may recall that Buber when discussing God qua transcendental unity refers exclusively to the "unique" monotheistic God-idea of the Israelites.[310]

Nowhere else "do we find so directly and appreciably, a whole made up of separate elements"[311] as we do in group life. Indeed, "the confusing multitude of things gives to some more primitive epochs one opportunity to experience multiplicity as unity, i.e., the social group."[312] This unity, society an sich, is inherently beyond individuation and thus it is cherished and idealized. Yet at the same time it continues to reflect its sociological context. The God-idea, which is always a dynamic concept, bears the tensions of social life. The relationship between man and his gods is "reciprocal" and "includes the whole scale of possible relations."[313] The idealized god promises a harmonious pattern to these relations. Accordingly, the divine-human relationship "repeats the modes of behavior which regulate the association of the individual with his social group."[314] To recapitulate, "the gods do not exist as the idealization of individual characteristics . . .; but . . . it is the inter-individual forms of life which often give their content to religious ideas."[315] Buber also treats the god-idea phenomenologically - that is, as a construction of the human psyche. But for Buber - as we have noted - der Einheits-Gott is not, as Simmel understands, a projection of the "sociological unity"[316] experienced by man; rather, for him, "Jehovah's"[317] unity is symbolic of the primal cosmic unity realized in the soul of the individual - the individual (e.g., the biblical Jew)[318] who has overcome, in religiosity, the conditionality of the world, which presumably includes social life. Thus Buber's tendency to associate religiosity, in its purest form, with the ecstatic and the mystic - religious types he explicitly considered non-sociological.

In a debate with Ernst Troeltsch - at the first conference of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie (October, 1910)[319] - Buber suggested that mysticism be characterized as "religious solipsism." Buber was here objecting to Troeltsch's designation of the mystic as a sociological category. Before the distinguished gathering, which included among others Max Weber, Ferdinand Toennies and Georg Simmel, Buber argued that mysticism, as the "absolute realization of religiosity" - an epistemological event of an unique order - should not be confused with religion, an admittedly sociological phenomenon. This thesis is now familiar to us. Buber's remarks addressed to Troeltsch, however, both offer a concise summary of his philosophical position and point clearly to the non-sociological character of this position. We thus quote:

> . . . I should like to pose the question whether mysticism can at all be considered a sociological category. I would contend that it is not: mysticism is solely a psychological category . . . . Mysticism may likewise be designated religious solipsism. It is, on the one hand, an absolute realization (Verwirklichung) of religiosity, achieving both an apprehension of one's self and an 'apperception of God.' In the intense exaltation of the self one establishes a relationship to the content of his soul (Seeleninhalt), which he perceives as God. On the other hand, mysticism seems to me to be rather different from religion which is a sociological whole (Ganze) constituted by religiosity. It also seems to me

> that mysticism negates community - mysticism does not struggle with any organized community, nor does it set itself up as a counter-community, as a sect would. Rather mysticism negates community, precisely because for it there is only one real relation, the relation to God. The process noted by Professor Troeltsch, the coming together of the believers, . . . does not at all occur in mysticism. The [mystic] remains thoroughly isolated in his belief [Gläubigkeit], for nothing else matters to him than to be alone with his God.[320]

Reality - "God" or the desired unity[321] - is then for Buber a decidedly non-sociological sphere, that of realized Erlebnis. Although the sociological may impinge upon an Erlebnis - in the sense that social life continually presents the individual with Erlebnisse - the precinct of its realization is preeminently personal.[322] Characteristically, Buber rejects Ludwig Feuerbach's definition of Gemeinschaft as a dialectic unity of the separate entities of I and Thou. For the pre-dialectical Buber, Feuerbach's affirmation of "the reality of the difference of I and Thou" represents an unacceptable dualism.

> Feuerbach desires to see the unity of which he speaks based on 'the reality of the difference of the I and Thou' (die Realität des Unterschiedes von Ich und Du). This unity of I and Thou is already given to man, however; for what else is social community if not this unity? We have overcome that disparate unity! We see in our feeling of unity an affinity not with the teaching of Feuerbach, but with the feelings of the saintly Francis of Assisi, who called the trees, birds and the stars his brothers.[323]

Human Gemeinschaft - the unity of I and Thou - is but an epiphenomenal expression of the higher, cosmic Gemeinschaft, the metaphysical unity of all. From this Heraclitean perspective, the need for human community, a Thou, is a feature of the inauthentic life. "So long as one is in the calm of his becoming (Werden), the Thou (das Du) that he bears in himself may [and should] be enough for him." But should he lose this calm, "then his need . . . is to find a Thou to whom he can speak in the world."[324]

Through his Erlebnis-mysticism, Buber sought to point to the desired revitalization of Kultur. In that this process was beyond individuation and confined to the precincts of the self, its relation to social life was perforce ambiguous, if not negative. The path from Zivilisation back to Kultur is decidedly experiential and exclusively personal, that is, non-social. (The mystical Erlebnis can of course be shared temporally, but not necessarily spatially by a collection of individuals.) Thus Buber proclaims in the name of the Neue Gemeinschaft: "Our Gemeinschaft does not want revolution, it is revolution. We have overcome the old negative meaning of revolution; revolution means for us not to destroy something old, but rather to live something new."[325]

Nonetheless, Buber maintained an interest in sociology, undoubtedly because it brought Zivilisation into critical review. To be sure, by recognizing Gesellschaft as a subject for scientific inquiry, sociology lent the bourgeois epoch a certain dignity. To conservative-romantics this was untenable and thus, while glorifying the vestiges of the "pristine" past, they chose to ignore or merely vilify contemporary social reality. In contradistinction to this group, many intellectuals like

Buber, who deemed themselves to be custodians of Kultur and yet who were unwilling to take the path of the conservative-romantics, accepted modernity (i.e., bourgeois Gesellschaft) with the view to suffusing it with a revivifying Geist. Sociology would become an instrument of their Kulturpolitik. That this was Buber's understanding of the role of sociology - regardless of the fact that through the prism of his mysticism sociological theory was virtually emasculated of its social content - will become clear from an ideological analysis of Die Gesellschaft.

CHAPTER IV - *DIE GESELLSCHAFT* - AN IDEOLOGIEKRITIK

A curious feature of the Buber edited collection of monographs, *Die Gesellschaft*, is its artistic layout. Simple, sweeping lines and floral vignettes which characterize *Jugendstil* - known as Art Nouveau in France - grace the cover of each of the monographs and illuminate the initialing found in the text. Indeed, as the publisher's Prospectus proudly announced, Peter Behrens (1868-1940), one of Germany's leading representatives of *Jugendstil*[1] was commissioned to design the cover and decorative end-paper for *Die Gesellschaft*; Hermann Kirchmayer (1857-19) of the *Tiroler Kunstbund*[2] - a center for *Jugendstil* artists at Innsbruck - would be responsible for the initialing. This employment of *Jugendstil* offers an interesting perspective on Buber's editorial intent, namely, to which audience he wished the *Sammlung* to appeal.

Jugendstil was "fashionable among the upper bourgeoisie, that cultured and urbane middle class" of the latter decade and a half of Wilhelmian Germany.[3] In its conception *Jugendstil* was a self-conscious revolt against the "historicism" which predominated in European art, particularly in the decorative and applied arts.[4] Hitherto nineteenth-century art, again especially in the latter spheres, was essentially imitative - neo-Gothic, -Rococo, -Classical, -Renaissance, -Baroque mark the style pattern of the emerging bourgeois society. In the 1890's a confident and exuberant avant-garde, raising a clarion call for "something new, quite unhampered by tradition" in cultural and aesthetic tastes, significantly turned their attention to the situation in the applied and decorative arts.[5] What they explicitly sought was a style, a form-language consonant with "the modernity of their tendencies."[6] Thus we notice that the "spiky, sprawling decorative form-language of the 1860's, 70's and 80's was replaced by the compact and closed; the jagged contour by the firm. Meanwhile the color-scale changes from dark harsh hues of the earlier period to light pastel shades."[7] Further, and perhaps most indicative of Jugendstil's quest for modernity is the priority placed on a rationality of design. An object can be deemed beautiful, according to Henry van de Velde (1863-1957), the Belgian artist who singularly inspired German Jugendstil, only "if all its details and ornamentations (Schmuck) serve to enrich its raison d'être (Daseinszweck)."[8] Clearly, Jugendstil - in the decorative and applied arts at least - is to be considered the first form-language authentic to modern, industrial culture.

The movement, as Jugendstil is rightly called, derives its name in Germany from the magazine Die Jugend - a lively, ribald literary periodical which appeared in Munich in 1896 and, incidentally, "had no particular association with applied art."[9] For Jugendstil, like Die Jugend, was a representative expression of the so-called "fin de siècle Stimmung" in its juvenescent ardour for reform, nay a "renaissance" in the aesthetic and spiritual ambience (as we recall, they were then equated). To this extent, Jugendstil - in paradox to its modernity - constitutes, as it was meant to, a critique of bourgeois, materialistic Zivilisation and its said insipid "imitative" taste and sensibilities.[10]

By 1906, the year of Die Gesellschaft's first publication, the avant-garde had already found Jugendstil and its whole ideological thrust passé. Expressionism began to dominate their interest. Nonetheless, Jugendstil was absorbed, as it were, by the "upper bourgeois" intelligentsia and remained more or less fashionable until the First World War. Franz Schoenberner (1892-19), a former editor of Simplicissmus - a satirical journal, like Jugend, established in 1896 and also associated with Jugendstil - described his readership as "a real caste composed first of ministers and professors of university, college and high school, and secondly of medical doctors or lawyers, briefly of the members of the 'free academical professions.'"[11] This "caste," Schoenberner continues, maintained an active interest in the Geisteswissenschaften and cultivated a disdain for Wilhelmian culture; that is Prussian militarism and the "philistine" values of the moneyed middle class (although many were children of the latter, we may add). They considered themselves a Geistesaristokratie, "ranking in their own opinion high above even the aristocracy of birth, the Geburtsadel, not to speak of the Geldadel . . ."[12] Further, this "caste" - the pacemakers of upper-bourgeois attitudes - inherited from the literary naturalism à la Zola of the early 90's a mild social concern. The proletariat was discovered, "at least as a literary or artistic topic" which lent added expression to the "rebellious attitude of opposition" to Wilhelmian Zivilisation.[13]

Buber's publisher, Wilhelm E. Oswalts (1888-1942), named director of Rütten & Loening in 1903, sought to cater to the "upper bourgeoisie."[14] Noting, for instance, their current interest in matters foreign - an expression of their desire to overcome the "provincialism" of Wilhelmian culture - parenthetically, a mood implicit in German Jugendstil - Oswalts issued a spate of translations. For instance, Stefan Zeromsky, the Polish realist; the Danish writer Aage von Kohl and his novels condemning war; M. J. bin Gorion's Gesammelte Sagen der Juden; Chinesische Geister und Liebesgeschichten edited by Martin Buber; Lafcadio Hearns' sensitive presentation of exotic Japan, Das Japanbuch; Buber's first Chasidic writings, Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman and Die Legende des Baal Schem; Waldemar Bonsels' Indienfahrt; the Dutch author Multatuli's scathing critiques of colonial rule in Indonesia and "bürgerlich" hypocrisy; the novel Manja, championing women's emancipation by the young Russian author Anastasia Werbitztaja; and many more. Works of a similar vein by German authors were also published.[15] Rütten & Loening, however, first reached its quintessential expression as the publisher of the liberal, cosmopolitan, anti-Prussian Geistesaristokratie, when in the midst of the war it issued Romain Rolland's Johann Christoff - a novel presenting the French poet's pacifism and a critical assessment of certain German "traits."[16]

The publication of *Die Gesellschaft* brought its editor and Rütten & Loening high praise from the literary press. "This publisher from Frankfurt a. M. has issued in the last few years a wealth of substantial works. . . . I should like to begin [my review of these publications] with the collection edited by Martin Buber. This ongoing series has the value of a veritable library" (*Der Volkserzieher*, Bern).[17] "A collection deserving our highest attention" (*Literarisches Zentralblatt für Deutschland*).[18] "The *Bubersche Sammlung* must be paid our highest praise (ibid.).[19] "Truly it is a joy that we have in Germany a project . . . like the Bubersche *Gesellschaft* (*Von Haus zu Haus*)."[20] "These inexpensive, beautifully printed booklets, with their often powerful and expressive presentations can bring about much good. Each of these booklets breathes the mirthful spirit of the day" (Hermann Hesse, März).[21] "Finally, for once a drink of fresh spring water!" (*Der Tag*, Berlin).[22] In 1910, four years after *Die Gesellschaft*'s first publication, one reads in the *Neues Wiener Tagblat*: "These periodically published monographs have for quite a while been fashionable. The *Sammlung* has remained the longest time in the favor of the public and indeed rightly so."[23] In 1909 *Augsburger Postzeitung* declared unequivocally that the monographs of *Die Gesellschaft* "belong to the most noteworthy publications of our contemporary literature."[24]

The titles of *Die Gesellschaft* display a range of interest common to the upper-bourgeois intelligentsia, as described by Schoenberner: from Paul Rohrbach's critical analysis, *Die Kolonie*, to (Pastor) Arthur Bonus' irreverent essay, Die Kirche; from Karl Bleibtreu's penetrating study of militarism, Das Heer, to Die Frauenbewegung by Ellen Key, the Swedish sufragette; and two monographs presenting Jugendstil, philosophically expressed, Der Architekt, by Karl Scheffler (van de Velde's leading disciple in Germany) and Oscar Bie's Das Kunstgewerbe. Perhaps most indicative of Die Gesellschaft's "ideological" intent is Buber's repeated attempts to solicit from Maximilian Harden a monograph.[25] Harden was then embroiled in the so-called Eulenburg Affair - a protracted scandal aroused by Harden's insinuation of wholesale perversion in the Kaiser's court. The firebrand journalist Harden was consequently a blasphemer to many and a celebrity among those of anti-Wilhelmian sentiment. A contribution of a monograph from Harden thus would have undoubtedly gained Die Gesellschaft considerable prestige among the latter, especially the Geistesaristokratie who nigh ritualized disdain of the Prussian monarch. Furthermore, sociology, the general theme of Die Gesellschaft since the 90's, was a leading topic of discussion among the middle-class intelligentsia. We need but recall that Simmel's lectures were attended by large contingents of Berlin's non-university community.[26] Moreover, Simmel published a large proportion of his articles in non-academic literary journals; thus from the period of 1897 to 1905, close to a third of his published essays, some twenty, appeared in Jugend.[27]

The title of the Sammlung, Die Gesellschaft, indeed seems - as we already had occasion to observe - to have had a polemical intent.

Sociology as scientific discipline was opposed by the reigning conservative old-guard of the German academy - reason enough to make its cause fashionable among ~~the~~ *Geistesaristokratie*. With few exceptions the conservative Professors, institutionally and ideologically committed to the Wilhelmian *Staat*, as they were, still tended to reject the notion of "*Gesellschaft*" as a conspiracy of the Third Estate.[28] A remarkable document bears eloquent witness to this situation - a 1908 reply of the Berlin professor of History, Dietrich Schaefer, to the Baden Ministry of Culture, which had requested from him a reference concerning Simmel's application for a professorial appointment at the University of Heidelberg:

> As you no doubt expect, I will express my opinion about Professor Simmel quite frankly . . . . Simmel owes his reputation chiefly to his 'sociological' activity. Upon it was based the request to grant him the (honorary) title of professor. But this request was primarily supported by Schmoller, who is always so ready to engage in innovations. It is my view, however, that sociology has yet to earn its position as a scholarly discipline (*Wissenschaft*). It is, in my opinion, a most perilous error to put 'society' in the place of state and church as the decisive (*massgebend*) organ of human coexistence. It would not seem right to me to give official standing to this orientation at this early date, especially not at a university which is as important to state and nation as Heidelberg is to Baden and Germany - least of all in the person of one who operates more by wit and pseudo-wit (*geistreiches und geistreichelndes Denken*) than by solid and systematic thinking . . . . I believe that there are more desirable and productive occupants for Heidelberg's second chair of philosophy than Simmel. I regret that I must render an unfavorable judgment.
>
> (signed) Dietrich Schäfer[29]

Rütten & Loening apparently did not share Schaefer's opinion concerning either sociology or Simmel. It seems that after having approved of Buber's (?) plan to promote the sociological point of view, in the projected Sammlung, Rütten & Loening through Buber first approached Simmel with an offer to edit the project. In a letter to Buber, dated 20 November 1905, Simmel rejected this offer:

> Dear Dr. Buber:
>
> Thank you for your friendly note. Unfortunately I cannot accept the offer included therein. In the course of the years I have received many such proposals and have rejected all of them. I totally lack the inclination and the ability to assume the responsibility for things which are not my own; indeed, I am in need of an editor no less than anybody else. Should I in some form or another - even with the greatest safeguards - undertake the editorship of your Sammlung, I would be misleading the public regarding a responsibility which [if I were to perform it properly] would cost me, as I am now constituted, a great and improportionate amount of time. [Accordingly, I cannot agree to any arrangement for my assumption of the editorship. On the other hand, I am always ready to work behind the scenes on behalf of your project.
>
> Please convey to your publisher [my response] and tell him that should he ever have the opportunity to discuss orally matters concerning the project, [this] would please me exceedingly . . . . With friendly greetings, Respectfully,
>
> Simmel[30]

Buber, as we know, eventually assumed the editorship of the project himself - and he did such with great enthusiasm.

In a letter to Alexander Ular he expressed an unfulfilled ambition to expand Die Gesellschaft to a multi-lingual international venture.[31] His work sheets, available for perusal at the Martin Buber Archive, Jerusalem, indicate that he considered requesting monographs for Die

Gesellschaft from an impressive list of central European intellectuals: Hermann Bahr, Paul Barth, H. S. Chamberlain, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Hermann Hesse, Hugo von Hofmannstahl, Ignaz Jastrow, Harry Graf Kessler, Alfred Lichtwark, Franz von Liszt, Georg Lukacs, Robert Michels, Walther Rathenau, Gustav Schmoller, Wilhelm Spann, Hermann Stehr, Ernst Troeltsch, Jakob Wasserman, Alfred Weber, *et al.*[32] As it was, *Die Gesellschaft* included forty volumes, issued between 1906 and 1912:

1.	Werner Sombart	*Das Proletariat*	(1906)
2.	Georg Simmel	*Die Religion*	(1906)
3.	Alexander Ular	*Die Politik*	(1906)
4.	Eduard Bernstein	*Der Streik*	(1906)
5.	J. J. David	*Die Zeitung*	(1906)
6.	Albrecht Wirth	*Der Weltverkehr*	(1906)
7.	Ernst Schweninger	*Der Arzt*	(1906)
8.	Richard Calwer	*Der Handel*	(1907)
9.	Fritz Mauthner	*Die Sprache*	(1907)
10.	Karl Scheffler	*Der Architekt*	(1907)
11.	Willy Hellpach	*Die geistigen Epidemien*	(1907)
12.	Paul Göhre	*Das Warenhaus*	(1907)
13.	Gustav Landauer	*Die Revolution*	(1907)
14., 15.	Franz Oppenheimer	*Der Staat*	(1907)
16.	Ludwig Gurlitt	*Die Schule*	(1907)
17.	Hellmuth von Gerlath	*Das Parlament*	(1907)
18.	Max Burckhard	*Das Theater*	(1907)
19.	Paul Robach	*Die Kolonie*	(1907)
20.	Oscar Bie	*Das Kunstgewerbe*	(1908)
21.	Ludwig Brinkmann	*Der Ingenieur*	(1908)

22.	Friedrich Glaser	Die Böse	(1908)
23.	Robert Hessen	Der Sport	(1908)
24.	Wilhelm Ostwald	Erfinder und Entdecker	(1908)
25.	Ferdinand Tönnies	Die Sitte	(1908)
26.	Arthur Bonus	Die Kirche	(1909)
27.	Martin Beradt	Der Richter	(1909)
28, 29.	Ellen Key	Die Frauenbewegung	(1909)
30.	Karl Jentsch	Die Partei	(1909)
31.	Joseph Kohler	Das Recht	(1909)
32.	Rudolf Pannwitz	Die Erziehung	(1909)
33.	Lou Andreas-Salome	Die Erotik	(1909)
34.	Rudolf Kassner	Der Dilettantismus	(1910)
35, 36.	Eduard Bernstein	Die Arbeiter-Bewegung	(1910)
37, 38.	Carl Bleibtreu	Das Heer	(1910)
39.	Wilhelm Schaefer	Der Schriftsteller	(1910)
40.	Julius Goldstein	Die Technik	(1912)

The contributors can be placed in more or less these groups: liberal literati, Kathedersozialisten and moderate social democrats. This was observed in a rather sinister manner by the conservative Berlin newspaper, Deutsche Tageszeitung, which imputes to the coterie which "gathered around Buber" the intention of "glorifying capitalism":

> Martin Buber, a Galician writer, also a young Jewish poet [sic] . . . has begun to edit a collective work, Die Gesellschaft. This work apparently seeks to glorify those characteristic relations that have - under the impact of industrialization and the massive circulation of people and money - taken shape in the large cities. This "Gesellschaft" . . . is a totally new, unprecedented formation. No wonder it has attained its purest and most developed form in America, a land that has no ruins or castles . . . And in the glorification of this pure capitalist world - devoid as it is of

> historical nexi - there has gathered around the editor [Buber] social democrats, some noble, neutral aesthetes and, enlightened by the stock-market, some 'national socialists' [Nationalsoziale]. [33]

"Glorification of capitalism" - a crude overstatement to be sure. For the predominant tone of Die Gesellschaft is decidedly critical of capitalistic Zivilisation. But what no doubt prompted the Deutsche Tageszeitung's embitterment, aside perhaps from an antisemitic prejudice, was the total absence from Die Gesellschaft of romantic-conservative opinion. Although many of the contributors do express neo-romantic sentiments, none was what one could, say, call a Rembrandtdeutscher - a representative of the school of conservatives who called for a total withdrawal from the cursed, capitalistic, liberal present to a pristine, pre-industrial "German" past. In contradistinction to this tendency, Tönnies, one of the most explicitly romantic authors who "gathered around Buber," counseled that modernity would have to be accepted if it is to be overcome. "The spirit of Gesellschaft remains the same: it cannot jump over its own shadow. But in its forward movement lies the possibility of surmounting it."[34] Nor do we, on the other hand, find any representatives of the Marxian left contributing monographs to Die Gesellschaft, as Karl Kautsky had occasion to comment.[35]

The ideological tendency of Die Gesellschaft is again pointed to by Buber's contention that the Sammlung, unlike books and journals, is an authentic liberal organ. Books and journals, no matter how untendentious, ultimately make a "choice" for the reader. A Sammlung such as

Die Gesellschaft, on the other hand, presenting a series of monographs each of which addresses a common problem - as opposed to defending a shared thesis - offers a maximum free-play of opinion. "A collection of monographs, by its very nature, does not succeed in achieving an inner unity. It fails to do so because it is usually not concerned with the development and structuring of an idea, but solely seeks to facilitate the intercourse (Samenkoppelung) of diverse views. A Sammlung may not evade its destiny (Schicksal) . . . to entertain all possible questions . . . . There is only one type of Sammlung which does not yield to any specific tendency and which is thus justified: a Sammlung which is based on a uniformly considered problem."[36] Coupled with this liberal ambition is the suggestion that this type of forum will serve to further the "socialization" or democratization of educated opinion.[37] As if to belie this pedagogic pretention the language and diction found in Die Gesellschaft is often overly educated and rather high-faluting.

Otto Neurath, writing a review of Die Gesellschaft in 1908, was particularly sensitive to the fact:

> The interest of the state in political and social enlightenment has hitherto been grossly insufficient. Thus the Sammlung under review is so much the more welcome. Should the reader of one of these volumes find that his previous knowledge . . . was adequate [to assure comprehension], it is reasonable for him to assume that he would understand the following volumes with equal facility. Alas, the Sammlung does not meet this requirement: the reader's task is made difficult by such irritating contrasts as Göhre's lucid presentation and Simmel's with its hyper-cultivated, syntactically complex and

> overly complicated conceptual constructions. Also some of the other authors also write in an unnecessarily complex style, to such a degree that one tends to get the impression that they intentionally choose this manner of expression.[38]

Neurath suggests that the sylistic improprieties that recur in Die Gesellschaft is perhaps a result of the editor's own "hyper-cultivated" tendencies:

> Although doubtlessly of the best intentions, the editor's introduction is not completely blameless (for the Sammlung's stylistic and hence pedagogic faults). Buber has a marked tendency to deal with 'higher' problems - this clearly indicates a lack of pedagogic sensitivity. Thus he loses the desired simplicity (Schlichtheit) which is also lacking in (not a few) of the Sammlung's volumes.[39]

Clearly the literary style adopted by Buber betrays a tendency to address a select highly educated, Kultur-conscious audience.

What ostensibly unifies the Sammlung is then neither matters of opinion nor subject matter, but a common perspective or as Buber says, "a uniformly considered problem." This is the problem of man's associative life viewed as essentially a "social psychological" process. By summoning "representatives of the psychological method in the sciences . . . and in literature," Buber hopes that the Sammlung will present "a descriptive social psychology" of Gesellschaft.[40] Few of the monographs, however, adhere to the definition of social psychology proposed by Buber in his introduction ("Geleitwort zur Sammlung"); rather what prevails throughout Die Gesellschaft is but a psychologizing mood. Buber posits, we recall, that what happens between men must surely be considered a psychological process - a process which cannot be simply reduced to the *relata* or individual psyches, however. This apparent paradox is explained by the concept of *das Zwischenmenschliche.* In social interaction dissimilar psychic happenings (*Geschehnisse*) combine and "complement one another," according to objective principles. Although they refer to events that primally take shape in the subjective precincts of the constituent psyches, these principles are attributed - as we have already discussed at length - to a realm transcendent to those psyches, viz., *das Zwischenmenschliche.* Accordingly, in the discussion of interpersonal events any analogue to individual psychology would but obscure the psychic logic unique unto the process of social interaction. Despite the explicitness with which Buber states this proposition, what we note in the *Sammlung,* for the most part, is either the forbidden reductionism, reducing social to individual psychic experience, or vague psychologistic explanation.

Indeed, an analysis of the various volumes of *Die Gesellschaft* - we shall consider what we believe to be four representative monographs - will indicate that the "social psychological perspective" as defined by Buber was only vaguely adhered to and what really seems to unify the various participants is a certain broad ideology: *eine geistesaristokratische Kulturpolitik.* This is to say, we consistently find in *Die Gesellschaft* an attitude critical of bourgeois *Zivilisation,* a disdain for Wilhelmian rule and an attendant suspicion of the authoritarian state and militarism, a denigration of politics, a decided rejection of romanticism and an affirmation of the efficacy of *Geist.*

Alexander Ular, Die Politik

Ular, for instance, in his monograph, Die Politik, considers the state to be the confused manifestation of an emotional need or rather of a dialectical interplay between two fundamental human instincts: the urge for power, and the need to feel dependent. The state arises out of the quest for power, authority over others, by an individual or by a clique. This quest - unprompted by economic interest, as Marxists mistakenly contend - is an instinct which lies latent in the breasts of all men. By force of circumstance and personality some men realize this quest and begin to control other men.[41] As a leader's power increases, those under his sway begin to feel, in Schleiermacher's sense, "utterly dependent" on their leader - on his success, on his power, indeed on his very person.[42] To explain this feeling, which colored so their sense of being, they ascribed to the leader supernatural qualities; legends and myths were spun "in order to distinguish the mighty deeds of this earthly man from reality. They who were [psychologically] dependent [on the leader] found no other explanation than a religious one."[43] The leader, now a divine being or representative, sustains his power by using - consciously or not - the religious feelings aroused by his person. The religion of the subjects becomes the basis of a "state" religion, which in essence serves to consolidate and institutionalize the leader's authority. This process witnesses the birth of the state.

The viability of a state is contingent on the extension of the "feeling of dependency" from the leader - subject, as he is, to inevitable death - to the state. In time the religious source of this feeling toward the state becomes implicit, so to speak, laicized, as with modern nationalism; disguised perhaps, the source nonetheless remains religious.[44] Moreover, the state remains true to its origins - it continues principally to serve the power interests of a leader (or more often an oligarchy). Politics is but an act concerned with the preservation or expansion of the power interest vested in the state. War, the penultimate political expression, "is not inherent in human relations."[45]

The proletarian revolution, a European concept, Ular cautions, will lead merely to a new form of oligarchy and continued political struggles. China should be Europe's model. Some two thousand years ago, after the collapse of the state religion, all oligarchies and the concomitant religious feeling of dependence disappeared. China's remarkable system of cooperative economic societies then made the recrudescence of oligarchies and a state forever impossible.

> No longer did anyone fight for authority over another . . . And since then it was not necessary for China to conduct a war - neither of expansion nor defense . . . . She left the atavistic sport to foreigners, who take pride in their mastery of this sport. Likewise China has no need for politics. And precisely because of this she is all the more powerful.[46]

Moreover, this was achieved "without a violent social revolution" ![47]

The state, Ular concludes, offers a perverse satisfaction of the need for dependence. This need can be satisfied in a more wholesome manner by the "natural" cooperative relations between individuals, one to another, which creates "quite simply the feeling of dependency of one individual upon another."[48] Furthermore, this relationship presumably harnesses the universal Machtinstinkt.

"Kultur," the interest of the many, Ular exclaims in his conclusion, will be effectively enhanced only when the state, the interest of the few, is eliminated.

> Kultur will truly be great only when the state is destroyed. Because they seek authority governments are always reactionary . . . . This is the whole secret of politics.[49]

Clearly, Ular is less concerned with the scholarly investigation of the "social psychology" of politics than with didactically propounding his brand of - may we say "geistesaristokratische" - anarchism.

Ferdinand Tönnies, Die Sitte

In Die Sitte, while adhering to scientific criteria in far greater measure than Ular, Tönnies is similarly irreverent of Buber's definition of social psychology. This irreverence is most singularly demonstrated by his apparent violation of Buber's "prohibition" against reducing social phenomena to categories of individual experience. The custom (die Sitte), a "psychological disposition" characteristic of a particular culture, is, Tönnies suggests, analogous to the habit (Gewohnheit), a psychological feature of individuals. "I only mention this [analogy] in order to lead to the concept of custom as essentially social-psychological, in analogy to the basically individual-psychological concept of habit."[50] An analogy of course does not necessarily imply an identification of the phenomena compared; its intention may be merely heuristic: to illuminate one phenomenon by reference to another. Tönnies does indeed speak of a "social or general will" that has a quasi-objective reality in that it serves to regulate the individual will. The "social will," however, being essentially an anthropological category, is fundamentally different from [that of] Buber's regulative realm, das Zwischenmenschliche, which in its extensive meaning is an ontological category. The former are the historically evolved "norms" of a particular group; das Zwischenmenschliche is an a-historical structural feature of all human relationships. The difference is rather significant when one considers that the "social will" can, ex hypothesi, be ignored at an individual's volition; in a particular situation an individual "may" at his discretion act contrary to the dictates of the "social will." Buber's zwischenmenschliche social action (à la Simmel) is - if the particular relationship is to be maintained - determined by the objective logic of the situation. Tönnies' epistemological discrepancy with Buber flows from a philosophical preference. He wishes to preserve the sovereignty of the will (which also concerned Simmel and Buber, but at another level). In practice Tönnies may have circumscribed the "will" by all sorts of constraints, but ideally he sought to assert - in deliberate rejection of both Spencerian behaviorism and historical-materialism - the social actor's volitional autonomy. Social relationships arise by virtue of being willed. Accordingly, social behavior involves the actor's "rational" awareness on one level or another, independent of materialistic, biological and psychic factors. Ultimately, then all social action has a "rational" basis. In traditional society the "norms" of behavior which are internalized by its members, have been hallowed by the "wisdom" of the generations; men continue to conform to these "norms," not only because of social sanctions, but because of the norms'[51] abiding rationality (affective reason), which men, at varying levels of consciousness, recognize. In non-traditional societies, the operative norms are based on another order of rationality (expedient reason) - a rationality which is conspicuously bereft of the "wisdom" that guides traditional behavior. In either case, Tönnies' ascription of volitional autonomy constitutes a violation of Buber's definition of social-psychology.

What interests us here, of course, is not an analysis of this difference, but that Tönnies' essay qualified for inclusion in Die Gesellschaft despite its lack of conformity with the program of the "uniformly considered problem." It would seem that it did by virtue of its general compatibility with the intellectual temperament of the Sammlung's intended audience. By contrasting Sitte - the hallowed "mores" of Gemeinschaft - with Mode, the contrived, mass-produced "fashions" of Gesellschaft, Tönnies appeals to the sensibilities associated with Jugendstil.

> Society [Gesellschaft], as the subject and supporter of fashion, stands in certain contrast to custom. . . All gesellschaftliche civilization has a quality utterly opposed to the artistic spirit which is rooted in tradition and in integrity. It is superficial and external. The items of mass production are flimsy, uniform, monotonous; they lack genuineness.[52]

The proliferation of mass-produced, uninspired, wares is symbolic of the barren values which preponderate in Gesellschaft. An obsession for "fashionable" things, Mode, has perversely replaced the quiet, reverence for Sitte. Mode, however, is the particular obsession of the "newest class of society" - the moneyed middle class. This class is "cavalier à la mode."[53] Culturally barren, they seek or rather "imitate" what they deem to be "smart, elegant."[54] "The primary reason for imitation is purely social - that is, to show that one knows what is proper, to manifest oneself as a cavalier à la mode."[55] The sentiments expressed here certainly earned the endorsement of the votaries of Jugendstil.

Tönnies' roots, however, are in a tradition antecedent to Jugendstil - conservative, antiprogress, romanticism.[56] But his realism and broad humanity prevented him from espousing the Volkist ideology of, say, a Treitschke. As previously alluded to, Tönnies counseled that the vulgar features of Gesellschaft were not to be overcome by an indiscriminate negation of modernity, but by a more sensible and human reorganization of the modern economy - in particular its marketing mechanism.

> One longs to return to nature; old castoffs are resurrected; old forms of life and old customs are valued and preserved. . . . Industry capitalizes on

> this fashion as it does on others. The spirit of Gesellschaft remains the same: it cannot jump over its own shadow. But in its forward movement lies the possibility of surmounting it. This lies in the reorganization of economic foundations.[57]

"The natural interaction [Wechselwirkung] between production and consumption should replace the predominance of movable capital, trade and commerce."[58] Life in a society that heeds this course will be "once again stable, calm, healthy . . ." Furthermore, not only will it be possible to cultivate Sitte anew, but art as well. Implicit is also a critique of Jugendstil - its hope to reform the aesthetic values of bourgeois society is chimerical if not preceded by a fundamental reorganization of the capitalistic marketing structure (Tönnies remains conspicuously reticent with regard to the means of production). This censure of Jugendstil nonetheless assumes a universe of discourse with the readership.

Franz Oppenheimer, Der Staat

Again we note from Oppenheimer's essay, Der Staat, that the qualifying criterion of a monograph's inclusion in Die Gesellschaft does not seem to be social psychology. To be sure, Oppenheimer, at the time still pursuing his doctorate in political economy at the University of Kiel, proposes to treat the state as a "social-psychological fact" and to trace its concatenations historically.[59] This "inductive, scientific"[60] approach soon yields to exclusively historic and economic arguments, however. This is perhaps a consequence of the principal scholarly concern of the treatise, which is to correct the class theory of the state: Oppenheimer, a student of economic history, wishes to meet the Marxists on their own ground. "The theory of class struggle," he argues, "is not a science (Wissenschaft), but a nescient of science (Mimicry der Wissenschaft),"[61] for it is based on an assertion of an ideological interest and exiguous knowledge. To present the requisite knowledge objectively (i. e., "inductively") is then Oppenheimer's task.

Der Staat brought Oppenheimer fame as an original social thinker.[62] Going through many editions, what no doubt fascinated the readers was not its detailed critique of the class theory, but rather its recasting of the social vision of liberalism. This vision Oppenheimer adjusted to the socialist estimate of the abuses of capitalism, while at the same time strongly censoring - though by innuendo - conservative interests, in particular Junkerdom. The social disorder attendant on capitalism - the flight from the land, the oversupply of urban labor, excessive profits, periodic fiscal crises - he ascribes primarily to "the monopolization of agrarian land" (Bodensperre);[63] the capitalist means of production play but a tertiary role. The dissolution of the large agrarian estates, Oppenheimer suggests, would halt the displacement of the rural peasantry and permit the return of the under-employed urban masses to agriculture. This process would ipso facto correct the present social and economic imbalance of industrial capitalism. Only then will the Freibürgerschaft[64] - the goal, indeed eschaton of history - be realized: maximum social equality and justice in an authentic competitive economy.[65] Given the persistence of Bodensperre, hitherto a "free market" was but an aborted dream, but now with the removal of the "last obstacle" the liberal vision will experience its natural expression: ample and unhampered economic opportunity for all.[66] Concomitant with full economic liberty - with constitutional guarantees against its abuse - what will evolve would be essentially a classless society. The state - the political organization of one group against another - will thus dissolve. National borders will prove meaningless and collapse, wars - a function of the state - will cease.

The ultimate aspects of this vision Oppenheimer admittedly shares with the Marxists; however, he points to a crucial difference. The Marxists deem a revolution of the means of production to be a prerequisite, whereas Oppenheimer's Freibürgerschaft - given the inevitable and peaceful liquidation of large land holdings - is an immanent possibility of the free economy. "It is true that the proletarian theory, as a matter of principle, predicts identically the same result. But the adherents of that theory do not believe it possible by the path of evolution but only through revolution . . . Only a small fraction of social liberals, or of liberal socialists, believe in the evolution of a society without class dominion and class exploitation . . . That was the credo of the old social liberalism, of pre-Manchester days, enunciated by Quesnay and especially by Adam Smith . . . ."[67]

Gustav Landauer, Die Revolution

In his monograph, Die Revolution, Landauer either regards social psychology metaphorically - e. g., "social psychology is nothing but revolution"[68] - or dismisses it as a restrictive perspective.

> This presentation mingles social psychology with sociology, and both with history, and then it turns to psychology and epistemology, from there to economics . . . to biology, cosmology, and hundreds of thousands of other disciplines. I can say nothing against [social psychology]. Rather I should like to express my dismay . . . that there are empirical scientists who do not hesitate to limit themselves to an area whose boundaries they themselves did not set. In the endeavor to establish a new scientific discipline between the boundaries of several established disciplines, we render a great service - the only authentic and often only possible service - if we ignore these boundaries.[69]

The theme of Landauer's essay was perhaps the most sensitive subject dealt with in Die Gesellschaft. The abortive Russian Revolution of 1905 raised the spectre of the proletarian revolt and terror. Landauer, while hardly apologizing for the violent component in revolutionary struggle, suggests that the institutionalization of terror - which seems inevitably to characterize revolution - is born out of a misconceived understanding of the purpose of revolution. All past revolutions in the modern era "since the Reformation"[70] have failed to realize that authentic revolution is not merely political but preeminently social or rather spiritual. Purely political revolutions are incomplete, and the "forces of negation" that inhere in them ineluctably become an end-in-itself: violence, and aggressiveness are apotheosized.[71]

Social revolution, on the other hand, implies an enduring spiritual regeneration - a lasting sense of brotherhood and mutual trust. Phenomenologically viewed, the virtue of political revolution lies in its power to affect, in embryo, such a spiritual renewal. In the midst of the emotional excitement new bonds between men are forged. "The fire, the rapture, the brotherhood of this aggressive movement rekindles ever again the image [das Bild] and the feeling of positive union. This union is engendered through the unifying quality, love - which is power."[72] But the battle is soon over, and the cameraderie realized in common struggle, if not accompanied by more lasting spiritual bonds, proves ephemeral. Failure to note this leads many a Marxist to place a misleading emphasis on political revolution. This is a tendency which perhaps inheres in the profoundest fallacy of Marxism: historio-material determinism, which suggests that a change of rule - violent if need be - that brings the "historic" class to power is all that is necessary to bring forth new and progressive social conditions. A better society, Landauer exclaims in rejecting Marxian determinism, is not contingent whatsoever upon any particular historic and economic circumstance; rather the possibility of a humane society is ultimately a matter of the assertion of the will. Social revolution "depends solely on our character (Natur), our will and our inner power."[73]

The present epoch is dominated by the centralized state - a state which administratively assumes the social functions which should be per-formed by a concert of will and the sense of mutuality of individuals organized in local communities. Centralization perforce denies the society of men of its unitive "spirit," of its humanity. The society is consequently spiritually "atomized" - individualism, isolation and melancholy reign.[74] But this deracination engenders its own dialectic - certain more brazen individuals rebel against their spiritual isolation and with singular ardor seek to "negate" that which they intuitively sense to be the source of their misery, the state. "A time bereft of spirit [Geistlosigkeit] is for the single individual a time of extreme spiritual intensity. Therefore it is also a time of quest, of boldness, indeed of impertinence; a time of courage and rebellion . . . "[75]

Political rebellion or the forces of negation are thus symptomatic rather than constructive. Indeed lest a spiritual revolution is forthcoming, it will be an ever recrudescent phenomenon. In consonance with this observation, Landauer notes that, given an absence of a "spiritual regeneration," contemporary Europe can expect a political revolution - directed not so much against capitalism as against the total fragmentation of all genuine human bonds. "Either the spirit of regeneration - as opposed to that of revolution takes hold of us soon, or we shall have once again - I dare say, again and again - to immerse ourselves in the bath of revolution."[76]

The spiritual regeneration necessary to avoid political revolution is the "peaceful" construction of counter-communities - communities so constructed as to encourage mutuality. "He who takes this step, transcends revolution; he points to a Kulturausgang."[77] Only a Kulturaktion, as opposed to political agitation, creates new possibilities, for "it begins with us."[78] The style and form of life we determine for ourselves set both the social and cultural tone of society. "Our way is that which is brought into existence through our very being."[79]

Landauer's deprecation of political agitation and violence and his talk of spiritual regeneration distanced him from those he most passionately sought to reach, the proletarian masses. His brand of socialist Kulturpolitik,[80] as expressed in Die Revolution, proved uninteresting to all but the "upper bourgeois" intellectuals like Buber and presumably the readership of Die Gesellschaft.

The four essays reviewed include the extreme varieties of ideological opinion represented in Die Gesellschaft: Ular, whose social anarchism was essentially a reflex against (Wilhelmian) militarism, which he understood as a function of the political state; Tõnnies, a Katheder sozialist, while criticizing the quality of modern social life, eschews romantic conservatism; Oppenheimer, in trying to salvage the liberal social vision, alleged that the large-land holdings, popularly considered the bulwark of Prussian power, were the source of contemporary social injustices; Landauer, an iconoclastic anarchist gave Cassandran warning that lest spiritual regeneration was forthcoming, political revolution was a distinct danger. Broadly speaking, the difference between each is not so much one of *Weltanschauung* as one of opinion - a shared universe of discourse can be noted. This *Weltanschauung* is roughly that which Schoenberner attributed to those who deem themselves a *Geistesaristokratie*.

The latter, resigned to modernity, sought to secure *Kultur* - aesthetic and spiritual sensibilities - in and for the bourgeois epoch. In consonance with this tendency, Buber envisioned *Die Gesellschaft* as serving to elevate life, that is: "it serves Kultur."[81] Interestingly, Peter Behrens also understood the function of *Jugendstil* as furthering *Kultur*: to infuse the artifacts of modern life with style, with a creative spirit and thereby transform the mundane, the *Gesellschaftliche* into a "sacrament."[82] Friedrich Ahlers-Hestermann called the art movement with which he and Behrens were associated *Zarathustrastil*[83] - in order to emphasize the elevating individuality and creativity sought by the movement. In this perspective it would seem that Buber's preference for *Jugendstil* was not merely a matter of taste, but more of a fundamental "ideological" affinity: an acceptance of *Gesellschaft* with the hope of transforming it through *Kulturpolitik*.

Similar to many *Geistesaristokraten*, Buber was self-consciously cosmopolitan and anti-militaristic. And thus when it seemed that a war was about to descend upon Europe, Buber joined with a group of similarly minded intellectuals from various countries to prevent the impending conflagration. In June, 1914, Buber met in Potsdam with seven other European intellectuals (viz., Poul Bjerr, Henri Borel, Theodor

Däubler, Frederik van Eeden, Erich Gutckind, Gustav Landauer, Florens Christian Rang) in a three-day retreat, from which they hoped would emerge the nucleus of a trans-national brotherhood; Romain Rolland was informed of the proceedings by post; Ernst Norlind and Walther Rathenau also indicated their interest in the project. The circle was to be officially proclaimed in August, 1914, in Forte di Marmi - the "guns of August" frustrated this plan and the hopes which animated it.[84] Buber may have also cooperated with Gutkind and van Eeden in the projected "international order of men of genius." In a prospectus of this order we read: "The organization we propose is composed of men of Genius - of all nations . . . It is based on the principle that men of genius require and deserve exceptional treatment, not only in their own interest, but in the interest of the whole world, which benefits by their labours . . . . We can be a true democracy only on condition that we are a true aristocracy. The great task of present civilization is to liberate spiritual authority from the depression of economical and political power . . . ."[85] Among others, the order was to include Buber, Ezra Pound, Sun-Yat Sen, Max Scheler and Rabindranath Tagore.[86]

But alas the war came and Buber, the Erlebnismystiker, suddenly forgetting his erstwhile opposition to war, greeted the First World War with unambiguous excitement. The intensified emotions and heroic mood wrought by war were understood as heightened Erlebnisse and a dawn of universal realization (Verwirklichung). But Buber was, in time, to learn the critical lesson that reality must include das Du, the social other.

CHAPTER V - FROM MYSTICISM TO DIALOGUE

Buber and the First World War

Despite his active participation with intellectuals from various countries in an effort to foster international unity and to prevent the impending conflagration which faced Europe,[1] Buber greeted the Great War with singular enthusiasm. Several weeks after the commencement of hostilities, Buber wrote Hans Kohn - whom he had befriended in the Bar Kochba Zionist circle of Prague - a letter extolling the mood of fraternity and selfless devotion issued by the war:

> . . . Never has the concept Volk been such a reality for me as in the last weeks. A sincere and great feeling also prevails amongst the Jews. Among the millions who have volunteered were Karl Wolfskehl and Friedrich Gundolf . . . . I myself, alas, have no prospect of being accepted [for conscription]; but in my own way I shall try to contribute . . . Addressed to anyone willing to accommodate himself to these times are the words of John: "He that loveth his life shall lose it." If we Jews really felt, thoroughly felt what this means for us then we would no longer need our ancient motto: "Not my might, but spirit" (cited in Hebrew) - might (Kraft) and spirit (Geist) would become one. Incipit vita nova![2]

The fraternity born of common struggle engendered a similar enthusiasm among many German intellectuals, irrespective of their previous politics.[3] Georg Simmel, for instance, who detested Prussian militarism,[4] noted approvingly that with the war there is no German who feels himself to be a mere constituent of the national community; he now "bears the whole in himself, he feels himself responsible for the whole."[5] What distinguishes Buber's position vis-à-vis the war is his tendency to view it from the perspective of his Erlebnis-mysticism. The war - or rather the Erlebnisse wrought by the war - he held, ushered in an "aeon of realization."

In the fall of 1914 Buber engaged in a controversy with the Dutch poet and pacifist, Frederik van Eeden. This controversy was the occasion of Buber's most systematic statement on the war.[6] Van Eeden published a bitter condemnation of the German invasion of Belgium.[7] Germany's "brutal" violation of her neighbor's neutrality is characterized by the Dutchman as a typical "trick of a despotic state"[8] - a trick which belies Germany's pretension to be the defender of Kultur against Russian barbarism.[9] In a non-published circular, addressed to Buber and other European intellectuals, van Eeden identified the defeat of despotism as the "idealistic motto" of Germany's adversaries, France and Britain.[10]

In a long personal letter[11] and in two published articles,[12] Buber, responding with obvious indignation, rejects van Eeden's contentions. Germany's invasion, he points out, was not unprovoked, Belgium's secret treaties with Germany's enemies left the German command with little choice but to launch a preemptive attack.[13] Then, Buber rhetorically asks, if England and France were truly opponents of despotism, why have they allied themselves with "the bulwark of despotism," Czarist Russia?[14] In any case, by focusing on questions of morality, Buber argues, van Eeden overlooks the war's metaphysical significance: the war is but a "Sinnbild,"[15] symbol of profound inner events.

Van Eeden had described the current burgeoning of patriotic emotions as mass hysteria.[16] Buber objects. Firstly, he argues, that "a calm clear resoluteness and readiness to sacrifice"[17] prevails - at least in Germany.[18] This mood is not a product of "psychic suggestion," but rather an "autonomous and elemental feeling: an unrestrained belief in an absolute value, which to die for signifies the fulfillment of life."[19] Men now find themselves released from "the many little instrumental aims (Zwecke) . . . ; [they have] won freedom and completion in sacrifice for an absolute value."[20] They have tossed off "the trusted, the secure, the conditioned in order to hurl themselves into the abyss of the unconditioned."[21] Hence to attribute the prevailing mood to Massenpsychologie betrays a crass misunderstanding of this mood - as crass as those theories which reduce religion to perverted sentiments manipulated by power-craving clergy. Just as institutional religion should be distinguished from religiosity, so the hysterical, chauvinistic aspects of the war mood should be viewed apart from that elemental feeling.[22]

This feeling is to be understood as an awakening of kinesis, that which Buber in Daniel (1913) referred to as a "nameless spark . . . through which the deed from being the Erlebnis of an individual becomes a happening given to all . . . "[23] Kinesis, an Aristotelian term, denotes the "passing from the potential to actuality."[24] For Buber, it is the power actuating realization. Mankind has longed for kinesis and now suddenly with the war we have witnessed its manifestation within us.

"This has been our solitary wish until now . . . , kinesis lain dormant in us and we were unable to arouse it."[25] This is the "magic power" of war.[26] Yes, despite the atrocities and agonies,[27] war (qua kinesis) is grace - "a fearful grace, the grace of a new birth."[28]

True, kinesis has yet to find its true direction (Richtung) and indeed "kinesis without direction is blind, but direction without kinesis is paralytic."[29] Moreover, Buber is convinced that kinesis will "increasingly become conscious of its [true] direction and will create its own world."[30] "We believe that the [surge of kinesis] will swell over the war and become the power of a new aeon of realization."[31] The present moment in history, however, is exclusively one of kinesis - - of a powerful, but directionless stirring of our mortified souls.[32] Buber likens the "Zeit der kinesis" to the work of a ploughshare: the violent upheaval of encrusted soil; the sowing comes only afterward.[33] To maximize its effectiveness the ploughshare should be independent of the will. Thus to achieve its initial task, kinesis must be unfettered by direction. And herein lies the greatness of the age, an "irrational differentiation of experience (des Erlebnisses) preponderates . . ."[34]

Kinesis an sich has no object, an object being defined solely by direction,[35] or by "consciousness."[36] Accordingly, the significance of kinesis does not lie in a specific referent such as fatherland or nation. The inner meaning of kinesis is not its content or direction, but that it pushes men to unconditioned action. Yet allegiance to a fatherland - to that which may inspire unconditioned action - is not ipso facto irrelevant to kinesis. Thus Buber attacks van Eeden for his summary rejection of patriotism. Should Holland go to war against the Swiss, van Eeden had argued that he, a Dutch citizen, would fight for Switzerland because this nation "has a higher system of law."[37] This position Buber dismisses as a "crass relativism."[38] The true warrior knows no comparative value, for only the Absolute could induce unconditional action.[39] For the Dutchman, Holland, his fatherland, is "the form of the Absolute visible, obtainable, graspable to [him]."[40] Kinesis is aroused in the Dutchman and in the Swiss when they fight for their respective fatherlands - providing, of course, each "means God when he says fatherland."[41]

By acknowledging that a particular fatherland may hold for its constituents kinetic value, Buber does not wish to affirm a subjectivism or even a polytheism.[42] God is one, but He is real-ized through our lives, that is to the extent we are quickened to unconditioned action.[43] "And precisely because now so many are driven to unconditioned action is this period - an age which seems to have been abandoned by God - one of the Unconditional's revelation."[44] Thus Buber writes van Eeden:

> . . . the *Erlebnis* of these times confirms my fundamental view: our connectedness with the Absolute manifests itself not in our knowing (*Wissen*), but in our action (*Tun*). We experience (*erleben*) the Absolute not in that we passively experience (erfahren), but in that we create (*schaffen*). [The Absolute] appears in men not as a What, but as a How, not as something cognizable (*Denkbares*) but as something livable (*Lebbares*).[45]

In this manifest connectedness to the Absolute, men - in spite of their varying directions - are bound to one another in a "transcendental" unity, a unity eminently more real than the unity of men who may share the same principle.

> Therefore men are transcendentally close and bound to one another not by virtue of similar aims, but rather because they realize their often divergent aims in the same manner. Not that they affirm the same thing, but that they transform into action that which they affirm with intensity, honesty, directness et cetera. What forever distinguishes the decisive from the inert, weak individual is not what he believes and wishes, but the fact that what he believes and wishes does not remain embedded in his thoughts but becomes an event. This [actuating] force I call kinesis.[46]

Kinesis or that which endows men with the requisite power (viz., intensity, directness) to break the shackles of the conditioned and to actuate an Erlebnis is then the source of real community.[47]

The war has metaphysical import for Jewry in particular. The alacrity with which hundreds of thousands of Jews have joined the ranks of the various armies engaged in the conflict heralds the birth of a new Jew, the heroic Jew.[48] This Jew "does not suffer passively, but fights; he does not forever ponder, but decides" - he is a Jew who acts.[49] The fact that Jewish soldiers, donning a variety of national uniforms, are obliged to kill one another is tragic, but of little ultimate significance. Although "Jewish troops are fighting one another, they are nonetheless fighting for their Jewishness (Judentum)."[50] This paradox is illuminated, Buber tells a 1914 audience of Zionists celebrating the feast of Chanukah,[51] by the sacred tradition's understanding of the Maccabean revolt: Judas Maccabaeus led a band of Jewish warriors in a successful struggle for their nation's freedom, yet the tradition celebrates not their military victory, but the consecration of the Temple. Why? Because, in accord with Judaism's religious genius, the tradition acknowledges that

> all external events are but a symbol (ein Sinnbild) of the inner, secret cosmic events; all external liberation is but a symbol of . . . the inner liberation of the suffering and struggling world from the power of evil. The locus where this liberation is immediately revealed to man is in his soul.[52]

In the Maccabean revolt the Jews overcame Malkhut Yavan Ha-reshaah - the evil dominion of Greece - symbol of the world's fundamental evil, which Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav identifies as man's egotistical desire.[53] This desire, Buber avers, enslaves men to instrumental aims (Nutzzwecke).[54] The vanquishing of Malkhut Yavan was thus a self-purifying act, marked and symbolized by the reconsecration of the Temple.

Now in 1914, as in the days of yore, the Jewish warrior is leading Jewry to victory over Malkhut Yavan. The latter-day Maccabean is passing through a liberating "Gemeinschaftserlebnis."[55] "A feeling of community has been set aglow in him, he feels something burning in him before which all instrumental aims (Nutzzwecke) collapse . . . "[56] Like Judas Maccabaeus before him, the Jewish soldier of 1914 has "overcome his inner duality, and has become unified";[57] once again the Jew is capable of serving the unity of the world. This Gemeinschaftserlebnis has a special significance for the western Jew, he whose deepest problem is not that he is assimilated, but rather that he is atomized.[58] His being is fragmented, for circumstances have torn him from the source of wholeness, his primordial community. He knows but "the arbitrary measure of his alienated wishes"[59] - his heart knows not "the heartbeat of a living community."[60] But this atomized Jew, having as a warrior experienced community, will, in time, hearken to "the call of the deep community of his blood . . . "[61] Meantime the war has created the extraordinary circumstance wherein the Jew feels himself subject to the unconditioned urgings of a community not his own - this is explained by his deep need to authenticate himself in a "great and vigorous community which demands [men] to live fully and to die."[62] With the end of the war - Buber is convinced - the formally atomized Jew will emerge with a desire to deepen his Gemeinschaftserlebnis and shall thus return to his community.[63] Only then will his liberation and the consecration of the Temple be consummated.[64]

Landauer and the "Kriegsbuber"

Gustav Landauer, an uncompromising opponent of the war, decried Buber's understanding the war as "aestheticism," an excessive and distorted emphasis on aesthetic values.[65] In a letter to Landauer dated 18 October 1914,[66] Buber hinted at latent tensions between them and voiced his hope that their friendship was "anchored in a basis" which could endure any momentary misunderstanding.[67] Further, Buber requested that they meet to discuss their "different view of things":

> Regarding the subject of our different views, I prefer not to discuss it in a letter . . . . I should like to talk to you, however not in some cafe or pub, but at either our home or yours. Erich Gutkind reports that you have accused me - as well as him - of aestheticism. Must you so misread and misunderstand me? I refuse to believe this![68]

The two friends met shortly afterwards and as an indication of their apparent reconciliation they co-authored a letter[69] addressed to several men of letters from various countries calling for the renewal of an earlier effort, scuttled by the outbreak of the war, to promote the "unity of peoples."[70] This letter bears the date "Ende November 1914."

Despite his "reconciliation" with Landauer, Buber was unrepentant about his metaphysical view of the war. His "Chanukah" lecture, we recall, was delivered in December, 1914. The thesis of this lecture was reiterated a year and a half later in Buber's essay "Die Losung," which served as the inaugural editorial of the journal Der Jude. In this editorial, which appeared on 3 April 1916, Buber quoted at length the earlier Chanuak address, and with regard to the special import the war's Gemeinschaftserlebnis holds for Jews added:

> What I said at that time has since been confirmed . . . . Through the Jewish Erlebnis of this war erstwhile deracinated Jews now feel responsible for the destiny of their community (Gemeinschaft). A new unity in Jewry has thus taken shape.

Further, in 1915 Buber published excerpts from his correspondence with van Eeden.[72]

Buber might have felt his affirmation, in the midst of war, of the principle of the unity of peoples would appease Landauer - and undoubtedly it did. Landauer seems - at this point - to have been willing to minimize the statements on the war made by his long-time friend.[73] In a letter to his wife, dated 3 August 1915, Landauer notes that his comments about the political immaturity of some intellectuals does not apply to Buber. To be sure, as a man of "poetic sensitivity" Buber is given to extravagant and uncritical expression, but he is nonetheless aware of the "madness of the war."

> Buber loves and appreciates everything which, as he understands it, is rooted in unconditionality. Hence, although he thoroughly appreciates my position towards the war, he finds in the unanimity of the German people and the preparedness of the younger generation to die such an unconditionality. . . . He allows for no analysis whatsoever and becomes particularly bitter when one speaks of mass-suggestion. He is displeased that the artificial entangling of nations and states be so unraveled; he desires that his insight into the madness of a struggle without a real object transcend reason and satiate all his feelings.[74]

Note the phrase we have underscored: Buber "thoroughly appreciates my position towards the war . . . "

Landauer thus dismissed Buber's war metaphysics as inconsequential. In time, however, he was to detect in these metaphysics a dangerous "spiritual confusion." In March, 1916,[75] Buber - after more than ten years of residence in Berlin and almost daily intercourse with Landauer[76] - moved with his family to Heppenheim, a town not far from Frankfurt-am-Main. On the seventh of May 1916, after two months of separation, Landauer visited Buber at his new home.[77] Buber greeted his friend warmly, but, nonetheless, Landauer left Heppenheim greatly perplexed and angered. Upon his return to Berlin, Landauer wrote Buber:

> This time just as at our parting in Berlin our companionship (Gemeinschaft) was confirmed through meeting. This companionship was established before the war and should, I trust, survive it. I cannot emphasize sufficiently that the issues which I shall presently broach were especially disturbing to me at our last meeting: I had not been in the company of the Kriegsbuber and had nearly forgotten him.[78]

His sudden disappointment in his friend, Landauer explains, is prompted by the "Kriegsbuber's" nationalistic outbursts. In his letter to Buber, Landauer is not explicit as to what transpired in Heppenheim. He does, however, point to two egregious examples of nationalism in Buber's essay "Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum."[79] In the first instance, Buber compares "the Greek of the Periclean period, the Italian of the Trecento" with "the contemporary German."[80] This comparison, Landauer comments, makes his "blood boil."[81] The second and far more offensive passage is Buber's reference to Germany's "world-historical mission"[82] to bridge the Occidental and Oriental civilizations, of rescuing the Oriental spirit endangered by the aggressive forces of the West. The insidious, materialistic tendencies of the West, Buber argues, have penetrated the East and are destroying the Oriental soul. "The world is about to lose something irreplaceably precious . . ."[83] Mankind requires an immediate spiritual renewal. Asia itself is too enervated to initiate this process. The force of renewal must then emerge from Europe, and there the only one qualified for this sacred task is the German nation.

> The nation (Volk) who will lead this renewal is that nation whose life is suffused with Geist and who alone in modern Europe possesses a metaphysical creativity which is related to the great Oriental nations - the German nation.[84]

This is Kriegspolitik, Landauer exclaims. To glorify Germany and to ignore its crimes against other peoples is tantamount to endorsing these crimes. Such statements, Landauer bitterly remarks, "are painful, exceedingly repugnant and well-nigh incomprehensible."[85] Although a nationalistic tone is not absent from any of Buber's utterances on the war, these passages referred to by Landauer are undoubtedly Buber's most explicitly (published)[86] Germanophile statements. Landauer is exceedingly piqued by these statements and seemingly as a consequence betrays a greater sensitivity to, and correspondingly lesser degree of, tolerance towards Buber's war metaphysics.

Landauer now - in the same letter from 12 May, 1916 - inveighs with a fury against Buber's metaphysics, which he previously sought to minimize: " . . . I say that you [Buber] have neither the right to discuss publicly the present political events known as the world war, nor do you have the right to place this confusion into your beautiful and wise generalities."[87] Accordingly, Landauer characterizes Buber's statement regarding Jewry's ready enlistment for the war as "a childish simplification."[88] Landauer thus argues that since he himself is a Jew he is obliged to assume that he is included in Buber's "prescriptive description of the psychic situation of the Jews"[89]- accordingly, he feels himself to be personally demeaned. Moreover, it strikes him as highly unlikely that the hundreds of thousands of Jews and non-Jews, whose readiness to die Buber praises, desire anything but to survive the war and return to their families and normal routines.

> I feel personally betrayed . . . [on behalf] of the thousands and tens of thousands of poor fellows who know nothing of any "task," but, nonetheless, out of an overwhelming sense of duty (namely, to live!) submit to coercion, because they hope that thereby they would survive with their lives. For the most part, these Jews are filled with the feeling that they have nothing to do with this madness and that they would be shot should they not acquiesce. They are animated with the feeling that all that matters is to survive the war and then continue to peddle or do business and to live with wife and children.[90]

Landauer sarcastically tells Buber that he should have been perceptive enough to realize that among the vast multitude of troops presently engaged in deadly battle "there were, say 23 to 37" who were not animated by "a feeling of overwhelming duty."[91] And even if for some reason he was incapable of noting these few, reason should have suggested to him that there might be such men, and, in turn, decency would have dictated silence.[92]

In this letter to Buber, Landauer renews his earlier charge that Buber's understanding of the war suffers from an aestheticism: "Despite all your protestations I deem [your statements on the war] to be a species of Aestheticism and Formalism . . ."[93] The emotions and styles of acting - "Virility, manliness, sacrificial courage, devotion"[94] - that Buber applauds are, Landauer observes, not intrinsic and unique to war. "No living man senses and needs such a detour."[95] Likewise, Landauer finds it utterly ridiculous that Buber sees in the conflict, destruction, and death wrought by the war "the spirit of Gemeinschaft." This absurd and sorry judgment is a function of faulty thinking, Landauer exclaims. Buber cavalierly imposes a construct entirely drawn from his wishful imagination on an historical reality - a reality which, despite our wishes, can only yield to an immanent, historical analysis.

> . . . "the spirit of Europe," the spirit of community (Gemeinschaft) which you now find [actuated] in this war is a completely vapid construction. Historical phenomena can only be treated historically, not by formal schematization. Here, in the latter, is truly no intuitively grasped synthesis, but emptiness; you wish to grasp as a unity the chaotic through mere contemplation, without also having in view that which is new (das Neue) and which could create the desired unity. You deny precisely that which is most essential through the employment of your vacuous method: you contemplate the everyday and declare it a wonder; you do not encounter the everyday with a formative vision; rather, you attempt to dovetail it into your schemata. I gladly admit that behind your method stands the wish to behold greatness. But simply from the chaotic to construe greatness does not satisfy the wish.[96]

The Gemeinschaft which mankind seeks is not achieved through war and the attendant patriotism. On the contrary; true Gemeinschaft is distant from everything associated with war. Further, by the very nature of its evolvement and enduring nature, true Gemeinschaft requires no such dialectical interpretations as Buber presents in defense of his Gemeinschaft. Landauer concludes his long and bitter letter with a refusal to cooperate with Buber's newly established journal, Der Jude - that is, so long as the journal and its editor continue, implicitly or otherwise, to support the war. "Ein Blatt, das veroffentlicht . . . was Habsburg, Hohenzollern und die mit verbundenen Interessegruppen gern hören, das Entgegengesetzte aber nicht, kann nicht mein Blatt sein."[97]

Buber's volte-face

Buber's response to Landauer's letter is unknown, apparently it was oral. Shortly after the receipt of the letter, Buber may have - according to an unconfirmed report[98] - boarded a train for Berlin in order to reply to Landauer tête-à-tête. In a letter of 25 June 1916,[99] Buber apologizes to Landauer for neglecting their "conversation" (Gespräch), explaining that due to the burden of work and consequent fatigue he lacked the "requisite concentration." Buber expresses the wish to continue their conversation "orally." The two friends met in Berlin (for a second time?) from the eleventh to the fourteenth of July 1916.[100] In a note to Buber, dated 22 August 1916, Landauer expresses his satisfaction with Der Jude and indicates his desire to contribute to the journal.[101]

It is difficult to believe that the episode initiated by Landauer's letter of 12 May 1916 was merely of incidental importance for either Buber or Landauer. Yet Buber - the executor of Landauer's literary estate[102] - omitted Landauer's letter of 12 May 1916 from the two volume collection of Landauer's correspondence that he edited. The copy of the letter in the possession of the Martin Buber Archive indicates that the letter was prepared for inclusion in the collection: the letter was typed, appended with footnotes and a code number. This work was apparently prepared by Ina Britschgi-Schimmer, who assisted Buber in the project and whose task it was to read Landauer's voluminous correspondence and make the initial selection.[103] Buber, however, chose to withhold the letter from publication. Hans Kohn, who wrote his biography of Buber under his protagonist's close supervision, conspicuously avoids any reference to Buber's controversy with Landauer, or for that matter with van Eeden. In the third section of chapter three of his biography, Kohn briefly notes that although Buber's attitude vis-à-vis the war was initially "unclear," he neither glorified the war, nor ignored its evil.

> In the year 1916 when Der Jude began to appear Buber had still to formulate a clear and distinct attitude toward the war and its problematics and the attendant political constellations. In his writings there never was a glorification of the war, nor was there ever a denial of its daemonic character.[104]

Kohn's first draft of this passage may have read a little differently. In a letter to Buber, Kohn notes his willingness to comply with the former's request that "the third part of chapter three" be revised.

> Concerning the passages of the third section of the third chapter we must discuss the matter at our forthcoming meeting in Zurich. I am of course most amenable to changing the said passages.[105]

Finally it should be noted that the passages in "Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum" that offended Landauer most were omitted in the second edition of the essay. To this latter edition, published in 1919, Buber added a brief prefatory note:

> At the close of the first speech passages were deleted in which the German nation is called upon to lead the return and to establish a new era of concord with the Orient. The German nation did not assume the function referred to in these passages and is now no longer capable of doing such.[106]

We submit that Landauer's letter of 12 May 1916 was of major significance in Buber's personal and intellectual biography. Further, this letter, *ex hypothesi*, was a pivotal factor in Buber's turn from mysticism, which we prefer to designate *Erlebnis*-mysticism, to the philosophy of dialogue.

In Buber's writings subsequent to the spring of 1916, we notice three new elements: (a) an explicit opposition to the war and chauvinistic nationalism; (b) a reevaluation of the function and meaning of *Erlebnis*; (c) a shift in the axis of *Gemeinschaft* from consciousness (i.e., from subjective-cosmic *Erlebnis*) to the relations between men.

In September 1916, Buber addressed an open letter to his "Prague friends": "you who are in danger, you in captivity, you in the trenches and you in the graves . . . "[107] For a moment - Buber tells his friends, undoubtedly referring to members of the *Bar Kochba* circle then in uniform, - he, Buber, was possessed by a vision that he and they were together once again. In this vision, Buber and his friends, strolling through the streets and visiting the taverns of "immortal Prague, "[108] were engaged in amiable and edifying conversation. Surely, in this moment when "those holy hours of great togetherness"[109] are reborn, Buber proclaims to his friends, one word comes forth from "out of your memory, [from] out of the memory of the world-spirit . . . : Sabbath. "[110] But alas, it is not Sabbath. Why? Buber's answer is allegorical.

The Golem of Prague - a man-shaped mass of clay created by Rabbi Loew - was animated by placing a piece of paper inscribed with

God's Name under its tongue. But come the Sabbath, Rabbi Loew would remove the sacred piece of paper from under the Golem's tongue, lest it go astray and menace the Sabbath peace. And it came to pass that one Friday eve the venerated Rabbi of Prague neglected to put the Golem to rest. Both in heaven and on earth, the Sabbath was delayed. Buber cryptically concludes from this legend: "Friends, it is not yet Sabbath. We must first remove the Holy Name from under the Golem's tongue."[111] The allusion is clearly to the crazed automaton, the war, that men have endowed with sacred spiritual value.

In an essay in December 1917, Buber bemoans the current confusion concerning the notion of a hero.[112] He who is fearless and is prepared to die, Buber declares, is certainly worthy of "all martial honor" (aller kriegerischen Ehren)[113]; however, this individual is not to be considered a hero. "The hero is . . . not driven, nor pulled into; he is not carried, nor dragged along; he is not commanded by any earthly power, nor is he used by any such power . . . "[114] Out of the solitude of his own being, the hero determines and decides for "his own thing."[115] He pursues that which is unique to his person with a singular resoluteness - "with all the power of his body and soul."[116] Yet despite his resoluteness, the hero is opposed to "the principle of force" - he is dedicated rather to "the principle of the spirit."[117]

In his writings during the latter period of the war, Buber frequently seeks to distinguish nationalism - which as a Zionist he still upheld - from the aggressive, self-centered national movements. Regrettably, he writes in April 1917, the content and meaning of nationalism have been debased by recent events.[118] Buber assures his readers that an era is approaching when nationalism will harvest brotherhood not conflict among peoples. We may look forward to a "union of nationalists from various peoples, a union of those concerned not with the hegemony, but the shaping of their respective nations . . . "[119] Prior to the advent of this glorious era, nationalism must be purified of the dross of chauvinism. This purification is the urgent task of mankind and, needless to say, "it is to be achieved without having first to travel the bloody, insidious road [of war]."[120] Accordingly, authentic Zionism - Buber wrote in August 1917 - "is beyond war and has nothing in common with it."[121] In a letter dated 4 February 1918, Buber assures Stefan Zweig "that a Jewish state with cannons, flags and military decorations is not imaginable to me, not even in the form of a dream . . . "[122] Realpolitik - the dominant variety of politics that pits one group against another, the politics that appeal to hate and rely upon vicious intrigue - is inimical to Zionism. "The way to Zion" - Buber argued in Der Jude of August, 1917 - "cannot lead through the highway of this madness."[123] In a letter dated 4 February 1917, Buber declares: "I also have overcome nationalism,"[124] i.e., chauvinism. Men of all nations - Buber writes in August 1917 - have begun to recognize the war as a horror of their own heinous creation.[125] They increasingly see "atonement" as a matter of one's response, it is man's responsibility "whether [the war] is a hopeless inferno or a hell-like purgatory . . . "[126] Man now has the opportunity to create a new world, a "true human community." Buber now argues that change in the quality of spiritual life must be preceded by a transformation of the relations between men. The axis of Gemeinschaft thus shifts from pathos to ethos.

The war has aroused a heightened longing for community (Gemeinschaft) - a bosom of comfort beyond the loneliness of the self. Buber remorsefully notes, in an essay written shortly after the armistice of November 1918, that men are "ready to surrender to any phantom of community, as we have so abundantly experienced."[127] Earlier Buber had written that one of the most reprehensible features of the war is that it sucks all into its vertigo and has thus effected a tragic confusion of "the genuine and the fictitious, the spiritual and the unspiritual."[128] Apropos this confusion, Buber remarks: "No idealism can be so pure, no enthusiasm so blessed with grace, that they are free from [their] system of application or are not stamped by the specific use [to which they are put]."[129]

> Poet, whether you write poetry or believe you do; scholar, whether you do research or pretend to; socialist, whether you are devoted or discuss tactics: recall that in a card game, he who plays out the hand can at the proper time use the good as well as the bad cards to his advantage. The 'authentic' ones among you are mixed in the game and must endure the company of the others and suffer their actions.[130]

For Buber this realization that one's actions are morally consequent implied a basic reevaluation of his notion of Erlebnis.

A few years prior to his death in 1965, Buber reported that he arrived at the idea of dialogical meeting "on the road of my thinking, out of the criticism of the concept of Erlebnis, to which I adhered to in my youth, hence out of radical self-correction."[131] Buber continues:

> "Erlebnis" belongs to the exclusive, individualized psychic sphere; "meeting," or rather, as I mostly prefer to say, precisely to avoid the temporal limitation, "relationship" transcends this sphere from its origins on. The psychological reduction of being, its psychologizing, had a destructive effect on me in my youth because it removed from me the foundation of human reality, the "to-one-another." Only much later, in the revolution of my thinking that taught me to fight and to gain ground did I win a reality that cannot be lost.[132]

Buber's essay "Vorbemerkung über Franz Werfel," March 1917,[133] is the earliest published indication of his departure from Erlebnis-mysticism. Buber faults Werfel - a Prague Jew and one of the first poets of expressionism in German literature - for an inability to treat the world objectively. "In der Welt dieses Dichters gibt es keine Gegenständlichkeit."[134] For Werfel the world is a mere extension of his ego, of his feelings. Characteristically, Werfel's images are those of voices, not objectified beings who stand over against him. These voices are ultimately mere "echo-words"[135] of the poet's own ego. "Die Sphaere Werfels ist nicht das Leben, ist das Erleben."[136] Buber attributes Werfel's increasing "Pauline melancholy"[137] to his failure to view "all impressions, moods, thoughts, indeed the core of [his own] soul as objects."[138] Consequently, Werfel has forfeited what Buber is wont to call "a pre-stabilizing distance"[139] from the world -- a distance which constitutes "a desired security from destructive melancholy and doubt."[140] Werfel abandons this security, according to Buber, because of his inability "to accept the natural aloneness of the ego."[141] He thus seeks union with the world, but it "is refused him, because it is not the Thou (*das Du*) but the I of the entity he encounters, and . . . I-ness rejects union."[142] "The real locus of duality," Buber observes, lies in one's inability to accept the separateness of his ego and to view the world as "other than I."[143] Some months after the publication of *I and Thou*, Buber delivered a lecture in which he identified "the psychologizing of the world" (*der Verseelung der Welt*) - the inclusion of the world in the soul - as the point where "the problematic of individuation [becomes] manifest."[144]

In an essay written just after the war, Buber speaks derisively of "the collectors of experiences (*Erlebnis-Sammlern*)."[145]

> . . . it may happen, by some odd perversity, that an individual entertains the illusion that he has surrendered himself to the unconditioned whereas in fact he has evaded it: he interprets the fact of having been affected by the unconditional as having had an "experience" (*Erlebnis*). His being remains wholly unperturbed and unchanged, but he has savored his hour of exaltation. He does not know the response; he knows only a "mood" (*Stimmung*). He has psychologized God.[146]

Buber prefaced the 1923 edition of his *Reden über das Judentum* with a note "clarifying" some of the key-concepts of these early addresses.[147] Anent *Erlebnis* he says:

> An "experience" (*Erlebnis*) is of concern to me only insofar as it is an event (*Ereignis*) or in other words, insofar as it pertains to the real God. The psychologizing of God and the psychic diffusiveness of the egoist who has cut himself off from the totality of the actual world I find noteworthy only as spectacles, as a dance on a tightrope between two cliffs. . . . I sense in this peculiar,

> eventless experiencing (ereignislosen Erlebnishaftigkeit) a perversion that is more than a psychic one; it is a cosmic perversion. Intrinsically, what really matters is not the "experiencing" of life (Erleben) - the detached subjectivity - but life (das Leben) itself.[148]

A year earlier, 1922, Buber held a series of lectures at the Jüdisches Lehrhaus founded by Franz Rosenzweig.[149] On the occasion of the fourth lecture of this series, a question from the audience offered Buber the opportunity to give his most comprehensive rejection of the "Begriff des Erlebnisses."[150] Firstly, Buber points out that he is usually "a patient man;" however, when one speaks of "experiencing God" this patience is exhausted.[151] Buber admits that he knows the "hell" that the misuse of the word Erlebnis implies - but through his sojourn in this hell he has learned the term's limitations.[152] To be sure, the term has validity when restricted to a psychic process that is exclusively subjective.

> . . . the word Erlebnis had undoubtedly and, indeed, it still has, its justification at certain instances in the course of life when it is necessary to underscore subjectivity. In order to point to the fact that over against life - or better said - that within life there are moments when we feel our egoity (Ichbezug) in an especially intense way - moments when we cannot simply accept, as we usually do, that . . . this our life is lived, but when we particularly feel and are obliged perhaps to reflect upon the fact that we live it. Occasionally this egoity crystallizes itself in particular events, such that we can no longer say: I live (lebe) it, but I experience (erlebe) it. I extract this fact, as it were, out of myself as something which now entirely pulsates as subjectivity. In order to be fair to that which is realized here I am obliged to call it nothing but Erlebnis.[153]

But a serious error is committed when *Erlebnis* refers to life, *das Leben* - an objective process. Hitherto the concept of *Erlebnis* was employed in such a manner "that life was subjectivized."[154] But in this way, "the great continuum, . . . the great continuity, the *spatial-temporal* continuity, in which we stand, of which we are part, in which we participate" is sundered and twisted, deformed; "discontinuous aspects of life" are served to the soul for its self-indulgent delectation.[155]

Life - in contrast to *Erlebnis* - is the world of space and time, it is a world of separateness. The removal of the pain and disunion that inhere in this situation cannot - as Buber had formerly held - be achieved in a solipsistic activity of heightening one's *Erlebnisse*. "Redemption" - Buber tells Hugo Bergmann in a letter dated 4 December 1917 - must be effected in time and space; it is not sufficient to conceive of redemption as a process *in* the ego - *ein ichvorgang*.

> Only the redemptive function of an individual - never the messianic event of the ascent of a man to God or the resurrection of a man - can be considered by man. Through the redemptive function the absolute future is prepared in the present, the continuous present. The consummation (*Vollendung*) of this future time is beyond our consciousness; on the other hand, its execution (*Vollzug*) is indeed accessible to our consciousness . . . . But precisely from this fact follows that the consummation cannot be an event - it is not to be located in a discrete, conscious instance of the historical past. In the same regard the consummation of future time may not be transformed from a process within the world (*Weltvorgang*) to a process within the ego (*Ichvorgang*). To be sure, the *Weltvorgang* must be experienced (*erlebt werden*) in the ego (as self-redemption . . .). However, should the *Ichvorgang* fulfil its world-redemptive task, every extra-temporal *Erlebnis* [must

> seek] temporal verification and representation. In this sense time is greater than eternity. The Messiah son of David does not desire rule over the nations, but life - that is: not divine power, human efficacy, time and space for his action - it seems to me that [the messianic idea] can mean nothing else.[156]

God, the Unconditioned, should - Buber tells a Vienna audience in May 1918 - become a reality not only in Erlebnisse, but primarily and pre-eminently in das Leben: He must be realized "between" men.

> The Divine may come to life in individual man; but it attains its earthly fullness only where . . . individual beings open themselves to one another, disclose themselves to one another, help one another; where immediacy is established between one human being and another; where the sublime stronghold of the individual is unbolted, and man breaks free to meet other man. Where this takes place, where the eternal rises in the Between (Dazwischen), the seemingly empty space: the true place of realization is community, and true community is the relationship in which the Divine comes to its realization between man and man.[157]

The lecture from which this citation is taken was, according to a draft, first entitled "Das Judentum und die wahre Gemeinschaft."[158] It was later published under the title: Der Heilige Weg, Ein Wort an die Juden und an die Völker,[159] and bore the dedication, "In memory of my friend Gustav Landauer."[160]

In consonance with this dedication, Der Heilige Weg indicates a considerable indebtedness to Landauer,[161] in particular to his political anarchism.[162] Landauer had characterized capitalism as the usurpation by the few of formally communal lands and the rise of the state, which serves to protect and legitimize the interests of these few.[163] The state seeks to centralize all authority and thus tends to undermine all regional and local organizations - Gemeinde, as Landauer was wont to call them. These Gemeinden were governed not by force, Gewalt, as the state is, but by spirit, Geist - or man's "pristine drive" for brotherly communion.[164] The state witnesses the progressive weakening of this drive - a process which, in turn, permits all sorts of outrageous economic and social practices.[165] The state is then ultimately defined by Landauer as a specific pattern of relations between men: "The state is a relation (Verhältnis), a relationship between men (eine Beziehung zwischen den Menschen), a specific way in which men relate to each other . . . "[166] The problem, Landauer concludes, is to alter the prevailing relations between men. " . . . we destroy the (state) by contracting other relations, by behaving differently."[167] Most socialists fail to see this and simply view the revolution as a change in the power structure to be achieved by the so-called progressive forces seizing control of the state apparatus. This would, Landauer contends, amount to little more than a coup d'état. This socialist state will still be governed by force, Gewalt, which means the continued eclipse of Geist.[168]

The cardinal function of socialist propaganda, Landauer urges, should be to betray the state as a "superstition."[169] Each individual - who, regardless of his social rank, is disturbed by the social and economic distortions wrought by capitalism - must disencumber himself of the false belief that the state is a universally necessary institution. Having done so, the individual will rediscover the remnant of the Gemeinde - the local communal structures, such as the parish, village, and neighborhood.[170] Here Geist will be reawakened. The socialist must now direct this reborn Geist into the establishment of re-structured Gemeinden in which landed property would be communalized.[171] These Gemeinden - on occasion Landauer refers to them as Gegen-Gemeinschaften[172] - will be socially characterized by "mutual help."[173] With the spread of the Gegen-Gemeinschaften the state will collapse - its authority will be undermined simply by being ignored.[174] Thus not the proletariat per se, but individuals who have liberated themselves from the "superstition of the state" and have rediscovered the Gemeinde are the vanguard of socialism.

In Der Heilige Weg, Buber portrays Jesus as an anarchist opposed to Rome - a "state pure and simple, which neither knew nor acknowledged anything superior to itself, which tolerated the gods only as guardians of its power and its laws . . . This state was a forced union that had supplanted all natural association (Genossenschaft)."[175] Jesus rejected the path of the Zealots, that of armed uprising, for it is

> bound to be self-destructive so long as a new structure of genuinely communal human life (ein neues echtes Gebilde menschlichen Zusammenlebens) is not born out of the soul's renewal, a structure that, in gaining strength will jolt the loathsome old system. Another of his sayings, "Do not resist evil," means: resist evil by doing good; do not attack the reign of evil but unhesitatingly band together for the reign of the good - and that will come when evil can no longer resist you, not because you have conquered it, but because you have redeemed it. Jesus wished to build the temple of true community (den Tempel der wahren

> Gemeinschaft) out of Judaism, a community whose mere sight would cause the despotic state's walls to crumble.[176]

Buber concluded Der Heilige Weg with a list of principles that are sine qua non for the renewal of Judaism.

> . . . community (Gemeinschaft), as the realization of the Divine in the shared life of men;
>
> . . .
>
> aid, mutual material and spiritual aid, as man's support, succor, and liberation of his fellow man for the work of realization, which through such aid is truly rendered unto God;
>
> . . .
>
> the community (die Gemeinde) in its multifarious forms, as local community, cooperative society, fellowship, and brotherhood, as the cell-unit of every community in which the immediate relationship between man and man, the carrier of theDivine, assumes lasting shape;
>
> . . .
>
> spirit (Geist), as the prophetic[177] teacher of faithfulness and renewal;

Buber concludes:

> All these principles can be summed up in the watchword: from within! Nothing new can be established by stripping an autocratic constitution off a country and superimposing on it a communist one instead when life between man and man remains unchanged, and so too the methods of government.[178]

Aside from a couple of articles commemorating Landauer's memory,[179] Der Heilige Weg is perhaps Buber's most singularly "Landauerian" essay. Themes from Landauer's social philosophy, however, reappear frequently in Buber's thought, that is, ever since he abandoned his Kriegsmetaphysik. Indicatively, the very first essays which mark this volte-face focuses on the problem of the state. In this widely publicized debate with Hermann Cohen, in the summer of 1916, on the nature of Zionism, Buber objected to the older philosopher's idealization of the state.[180] Cohen - enslaved by the "concepts" (Begriffe) spawned by nineteenth-century liberalism - naively, Buber argues, regards the state as an absolute principle, as the quintessence of humanity.[181] As regards Zionism - which Cohen ridiculed as a pretentious and illegitimate quest for a state - Buber told the Philosopher of Marburg that the founding of a state was not the Zionist goal.[182] The Jewish pioneers in Palestine are not interested in a state, rather they seek the renewal of Judaism, that is, of true human community, a community as envisioned by the prophets of men governed not by the "need for power" (Machtbedürfnis) but by Geist.[183] Landauer, not surprisingly - in a letter to Buber dated 12 October 1916 - expressed satisfaction with the thrust of Buber's argument against Cohen.[184] With the publication in January 1917, of an elaborated version of Buber's statements in the debate,[185] Landauer again wrote his friend:

> . . . Mit welcher Herzens freude habe ich Ihre Cohen-Büchlein noch einmal gelesen. Auch in den Anmerkungen ist noch manches von dem Wesentlichen nachgetragen, das uns verbindet. "For you shall be the seed of peace." (Sondern sie sollen Same des Friedens sein."[186]

The latter citation is from Luther's translation of Zachariah 8:13, a passage which introduces the prophecy of Israel's return from exile and which Buber cites as a foil to Cohen's contention that Jewry's dispersion among the nations and the eventual acquisition of the right to full participation in the various nation-states of the world enjoyed prophetic blessings.[187] Landauer no doubt appreciated the opposition between the nation-state and "peace" implied by Buber's citation of Zachariah.

Buber's earlier intellectual relationship with Landauer was founded on common aesthetic and metaphysical concerns. Political and social questions, on the other hand, were almost entirely absent from their pre-war relationship.[188] In an approbatory essay from 1904,[189] Buber epitomized Landauer's anarchism as a metaphysical solipsism. One knows with certainty only the facticity of his own being; accordingly, the veracity of all our beliefs concerning the external world are subject to an abiding doubt. Landauer, according to Buber, therefore bids us to free ourselves from these opinions, or as he calls them, "dogmas."[190] Should one comply with this demand he will find himself freed from the external bonds imposed by these "dogmas" and he will now be able to mold his life according to his integral will. Anarchism is, Buber states, "a fundamental disposition of each man who wishes to form from within himself a new being (Wesen)."[191] The emphasis here is on a personal aesthetic anarchism. Parenthetically, the compatibility of these dimensions of Landauer's anarchism with Buber's early Nietzscheanism is readily apparent. Grete Schaeder has observed that in the pre-war period, what was for Landauer "a source of his social mysticism" was for "Buber primarily a poetic principle, which he recreated in his Legendendichtung."[192] Interestingly enough, Buber felt Landauer best understood his "poetics." A penciled note found with the draft of Daniel reads:

> Lieber Landauer, Sie sind unter meinen Freunden der einzige, fuer den Daniel von je da war. So ist es mehr als Ausdrück eines Gefühls wenn ich diese erste Urkunde seines Lebens Ihnen züigne.[193]

Buber had also personally solicited the article that Landauer had written about him to be published in the special "Buberheft" issued by the Neue Blätter in 1913;[194] the individual - "er bleibe lieber ungenannt" - who the editor of the Neue Blätter, Anton Heidrich, suggested was totally unacceptable to Buber.[195] In his article, Landauer emphasized the philosophic and Jewish significance of Buber's thought. Buber, according to Landauer, represented the pairing of abstract conceptualization and feeling, "without which our ruined and declined culture (kultur) could not have any renewal."[196] Landauer then expatiates on Buber's role in correcting the negative image of the Jew - both in the eyes of the gentile and the Jew himself. "Und fuer Jeden und Nichtjuden ist das Bild jüdischen Wesens anders geworden."[197] (This latter remark hints that Buber's informed and affirmative Jewishness held a special attraction for Landauer, an assimilated but ethnically conscious Jew.[198]) Landauer also valued Buber's aesthetic message - a message which could be viewed as a species of Kulturpolitik, a structuring of man's spiritual environment through a reformation of his aesthetic and religious sensibilities[199] - that Buber's thought lacked a social dimension was apparently countenanced by Landauer as an inoffensive omission. Only with the war did it become apparent that Buber's singular emphasis on Kulturpolitik implied a distorted understanding of social and political realities.

Concomitant to the reversal of his position on the war and his reevaluation of his Kulturpolitik,[200] specifically his Erlebnis-mysticism, Buber discovers - as we have noted - Landauer's social philosophy. Characteristically, Landauer's 1911 statement that "Sozialismus ist Umkehr, Sozialismus ist Neubeginn . . . ,"[201] which Buber used as a motto for a 1919 essay[202] - seems to have provided a source of one of the most central themes in Buber's mature thought. The redemption of the world from "I-it" depends on man's Umkehr, or turning. I and Thou concludes with this thought: " . . . the God-side of the event whose world-side is called return (Umkehr) is called redemption."[203] In Der Heilige Weg the idea of a "new beginning"[204] specifically refers to the transformation of human relations which is a prerequisite for the reconstruction of community. "To bring about a true transformation of society, a true renaissance, human relations must undergo a change."[205]

Buber had earlier employed the term Umkehr, but solely as a religious-mystical conception - a man who returns, rises from conditionality to unconditionality[206]; now Umkehr acquires a social, more correctly an interhuman dimension.

This latter notion of Umkehr places the onus of social reform on the individual qua individual: each of us must strive to restructure his relations with other men. The thrust of this precept is to affirm the effectuality of individual action and the possibility of positive change. Thus Buber rejects what he believes to be Ferdinand Tönnies' pessimism that Gemeinschaft is forever locked in the past.[207] To be sure, Buber's comments in a 1919 discussion of Tönnies' thesis, Gesellschaft , is rapidly displacing Gemeinschaft and many characteristic institutions of the latter were irretrievably lost. It would be foolish, if not impossible, Buber concedes, to withdraw from history and retreat to a pre-modern society.[208] But are we, he queries, to assume that "the dissolution of Gemeinschaft is an inevitable evolutionary fact?"[209] In reply to his own question, in addition to reiterating Landauer's teaching that the remnants of Gemeinde provide a basis for the renewal of Gemeinschaft,[210] Buber introduces the fact that gemeinschaftliche relations persist on the interpersonal, subinstitutional level.

> Gemeinschaft . . . consists today merely as a personal event, as a gracious dawning (ein gnadenreiches Aufdämmern) of the truth between men and men.[211]
>
> . . . our associative life is no longer an elemental being with-and-for one another (elementares Ineinander) but an accommodating being next-to-one another (angepasstes Nebeneinander); however, do we not experience - whenever a true glance meets another - that the Thou (das Du) is still primary for us and that being for-one another (das Einander) is sacred?[212]
>
> . . . as often as a man joins hands with another [there is Gemeinschaft].[213]
>
> . . . No lived (gelebte) Gemeinschaft is lost.[214]

By redefining it as essentially a trans-historical pattern of relations, Buber has rescued Gemeinschaft from the limited historicity that Tönnies imposed upon it. Gemeinschaft, he says in Der Heilige Weg, exists whenever "individuals open themselves to one another . . . (whenever) immediacy is established between one human being and another . . . "[215]

The understanding of the structure of this pattern of relations will, Buber suggests, constitute the grammar for the renewal of *Gemeinschaft*, that is, the maximization of *gemeinschaftliche* relations. First, he noted that these relations are not to be conceived as a product of particular attitudes, feelings or actions.

> Gemeinschaft ist wenn Mehrere zusammen Etwas haben, was Anderes ist, als die Summe der Anteile - dieses Andere, die Gemeinschaft, ist nicht Resultat, nicht Produkt, nicht abgezogen aus dem Tatsächlichen - Sie ist viel mehr das Primäre.[216]

This founding fact of *Gemeinschaft*, Buber writes in *Der Heilige Weg*, is something that occurs in the region of the Center - the Between, in that "seemingly empty space" between men who meet each other in immediacy.[217] Ontologically, *Gemeinschaft* is then not established by the mere relation of men to each other, but by their mutual relation to the realm of the Between (*das Daszwischen*,[218] *das Zwischen*[219]), or to the Center (*die Mitte*).

> Gemeinschaft ist Geschehen um die lebendige Mitte Beziehung der Einzelnen zueinander, die noch nicht Gemeinschaft ist - schliesst sich der Kreis; wird Gemeinschaft.[220]

That social reality is for Buber an ontic category, that is "on the far side of the subjective" is a logical consequence of his reevaluation of *Erlebnis*-mysticism. In this reevaluation Buber did not, however, abandon his concern with "realization" - he merely negated *Erlebnis* as a valid locus of that realization.

Human Gemeinschaft as the Locus of God's Realization

In Der Heilige Weg Buber restates a proposition we encountered in his earlier work, namely that it is a function of man to effect the metaphysical unity of the universe. This act, we recall, Buber referred to as realization (Verwirklichung). Now in the above essay the act of realization is transposed from the spiritual recesses of the individual to the realms of interpersonal relations.

> In every human being there is present the beginning of universal being (Allsein); but it can unfold only in the relatedness to universal being, in the pure immediacy of giving and taking . . . merging him with the oneness of the world. The Divine may come to life in individual man; . . . - but it attains its earthly fullness only where . . . individual beings open themselves to one another . . . , help one another . . . [The] true place of realization (Verwirklichung) is community, and true community is that relationship in which the Divine comes to its realization between man and man.[221]

Buber often reiterates this point: the realization "of the Divine on earth is fulfilled not within man but between man and man . . . , it is consummated only in the life of true community."[222] Gemeinschaft then has a metaphysical status; it implies "relatedness to universal being." Gesellschaft, of course, signifies the converse; it is a state of unrealization, of cosmic disunion.

In Gesellschaft, Buber writes in a 1919 essay, one suffers "a radical forlorness" - or "what the religious man would call distance from God, a void of God."[223] The intellectual fashion that typifies Gesellschaft - deterministic doctrines of evolution and ineluctable development - only tends to exacerbate the despair of the forlorn. What is necessary, and indeed imperative if man wishes to break the grip of *Gesellschaft* is a bold assertion of the possibility of the renewal of *Gemeinschaft*. Buber refers to this assertion as a "turning" (*Wende*), as a "willing of God" (*Gottwollen*).[224]

> Keiner vermog es als der ewige Geist der Wende, der Überwindung der Entwicklungen, der Eine, der allein, wenn die letzte Not ihn ruft, den verirrten Menschen umkehren macht: das menschliche Gottwollen.[225]

Turning, an individual defies the given pattern of relations in *Gesellschaft,* "tears the veil of conceptualization, a veil inspired by a passion for instrumental aims (*Zwecksucht*) that makes individuals appear not as persons but as members of a state, of a class . . . "[226] He who turns relates to his fellow man unconditionally, and behold there awakens in both him and his fellow "an awareness of their universal being"[227] - each appears to the other as a person, as someone "unique and a bearer of universal being (*Alltragende*)."[228]

Since God desires to be realized in mankind (*Menschheit*),[229] the act of turning is graced by "theophany"[230]:

> . . . das menschliche Gottwollen und das götliche Menschwollen sind nicht zu trennen. Wenn der menschliche Wille mitten in einer Welt der Determination die Freiheit Gott zu wollen bekundet, ist Gottfreiheit über ihm. Wende hat doppeltes Antlitz . . .[231]

Parenthetically, we may compare this citation from 1919 with the last paragraph of *I and Thou:*

> . . . Doom becomes more oppressive in every new eon, and the return (*Umkehr*) more explosive. And the theophany comes ever closer, it comes ever closer to the sphere between beings - comes closer to the realm

> which hides in our midst, in the between . . . .
> But the God-side of the event whose world-side
> is called return is called redemption.[232]

The striking parallel between these two citations suggests that the essay entitled "Gemeinschaft," from which the first is taken may have been - or is based on - the first draft of I and Thou that Buber says he wrote "in the autumn of 1919"[233]; "Gemeinschaft was published in 1919, and evidence indicates it was written no earlier than the summer of that year.[234] The suggestion that the essay "Gemeinschaft" constitutes or is based upon[235] the first draft of I and Thou gains cogency when it is considered that the third and last section of I and Thou - that section whose concluding paragraph has a thematic parallel to the essay "Gemeinschaft" - was written before the other sections of that book.[236] Irrespective of this conjectured manuscriptural connection between the essay "Gemeinschaft" and the peroration of I and Thou, their thematic similarity has in and of itself intrinsic interest.

The former essay was part of a series of monographs - Worte an die Zeit - projected by Buber. According to its prospectus the series - of which only two monographs actually appeared[237] - was to illuminate "the becoming religiosity of community and the construction of a new human environment - "die werdende Religiosität der Gemeinschaft und der Aufbau einer neuen Menschenwelt."[238] In 1914 Buber, the Erlebnis-mystic, spoke of religiosity as a tendency in man that seeks to actuate God's realization; by securing the creative integrity of one's personality one acts to renew the cosmic harmony.[239] In 1919, religiosity is that human disposition that affects the realization of God through the establishment of authentic relations: "Whenever one man joins hands with another, we feel [God's] presence dawning (aufkeimen)."[240] ". . . true community is that relationship in which the Divine comes to realization between man and man."[241] In a lecture given a few months after the publication of I and Thou, Buber expressly equated the realization of community and that of "the eternal."[242] What Buber means here is stated rather unambiguously in Der Heilige Weg:

> [Judaism's] longing for God is the longing to prepare a place for Him in the true community . . . ; [Judaism's] wait for the Messiah is the wait for the true community. . . . Hence Judaism must not liken itself to other nations, for it knows that, being firstborn, realization is incombent upon it. . . . So long . . . as the kingdom of God has not come, Judaism will not recognize any man as the true Messiah, yet it will never cease to expect redemption to come from man, for it is man's task to establish God's power on earth. . . . To do the good deed is to fill the world with God; to serve God in truth is to draw Him into life. . . . [Judaism's] ideal, holiness, is true community with God and true community with human beings, both in one.[243]

By working for Gemeinschaft, men affect the realization of God in the world. Given this proposition and the postulated ontic status of gemeinschaftliche relations - a status which is, as we have seen, enjoyed by virtue of the relata's mutual relationship to a "real" (wirkliche)[244] Center, the realm of the Between - it would seem that the realized God coincides with the Between, that is, the realized God is the ontological source of Gemeinschaft's onticality. Indeed Buber consistently ascribes the ontic character of the Between to the fact of God's realization in this realm - "The kingdom of God," Buber observes in a 1923 lecture on the theme of *Gemeinschaft*, "evolves in and out of our Center."[245] The realm of the Between - that which establishes "authentic" *Gemeinschaft* - is the locus of God's realization.

As Buber developed his philosophy of dialogue - dialogue demanding the absolute autonomy of the subjects of, or rather the partners in, the I-Thou relation - the notion that God is realized through the actions of man became increasingly problematic. The concept of realization implied an anthropomorphism that clearly courted what Franz Rosenzweig in 1914 labeled - in veiled reference to the thought of the young Buber - an "atheistic theology,"[246] a tendency to efface the difference between man, the earthly penitent, and God, the providential Lord of Creation. In 1923 Buber expressly admitted to the atheistic dangers of the teaching of God's realization.

> . . . This term lures us into the glittering notion that God is an idea which can become reality only through man, and, furthermore, induces the hopelessly wrong conception that God is not, but that lie becomes - either within man or within mankind. I call such a theory . . . hopelessly wrong, not because I am not certain of a divine *becoming* in immanence, but because only a primal certainty of divine *being* enables us to sense the awesome meaning of divine becoming, that is, the self-imparting of God to His creation and His participation in the destiny of its freedom, whereas without this primal certainty there can be only a blatant misuse of God's name.[247]

The concept that God's realization is effected by man obscures the fact that God is a gracious being who stands over against man - a fact which is *sine qua non* if the dialogical tension posited by the I-Thou relation is to remain meaningful. Despite this recognition of the incompatibility between "realization" and "dialogue," Buber continues to refer to the realization of God.[248] Only to realize God now means "to *prepare* the world . . . as a place for His reality - to help the world become God-real (*gottwirklich*)."[249] Buber tries to soften the anthropomorphism of this statement by emphasizing that "man creates certainly not God; rather he creates ever again God's image."[250] In *Religion als Gegenwart* - which preceded the publication of *I and Thou* by less than a year - the "*Du-welt*" is repeatedly described as "*die Verwirklichungswelt.*"[251] A few months after the appearance of *I and Thou,* Buber noted that in dialogue we help "the world become God-real" - the "one thing for whose sake we are on earth, the one thing that God will *not* achieve *without* us."[252] God addresses man, and if man responds the divine is "realized" in the world.

In Buber's early *Erlebnis*-mysticism, realization is in the exclusive precinct of the self. "The ecstatic," i.e., the *Erlebnis*-mystic - Buber observed in a critical preface written in 1954 to a collection of some of his earliest essays - "loses the sure knowledge of the *principium individuationis,* and understands this precious experience of his unity as the experience of *the* unity."[253] After having experienced the "higher" unity of the self, one perforce regards the "lower" world of the everyday, of time and space, with profound disdain. Subsequent to the *volte-face* from his earlier view of the world, Buber declares that the *principium individuationis* is not to be overcome, but sanctified. This, in effect, is Buber's answer to Hugo Bergman regarding redemption.[254] In his letter to Bergman dated 4 December 1917, Buber, we recall, argues that redemption is a process that requires authentication (Bewährung) in time and space. It is false to consider redemption, Buber tells his correspondent, an "atemperal Erlebnis," nor is it a microcosmic process in one's ego. Indeed, an "eventless experiencing" (ereignislosen Erlebnishaftigkeit), that which is unrelated to time and space, to "the totality of the actual world," is "a cosmic perversion," Buber writes in 1923.[255] In the same year Buber gave a series of five lectures in Zurich on the theme of Gemeinschaft.[256] His thesis: Gemeinschaft "is an event that arises out of the Center between men."[257]

As an "event" Gemeinschaft takes place in "life's totality,"[258] that is, in time and space. On the other hand, Gemeinschaft, or more correctly, the gemeinschaftliche relation - like Erlebnis - being realized in "ontic directness" (ontische Unmittelbarkeit),[259] enjoys, Buber claims, a noumenality. This is to say, Gemeinschaft is beyond the phenomenality of time and space. Yet unlike realized Erlebnisse, which have similar metaphysical privileges, gemeinschaftliche relations are actualized in the matrix of the phenomenal world, in "the totality of the actual world."[260] Although the event of relation (Beziehungsvorgang),[261] Buber observes in I and Thou, is in origin noumenal, it is manifest in time and space, which - by virtue of its noumenality - it, the relational event, acts to "consecrate."[262] Bound to life, relation heightens a particular moment's uniqueness or "presentness,"[263] thereby lifting that moment from the pale of the principium individuationis, which would see it as a mere fact - a "fiction of the fixed lapse"[264] - along a continuum of cause and effect.

> The You [of the relation] also appears in space, but only in an exclusive confrontation in which everything else can only be background from which it emerges, not its bounding and measure. The You appears in time, but in that of a process lived through not as a process that is a part of a constant and organized sequence but in a "duration" whose purely intensive dimension can be determined only by starting from You.[265]

In relation the "spell of separation"[266] is broken:

> When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, then he is no thing among things nor does he consist of things. He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described . . . And even as prayer not in time but time in prayer, the sacrifice not in space but space in sacrifice . . . I do not find the human being to whom I say You in any Sometime and Somewhere. . . . As long as the firmament of the You is spread over me, the tempests of causality cower at my heels, and the whirl of doom (Verhängnis) congeals.[267]

In the I-Thou relation the primal oneness of "the world-order" - as opposed to the multiplicity of "the ordered world" governed by the principium individuationis - becomes manifest.[268] Through relation the cosmic unity is realized:

> . . . man encounters [in relation] being and becoming as what confronts him - always only one being and every thing only as a being. What is there reveals itself to him in the occurrence, and what occurs there happens

> to him as being. Nothing else is present but this one, but this one cosmically . . . . The encounters do not order themselves to become a world, but each is for you a sign of the world order. They have no association (sie sind nicht untereinander verbunden), but every one guarantees your association with the world.[269]

In relation one realizes not only a cosmic but also an existential "oneness": "The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being. The basic word I-It can never be spoken with one's whole being."[270] Or: "I require a You to become (Ich werde am Du); becoming I, I say You."[271]

Realization effected by relation may not be understood as a particular phase in the evolution of man and the cosmos, however. Rather, each instance of realization is but a form of "the eternal becoming of the living God - ein Werden des in Ewigkeit seienden Gottes."[272] Buber opposes this formula to "the chatter of 'the emerging God (der werdende Gott)'"[273] - which he deems "presumptuously"[274] ignores the dialogical tension between man and God. Nonetheless, talk of the "eternal becoming . . ." still recalls the Heraclitean doctrine of continuous flux from which the "chatter of the emerging God" is derivative and which Buber expressly affirmed in his pre-dialogical period. As an Erlebnis-mystic, Buber adopted, as we had an occasion to note, Heraclitus' ascription of an ontological status to flux; nothing is, only becoming is real. Each moment and situation is new and unique, Buber taught.

Mutatis mutandis, in his post-mystical period, Buber still holds a view of "the emergence (ein Werden) of the living God"[275] as an ever fluid, protean process. The living God emerges in mankind and in the world - permeates being, as Buber is wont to say - through a continuous, non-teleological pattern of discrete theophanies and through the realization of these theophanies by the responding man. Buber's description of this process parallels Nietzsche's presentation of "the eternal return of the same" - a notion, as we have seen, cognate to Heraclitus' logos. Although an on-going, protean process, Buber states in the eighth lecture of Religion als Gegenwart, revelation is essentially one.

> Die Offenbarungen . . . sind ihrem Grund nach nichts anderes als die Ewige, allgegenwartige Offenbarung, die Offenbarung des Jetzt und Hier. Niemals und nirgendwo ist geschehen, was nicht auch jetzt und hier geschiet. Aber es gibt eine Geschichte, es gibt trotzdem eine qualitative Verschiedenheit der Geschichtsseiten - Ich will das zu erklaeren versuchen. Es gibt die Offenbarung, die ewige Offenbarung, und es gibt die Freiheit des Menschen, und der Mensch ist in die Freiheit gestellt. Dies, dass dieses unlösbare Parodox, in dem wir stehen, in dem sich unser Leben vollzieht, das unser Leben traegt, das Paradoxe dass Gott die Welt bestimmt und dass der Mensch frei ist . . . Der ewige Kraftquell strömt, die ewige Berührung harrt, die ewige Stimme tönt, nichts weiter . . . Nicht die Stimme ist verschieden, sondern die Hörer und der Moment sind verschieden.[276]

If revelation is continuous and one, its manifestation, its theophany, in each moment and situation is of equal priority and, in that each moment is other than the preceding, is unique. Every moment and situation qua theophany then requires its own realization. Accordingly, realization follows a discontinuous pattern. "The encounters [of I and Thou] . . . have no association with each other."[277] This discontinuity also lies in the very nature of realization. The Thou of a theophany demands to be actuated in time and space, as such the Thou ineluctably is objectified, it becomes It.

> However exclusively present [a You] may have been in the direct relationship - as soon as the relationship has run its course or is permeated by means, the You becomes an object among objects, possibly the noblest one and yet one of them, assigned to measure and boundary. The actualization of work involves a loss of actuality (Am Werk bedeutet Verwirklichung im einen Entwirklichen im anderen Sinn).[278]

That "all response binds You into the It world,"[279] Buber regards "the sublime melancholy of our lot."[280]

The discontinuity of the realizing relation renders Gemeinschaft - conceived by Buber as a relation between men in which they realize a particular theophany - problematic. If the desired relation between men, per definitionem, is evanescent, how can one meaningfully speak of Gemeinschaft, which after all as a social fact implies spatio-temporal duration?

Despite the discontinuity it is doomed to, gemeinschaftliche relation could acquire a semblance of constancy by frequent renewal of this relation. Should one maximize his openness to the Thou that stands against him, it might be said that Gemeinschaft has for him a measure of continuity. This continuity Buber speaks of here does not necessarily include the same particulars, the same relata, of the relation. In the course of a day, one can conceivably have a Thou-relation "in the tiniest and most transient events"[281] - say, with a stranger with whom he exchanges a glance in an elevator - and in more permanent associations - with one's wife and children whom he may recurrently meet in I-Thou.[282] The continuity of these relations is ontological, it rests in the relation *an sich.* Specific feelings, thoughts, attitudes, institutional fidelity may accompany a *gemeinschaftliche* relation, but it is - we recall - "the relation to the Center which is the constitutive element."[283] This is to say, true *Gemeinschaft* is an ontic relation. "Whoever stands in (the I-Thou) relation, participates in an actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), that is, in a being (*Sein*) that is neither part of him nor merely outside of him."[284] The noumenal source of *Gemeinschaft* - its "mystery of objectivity - is, according to Buber, the eternal Thou that forever reveals itself in "one boundless flood,"[285] transforming into the potential Thou of every moment and situation. If one responds to that Thou that awaits him in these moments and situations, he renews his relation to the Center,[286] the eternal Thou: each relation "leads you to that You in which the lines of relation, though parallel, intersect."[287] By virtue of the common Center, all *gemeinschaftliche* relations enjoy a vertical (*qua* noumenal), although not (in a strict sense) a horizontal, spatio-temporal continuity.

Gemeinschaft, the I-Thou relation between men exists then in the act of realization; as realization is renewed *Gemeinschaft* exists *de novo.* Because of its requisite "ontic directness," its intense exclusiveness, the realization of *Gemeinschaft* "by its very nature contains *only* two partners"[288] - an individual and he who confronts him, "both in their full actuality."[289] One should perhaps speak of the I-Thou as a *Zwiege-*

meinschaft. Unfortunately Buber does not offer a systematic explication of the transition from the *Zwie* - to the *Vielgemeinschaft*, we are thus obliged to rely on inference.

The relative continuity, as just observed, of the *Zwiegemeinschaft* is enjoyed by but one individual only, the constant *relatum* of the relation(s). To be sure, in such instances as marriage where daily and intimate contact permits the possibility of a repeated coincidence of the *relata* of the I-Thou relation, the constancy of *Gemeinschaft* is indeed shared by two. Aside from such special cases, *Gemeinschaft*, in order to be considered a fact of social continuity - a fact that enduringly characterizes the associative life of many, of three or more men who do not necessarily live in frequent, close interaction - one will have to assume the intensive multiplication of the I-Thou relation within a contiguous locality, given a periodic iteration of most *relata* of the *gemeinschaftliche* relation, albeit, of course, not necessarily with a coincidence of the partners. In such an instance we may speak of a *Vielgemeinschaft:* within a given group of men I-Thou relations abound such that most constituents of the group partake, with relative frequency, in the *gemeinschaftliche* relation.

A true *Vielgemeinschaft* is said to arise where a collection of men have "a common relationship to the Center."[290] This proposition has caused considerable confusion for some of Buber's commentators. The Center has been variously understood as a true, charismatic leader;[291] as "the sphere of ultimate values"[292]; as a metaphysical sensation that accompanies the effort to build a just, organic community[293]; as a "central Thou" shared by numerous individual I's, who thus, epiphenomenally, have a "commonality."[294] While none of these explications of Buber's concept of the Center are incorrect, all suffer from an incompleteness.

The Vielgemeinschaft, Buber held, is founded when a host of men encounter and realize a common revelation, a Thou that addresses them collectively. In a 1930 essay bearing as a title the query "Wie kann Gemeinschaft werden?", Buber states:

> Wenn Menchen mit einander wirklich etwas zu tun haben, miteinander erfahren und miteinander auf diese Erfahrung lebensmaessig antworten, wenn Menschen eine lebendige Mitte haben, um die sie gereiht sind, dann entsteht Gemeinschaft zwischen ihnen.[295]

The Center introduces an unconditionality into the lives of men, which in turn, induces an immediacy in the relations between men. As an illustration of the Gemeinschaft between men that emerges from the common realization of a shared Center, Buber points to - in "What is man?" (1943) - the example of

> . . . the closer union of which is formed for a few days among the genuine disciples and fellow workers of a movement when an important leader dies. All impediments and difficulties between them are set aside, and a strange fruitfulness, or at all events, incandescence, of their life with one another is established. Another transient form is seen when in the face of a catastrophe which appears inevitable the really heroic element of community gathers together within itself, withdraws from idle talk and fuss, but each is open to other and they anticipate in a brief common life, the binding power of a common death.[296]

In *I and Thou* Buber expresses this observation as a thesis:

> True community [*die wahre Gemeinde*] does not come into being because people have feelings for one another (though that is required too) but rather on two accounts: all of them have to stand in a living center (sic)[297] and they have to stand in a living reciprocal relation to one another. The second event has its source in the first, but it is not immediately given with it [*ist aber noch nicht mit ihm allein gegeban*]. A living reciprocal relationship includes feelings but it is not derived from them. A community [*die Gemeinde*] is built upon a living active center.[298]
>
> . . . men's relations to their true YOU, being radii that lead from all 1-points to the center (sic), create a circle. Not the periphery, not the community [*die Gemeinschaft*] comes first, but the radii, the common relation to the center (sic). That alone assures the genuine existence of a community [*die Gemeinde*].[299]

This statement was reiterated, almost verbatim in every discussion of Buber's on *Gemeinschaft.*[300] It may therefore be taken as his credo on the matter.

Being founded by a "situational" revelation, the *Vielgemeinschaft,* like the *Zwiegemeinschaft,* is faced with an inherent discontinuity. But having once undergone the exalting occasion of a *Vielgemeinschaft,* men thirst for something spread out in time, for duration. Thus religious faith is born: the Center becomes God-object.[301] Concomitantly, men also "thirst for something spread out in space, for the representation in which the community of the faithful is united with its God."[302] The cult of a Center-God thus arises. Both religion and cult initially serve to supplement the founding acts of relation of the *Vielgemeinschaft,* but

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in time, they become substitutes for these relations. What is more, religious dogma and cultic practices tend to weaken one's attentiveness to the address of the eternal Thou. A group's relationship to the Center must be renewed in every situation, otherwise, it ceases to be a genuine Vielgemeinschaft.[303]

The tendency of a community of men to renew their relation to the Center may be facilitated by their "distinctive conception of the universe."[304] This conception, first shaped by the "original encounter"[305] of the community with the Center, the eternal Thou, is continually "reinforced by the subsequent generations that point in the same direction."[306] This particular conception of the universe serves to sensitize those who share it to the Center, to the address of the eternal Thou. Should, however, the group's view of the universe become detached from the Center, should the view fail to be periodically renewed by the "breath" of the Unconditional, it would cease to serve its primordial function. "When a culture," Buber writes in I and Thou, "is no longer centered in a living and continually renewed . . . relational process it freezes into an It-world."[307]

Buber referred to the sensitivity of a group of men to the Center as an "essential We."[308] When the essential We is present, there prevails within a group "an outer directness which is the decisive presupposition of I-Thou relations. The We includes the Thou potentially."[309] But even the "We" does not exist an sich; it too suffers the threat of discontinuity. "Just as little as the I does [the essential We] allow itself to be carried over factually into a third person . . . , it actualizes itself and is no longer there."[310] The essential We must forever be renewed.

Buber explains the process of intermittently renewing the "essential We" by an appeal to the Heraclitean idea of the logos. In a lecture of 1956 - "What is common to All" - Buber critically confronts "the degenerate Western spirit" and to do so "summoned Heraclitus."[311] Buber contrasts the prevailing individualism of Western culture - "the tendency toward the primacy of individual existence and toward self-glorification"[312] - with the world-view of Heraclitus. Mankind has "a single cosmos in common (einen einzigen ihnen gemeinschaftlichen Kosmos),"[313] Buber quotes the Seer of Ephesus. The flux of all implies that men have both a corporeal and spiritual "mutuality"[314] with the cosmos, in general, and with each other, in particular. The logos which governs this mutuality between men "dwells in the substance of the world, that is common . . ."[315] Heraclitus "thereby asserts that all men in the eternal originality of their genuine spoken intercourse with one another have a share in the consummation of this indwelling."[316] In "genuine spoken intercourse" - that which bears the dynamic "tension" (Spannung)[317] of the "common" - men shape the "common cosmos" (ein gemeinschaftlicher Kosmos) that belongs peculiarly to human culture. Implicit in Heraclitus' world-view, Buber states, is the notion of the "genuine We" (das echte Wir)[318] - "the genuine saying of We."[319] Heraclitus "would not have denied . . . that we cannot follow the logos more adequately than by saying We"[320]:

> Man has always had his experiences as I, his experiences with others, and with himself, but it as We, ever again as We, that he has constructed and developed a world out of his experiences . . . Thus the cosmos is preserved amid the changes of the world images.[321]

Moreover, without the renewal of the essential We - through I-Thou relations - the logos would be undermined and the cosmos would be, Buber quotes Heraclitus, "like a heap of chaotically spilled-out refuse."[322] For "the same meaning of existence which holds sway in the coming-to-be of words, the same genuineness for ever renewing itself in the fire of oppositeness is that which embodies itself in the world process."[323] The destiny of the logos depends on the periodic renewal of relations.

Despite his singular wisdom, Heraclitus failed - Buber quickly adds - to see that the requisite renewal can be inspired only by an address from the eternal Thou, the transcendent Thou that stands against us, commanding our unconditional response.[324]

Buber admits that the *Vielgemeinschaft*, as conceived by him, cannot be comprehended by "current sociological categories."[325] Indeed the *Vielgemeinschaft* is not to be associated, with any particular social structure. An essential We "can arise in every kind of group, but it cannot be understood from the life of any single one of the groups."[326] The structure of *Gemeinschaft* is and must remain fluid and protean, for such is the logos or rather the address of the eternal Thou. Accordingly Buber celebrated Hasidism as but "a great historical example of a communal reality which can arise to this or that extent, in this or that form, at different times and different places."[327] All Gemeinschaft, by definition, is situational[328]- is a fact established by the realization of the situation's address. From this premise, Buber rejected the proposition that Gemeinschaft could be purposefully created. In reply to a question put to him, by an interlocutor at a 1923 lecture he delivered on the theme of community - whether "Gemeinschaft could be willed," buber answered

> Gemeinschaft kommt nur zu stande, wenn sie nicht gewollt wird: als Nebenerschienung nicht bewirkt, verursacht. Das Wollen, Benzwecken der Gemeinschaft schliesst sie aus.[329]

As a fact of realization, Gemeinschaft, is not determined by social or institutional structures. On the other hand, the realization affected by the I-Thou relation may have definite sociological consequences. Foremost, the ontic directness accompanying the I-Thou relation permits one to "stand against the alleged necessity, the economic and political."[330]

Yet, in seeming contradiction to the aforesaid, Buber does talk of "de-centralized cooperative settlements"[331], of "aiming at a new organic whole."[332] Buber, however, claims that when he discusses specific forms of Gemeinschaft, he is not being prescriptive:

> . . . by 'community,' the unfolding of whose forces I desire, I understand nothing that has already found its form in past time; and that, when, I talk about realization, I think of certain conditions that will presumably be given for it.[333]

(Buber's contention here that his adumbration of the future Gemeinschaft has no prescriptive intent is not fully convincing. Indeed his communitarian socialism and concern with Utopian social experiments suggest, as Paul E. Pfuetze has indicated, "a strain of romanticism in [his] social philosophy."[334] More specifically, Buber's socialism - his insistance that social change be preceded by an inner transformation in human relations, that the state be reduced "to its proper functions," that society be restructured as a federation of small Gemeinden - points to, as we have had occasion to discuss, the underpinnings of his social vision in the thought of his friend Gustav Landauer).

Responsiveness to the address of "the becoming of the living God" to the ever becoming logos is the guarantee of both the Zwie and the Vielgemeinschaft. Thus, in conclusion, we may describe Buber's social philosophy as a religious, or perhaps more aptly, if we wish to underscore his definition of Gemeinschaft as an ever renewing and protean pattern of revelation and response qua realization - as a Heraclitean sociology.

Clearly here we have sociology in a very special sense. Buber's sociological focus is on neither the institutional nor the organizational. Rather he sought to identify principles which generate particular interpersonal and spiritual sensitivities - sensitivities which he deemed essential for the wellbeing of any society. As Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, who earned his Ph. D. in sociology with Buber, has observed:

> Buber's central sociological or social philosophical concern was to define the conditions of social and cultural transformation and the conditions of the stagnation or demise of cultures and societies rather than to prescribe simple structural or organizational change.[335]

The regenerative principle Buber identified as the gemeinschaftliche or dialogical relation between individuals. This principle does not derive from, nor is it ex hypothesi absent from any particular social system. Dialogue is, in other words, an ontological structure of relation - as such, it does not possess a specific social content.

As a subinstitutional structure of interpersonal relations, Buber feels, that dialogue is obscured by the sociologist's general perspective. Dialogue demarcates a realm of interpersonal existence - das Zwischenmenschliche - which requires special attention. Writing in 1953 Buber observed:

> It is usual to ascribe what takes place between men to the social realm, thereby blurring a basically important line of division between two essentially different areas of human life. I myself, when I began nearly fifty years ago [in the Geleitwort to Die Gesellschaft] to find my own bearings in the knowledge of society, making use of the then unknown concept of das Zwischenmenschliche, made the same error. From that time it became increasingly clear to me that we have to do here with a separate category of our existence, even a separate dimension, to use a mathematical term, and one with which we are so familiar that its peculiarity is extremely important not only for our thinking, but also for our living.[336]

Accordingly Buber feels that the study of das Zwischenmenschliche should be distinguished from sociology. To be sure,

> [t]he sociologist may object to any separation of the social and das Zwischenmenschliche on the ground that society is actually built upon human relations, and the theory of these relations is therefore to be regarded as the very foundation of sociology.[337]

But the sociologist's concept is far too ambiguous and all-inclusive. By not restricting his purview to interpersonal happenings between the "partners," the sociologist inevitably fails to appreciate the singular significance of dialogue and the sphere in which it unfolds, das Zwischenmenschliche.

Nor, of course, can das Zwischenmenschliche be comprehended by psychology.

> . . . it is basically erroneous to try to understand the interhuman phenomena as psychological. When two men converse together, the psychological is certainly an important part of the situation, as each listens and each prepares to speak. Yet this is only the hidden accompaniment to the conversation itself, the phonetic event fraught with meaning, whose meaning is to be found neither in one of the two partners nor in both together, but only in their dialogue itself, in this "between" (Zwischen) which they live together.[338]

This conceptualization of das Zwischenmenschliche as enjoying an extra-mental ontic status, as we have noted in our discussion in Chapter III, seems to bear the imprint of Simmel, who understood the forms of interaction to be paradoxically objective structures of "subjective minds." The specification of Buber's focus on the relation of dialogic sensitivity between individuals, we have argued, derives from Landauer's ethical-social vision. Finally, we may infer from his notion of the Center, that although he rejected his early Erlebnis-mysticism, Buber apparently held fast to Nietzsche's Heraclitean Weltbild: the world (qua reality) is in constant flux and should we desire to remain in accord with this process our "primal" relation to it must be continually regenerated. Indeed, in that he continued to see the solution of the fundamental problems of human existence and culture as resting in acts of the spirit, Buber remains a Kulturphilosoph.

APPENDIX

Die Gesellschaft: Sammlung Sozialpsychologischer Monographien.[1]
herausgegeben von M. Buber

Geleitwort zur Sammlung

. . .

This collection of monographs, *Die Gesellschaft,* addresses itself to the problem of the inter-human (*das Zwischenmenschliche*). Its subject matter is, therefore, the associative life of men in all its forms (*Formen*), objective structures (*Gebilde*)[2] and actions (*Aktionen*). The methodological perspective assumed in each of the monographs here presented is that of social psychology.

Das Zwischenmenschliche is that which occurs between (*Zwischen*) men; in some ways it is not unlike an impersonal, objective process. The individual may very well experience *das Zwischenmenschliche* as his "action and passion," but somehow it cannot be fully ascribed or reduced to personal experience.[3] For *das Zwischenmenschliche* can only be properly apprehended and analyzed as the synthesis of the "action and passion" of two or more individuals: the "action and passion" of one are intertwined with those of another, each finding in this abiding tension opposition and complementarity.

Two or more individuals live with one another, that is to say, they stand to one another in a relation of interaction (*Wechselwirkung*) -

in a relation of reciprocal effect. Every relation of interaction between two or more individuals may be designated as an association or a society (*Gesellschaft*). The function of association is social life, or more properly, *das Zwischenmenschliche*.

What one could comprehend and analyze in his own sphere of existence, without having to postulate the existence of another intentional being (*zwecksetzender Einzelwesen*), [4] is simply the human or the individual. The notion of *das Zwischenmenschliche*, on the other hand, assumes the existence of diverse, distinctly constituted intentional beings who live with and affect one another. We do not regress to the fact of individuation - the incontrovertible existence of individuated beings - and raise it anew as a problem; rather we accept this fact and proceed from there.

Das Zwischenmenschliche occurs in specific forms and produces specific objectified structures. Pure forms of *das Zwischenmenschliche* are super- and sub-ordination, cooperation and non-cooperation, groupings, social rank, class organizations and all types of economic and cultural associations, both natural and normative. The structures of *das Zwischenmenschliche* are the objectified expressions of human collectivity: values, elements of spiritual and economic mediation (*Mittlung*), the objective instruments of production, the social aspects of culture and indeed all products of human association. To be sure, form and structure constitute the static aspects of *das Zwischenmenschliche*.

Those features of social life which are not presented in constant temporal conjunction but unfold in time - action, transformation and revolution - represent the dynamic aspect of das Zwischenmenschliche.

Sociology is the science of the forms of das Zwischenmenschliche. The objective structures of das Zwischenmenschliche are dealt with by ethics, political economy, political science or the philosophy of law. The actions of das Zwischenmenschliche are the subject matter of historiography: that is, of economic, social and cultural history.

None of these disciples, if they do not wish totally to detach themselves from the roots of the lived life (erlebte Leben), can dispense with psychology. The actual "psychological" problem of das Zwischenmenschliche, however, arises initially outside the purview of the various [traditional] disciplines and thus requires separate consideration and treatment. Social forms, structures and actions are derivative expressions of psychic processes; they thus demand to be investigated in relation to these processes. Should one limit oneself to external images, structures, correlations and causality, the essence of society would not be thoroughly disclosed. Only when one grasps society as essentially the experience of souls (als das Erlebnis von Saelen), does he advance to its abiding existential basis.

Social life arises out of feelings and urges, which beget, in turn, new feelings and urges. This all runs its courses within a psychic cycle, and in this context is regarded as nothing but psychic. What happens between individuals happens between complexes of psychic elements; only as such is it understandable. The social forms have their ultimate significance in that they bring human psyches into a relation of opposition and complementarity. Social structures are, as it were, the aggregation of the psychic energy of many, energy which is deposited in the psyches of many and wherein this energy retains a personal content and character. Social action is essentially the transformation of psychic life in rhythm, tempo and intensity of expression. The problem of das Zwischenmenschliche is, thus, fundamentally one of social psychology: its object is social life, which is to be regarded as a psychical process.

What is the subject of this process? Where is the "I" who experiences this process? On what basis can this process be removed from the field of individual psychology?

That there is no social soul which exercises supremacy over individual souls is self-evident. Likewise it is obvious that the "social-psychological" process takes place in those complexes we call individuals.[5] Given this fact, one tends to justify a special denotation of a genetic or methodological factor: the psychic processes considered here are only possible if the individual is in a state of sociation (Vergesellschaftung)[6]; indeed, these processes can only be observed in this state.

More significant though is something else. To be sure, the social-psychological process is enacted in the individual - however, the entire process is not realized by each individual. The process does not consist of many similar happenings, each having a human soul as its subject. Rather the process combines dissimilar happenings (Geschehnisse) which, when combined, complement one another and form the social-psychological process. The relationship, interaction and community of these dissimilar happenings are none other than das Zwischenmenschliche.

The individual experiences not some exemplar of this process - but a part of it only.[7] This, as it were, basic situation (Grundverhältnis), frequently obscured by the fact that the variegated distribution of the social-psychological process is represented not by individuals but by groups. Upon closer scrutiny, however, one will note that within these groups a new and subtle distribution [of the social-psychological process] takes place. Occasionally this "basic situation" is almost unnoticeable, as with mass phenomena. On the other hand, in polar relations as, for instance, that of a man and a woman, it is completely apparent. This "basic situation" constitutes more than any other fact the legitimation of social psychology as a field of study.

The social-psychological problem can be considered and treated from two different approaches: either as the various fundamental forms (Grundformen) of the social-psychological process - that is, the usual classification is applied and the social ideas, feelings and urgings are systematically ordered and analyzed. The analytic social psychology [zergliedernde Socialpsychologie][8] which is in this manner achieved can by its very nature be the work of a single individual only. The other way of approaching the problem, however, is to present the various forms, objective structures and actions of das Zwischenmenschliche and demonstrate the essential social-psychological process in them.

Since these aspects belong to the most varied realms of life, a cooperative collection - like this series which marshals the efforts of experts from various fields - suggests itself as most appropriate for a total and integrated presentation. Should this succeed, the series may be considered as a preparatory work to "a descriptive social psychology" [beschreibende Sozialpsychologie][9]. . .

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FOOTNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. Buber, "Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen," (1954) Werke (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1962), I, 269.

2. On the various synonyms of das Zeischenmenschliche (viz., das Zwischen) see below, n. 8.

3. Buber "was first to employ the term." M. Friedman, "Introductory Essay," Buber, The Knowledge of Man. Trans. M. Friedman and R. G. Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 25. Also cf.: [Das Zwischenmenschliche ist] ein Ausdruck, der wohl zum erstenmal in [dem Werke von Buber] gebraucht worden ist . . . " H. Kohn, Martin Buber. Sein Werk und seine Zeit. 2nd edition. (Köln: Joseph Melzer, 1961), p. 89. Writing in 1954, Buber noted: "Ak ich begann vor nahezu fünfzig Jahren in dem Wissen von der Gesellschaft selbständig zurechtzufinden begann, [bediente] mich dabei des damals noch unbekannten Begriffs des Zwischenmenschlichen . . ." Buber, "Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen," op. cit., p. 269. The cognate term der Zwischenmensch appeared in two passages of Alexander von Villers' (1812-1880) published letters. Buber, however, was apparently unfamiliar with these letters (or passages) until they were brought to his attention in 1954; cf. Buber, Die Schriften über das dialogische Prinzip (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1954), p. 284.

4. This series was published by Rütten & Loening of Frankfurt a. M.

5. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Buber, Martin." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, II, 161.

6. R. Weltsch, "Nachwort. Martin Buber, 1930-1960." H. Kohn, op. cit., p. 450.

7. Writing in 1906 an enthusiast of Simmel referred to Buber as a "sehr bedentender Simmel-Schüler." Correspondence, Hanna Wolfskehl to Albert and Kitty Verwey, 20 November 1906, in Mea Nijland-Verwey, ed. *Wolfskehl und Verwey. Die Dokumente ihrer Freundschaft 1897-1946* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1968), p. 45.

8. As a term, *das Zwischenmenschliche* first reappears relatively late in Buber's writings, viz., in an essay from 1954: "Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen," *op. cit.* The conceptual content of the term is present from the beginnings of Buber's philosophy of dialogue, however. In an essay from 1918, *Der Heilige Weg* - which we will identify along with a pamphlet from that same year, "Gemeinschaft," *Worte an die Zeit. Eine Schriftenreihe* (von M. Buber). Heft, as a possible *Urzellen* of *I and Thou* - Buber speaks of *das Dazwischen* as scheinbar leerer Raum . . . , wo Unmittelbarkeit sich zwischen den Wesen stiftet . . . " *Der Heilige Weg* (Frankfurt a.M., Rütten & Loening, 1919), p. 16. Buber also intended, as we gather from his worksheets, to follow the aforementioned essay "Gemeinschaft" with a treatise entitled "das Zwischenmenschliche"; cf. the list he prepared of projected essays for the series *Worte an die Zeit*, Martin Buber Archive, II/911. In *I and Thou* Buber again speaks of "das Dazwischen" as "*der Sphäre zwischen den Wesen.*" *Werke*, I, 160. Buber also speaks of "das Zwischen": "Die den Begriff des Zwischen begründende Anschauung ist zu gewinnen, indem man eine Beziehung Zwischen menschlichen Personen nicht mehr, wie man gewohnt ist, entweder in den Innerlichkeiten der Einzelnen oder in einer sie unfassenden und bestimmenden Allgemeinwelt lokalisiert, sondern faktisch zwichen ihnen. Das Zwischen ist nicht eine Hilfkonstruktion, sondern wirklicher Ort und Traeger zwischenmenschlichen Geschehens." "Das Problem des Menschen" (1943), *Werke*, I, 405. Clearly, *das Zwischenmenschliche*, *das Dazwischen* and *das Zwischen* are synonyms.

9. Buber's bibliography, incidentally, numbered 260 items prior to the publication of *I and Thou* in 1923. Cf. M. Catanne, *A Bibliography of Martin Buber's Works, 1895-1957* (Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1958) pp. 3-33.

10. Cf. K. W. Swart, *The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth Century France* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. IX-XI and *passim.*

11. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

12. Cf. "I was at the time [i. e., at the age of seventeen] so taken by the book [*Thus Spake Zarathustra*] that I decided to translate it into Polish and had even translated the first part. I had just gone to the second art when I received the letter of a known Polish author who likewise had translated several sections of the book and proposed to me to do the work in common. I preferred renouncing in his favor." Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in P. A. Schilpp and M. Friedman, eds., *The Philosophy of Martin Buber* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1967), p. 13, n. 4.

13. R. G. Köhler, "Programmatische Künstlerschriften, "in Helmut Seling, ed., *Jugendstil*. *Der Weg ins 20. Jahrhundert*. (Heidelberg: Keysersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1959), p. 404f.

14. "Geleitwort zur Sammlung," *op. cit.*, p. IX.

15. Cf. Samuel Sänger, "Kulturpolitik: Gedanken, Ziele, Wege." *Die Neue Rundschau,* XIX (1908), 166ff.

16. On one occasion Buber explicitly referred to his Zionism as *Kulturpolitik:* ". . . Es ist die Grundlage unseres Zionismus, dass eine jüdische Vollkultur, eine wahrhafte und vollständige jüdische Kultur im Galuth unmöglich ist und dass wir deshalb mit aller Kraft unserer Seele dahin verlangen wo allein sie erstehen kann. Aber damit wir dahin gelangen, brauchen wir eine jüdische Kulturpolitik, weil . . . Palästina nur aufgebaut werden kann durch ein aus dem Geist lebendiger Tätigkeit und Wirkung des Geistes geeinigtes und gefestigtes Judentum." "Bericht über dem ausserordentlichen Delegiertentag der Zionistischen Vereinigung für Deutschland

(25. und 26. Dezember, 1916). "Jüdische Rundschau," 5 January 1917, p. 10; for representative examples of Buber's Kulturpolitik, see Buber, "Jüdische Kunst. Referat erstattet auf dem V. Zionisten-Congresse zu Basel (1901)," in Buber, Jüdische Bewegung. Gesammelte Aufsaetze und Ansprachen (Berlin: Jüdische Verlag, 1916), I, 58-67; "Jüdische Renaissance" (1901), in ibid., 7-10; cf. "Die zionistische Propaganda muss eine Umwertung aller Funktionen, eine Umgestaltung des Volkslebens in seinen Tiefen und seinen Grundlagen werden. Sie muss an die Seele rühren und die Seele forden . . . . Wir müssen die lebendigen Kräfte der Nation hervorlocken, die gefesselten Instinkte losbinden . . . . Zu einer grossen Jüdischen Kultur gibt es nur Einen Weg: durch Kultur." Buber, "Zionistische Politik" (1903), ibid., 113-121; also cf. "Die Fesseln des Golus verwundeten, verwüsteten unsere Seele. Täuschen wir uns nicht - wir sind sehr krank . . . . Drei Dinge vor allem versteht der heutige Jude nicht: zu leben, zu schauen, zu schaffen . . . . Man darf den Begriff des Schaffens nicht auf die Schöpfung des Küntslers beschränken. Jeder schafft, der aus seiner Innerlichkeit etwas Selbstständiges, Ganzes herausstellt. Alle wahrhafte Volksarbeit ist ein Schaffen. . . . Dann werden Seelen und Werke verschmelzen und Zion, unser Zion wird erstehen." Buber, "Was ist zu tun?" (1904), Jüdische Bewegung, I, pp. 128-137.

17. Cf. H. S. Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958), pp. 33-66.

18. G. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), p. 65; cf. A. Bonus, Religion als Schopfung (Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1902), pp. 37-51; cf. "Was steht hinter unserer Wirklichkeit? Etwas anders! Wie ist die Welt an sich? Anders!" G. Landauer, Skepsis und Mystik (Berlin: E. Fleischel, 1903), p. 100.

19. A. Aliotta, Trans. A. McCaskell, The Idealistic Reaction against Science (London: MacMillan & Co., 1914).

20. C. Antoni, *From History to Sociology*. Trans. H. V. White (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959), p. 10.

21. Julius and Heinrich Hart presented "Erlebnis" as a source of noumenal knowledge and had defined the term with patent reference to Dilthey: "Wahres Wissen ist Erlebnis, es aeussert sich im innigen Verstehen . . . " Julius and Heinrich Hart, "Vom Leben im Licht," *Das Reich der Erfüllung. Flugschriften zur Begründung einen Weltanschauung* (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1900), p. 77. Gustav Landauer, who was at the time associated with the Hart brothers philosophically, also referred to "Erlebnis" as noumenal knowledge, probably with allusion to Dilthey's epistemology: "Es war [dem Meister Eckhart] sicher, dass, was wir in uns selbst als seelisches Erlebnis finden, dem wahren Wesrn der Welt näher stände als die aussen wahrgenommene Welt." Landauer, *op. cit.*, p. 103. They who attributed noumenal significance to "Erlebnis," felt they were overcoming Dilthey's inexplicable hesitations; cf. "Dilthey war Metaphysikscheu . . . . Ihn erfüllte immer eine geheime Scheu nicht bloss vor den Fesseln des Systems, sondern sogar im einzelnen 'vor dem letzten Wort,' vor der endgültigen Formung des inneren Erlebnisses. Die Irrationalität des Erlebens geht für ihn so weit, dass jede Formung ihm gleichsam Sünde wider der Heiligen Geist erscheint, als eine unkeusche Berühung der Erlebnisnacktheit, die eigentlich nur der inneren Schau sich in ihrer ganzen Schönheit hingeben darf. In diesem Kampf gegen den Intellektualismus ist er der Jakobi des 19. Jahrhundert. Hier berünt er sich mit Bergson, und sie beide nähern sich in diesem Punkte der Mystik, die ja überhaupt in der Lebensmetaphysik unserer Zeit wieder eine erhöhte Bedeutung gewonnen hat . . . . Immerhin liegen auch so in Diltheys Lebenswerk allerhand Ansätze zur Metaphysik vor, die sich noch einmal als Samenkörner für die Zukunft erweisen werden und teilweise schon erwiesen haben . . . bei Eduard Spranger, dessen Gedanken sich immer mehr zu einer grosszügigen Lebensmetaphysik zu verdichten scheinen . . . " P. Wust, *Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1920), pp. 199ff; cf. "Man konnte sagen, dass Dilthey die

Idee der Philosophie in einem höchst modernen Sinne überwunden habe, nämlich den Blassen Schatten einer allgemeingueltigen Weltauffassung, und dass er das reichere Gebilde einer *geistigen Lebensverfassung* an ihre Stelle gesetz habe . . . Nur im Erlebnis entfaltet sich der Sinn der Welt. Man könnte dies Mystik nennen . . . ," E. Spranger, "Nekalog auf Dilthey," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, IX (1911), 378. Writing in 1913, Max Scheler also commented on this tendency to extend Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie to metaphysics: "Seit etwa einem Jahrzehnt finden wir bei einer Gruppe bedeutender philosophischer Charaktere . . . , die einen Anspruch erhoben und eine Art Prophezeirung ausgegeben, es solle kommen und werde kommen eine 'Philosophie des Lebens' . . . [E] ine 'Philosophie des Lebens,' in deren Benennung 'des Lebens' ein Genitivus subjectivus ist, d. h., eine Philosophie *aus* der Fülle des Lebens heraus, ja - schärfer gesagt - eine *Philosophie aus der Fülle des Erlebens heraus* . . . . [W] as sich in diesem Erleben unmittelbar vor uns auftut an *Gehalten*, all das, was *im* Denken und Anschän der Welt, was *im* Wollen, Wirken und Leiden an den Widerständen, in denen sie sich dem Wollenden, Wirkenden und Leidenden allein verrät, was *in* den Bewegungen der Liebe und des Hasses, von Welt, Mensch, Gott, Weib, Kunst usw. uns an Gehalten, an Werten, an Sinneinheiten entgegenblitzt . . . - was also in diesem unmittelbarsten und dichtesten erlebenden Verkehr mit All und Gott sich vor uns hinzustellen Miene macht - und was schon verschwunden und gestorben, ja vernichtet und aufgehoben ist, wenn es gelebtes Leben wurde - : das Ganze möglicher Welt, sofern es so und nur so gegeben ist, dies sei der 'Gehalt' der neuen Philosophie." Scheler, "Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens" (1913), in Scheler, *Abhandlung und Aufsätze* (Leipzig: Verlag der Weissen Bücher, 1915), II, 171 ff. (emphases original). For a critical view from a neo-Kantian perspective of the attempt to extrapolate from Dilthey a *Lebensmetaphysik* see the joint study by Max Brod and Felix Weltsch from 1913; cf. "Die Sehnsucht, die unser wissenschaftliches Zeitalter nach der Intuition, dem unmittelbaren Erlebnis erfasst hat, zeigt am besten, was uns der wissenschaftliche Begriff nicht bieten kann. Aber auch hier müssen wir eine Einschränkung machen. Keineswegs ist hier Verachtung des wissenschaftlichen Begriffs am Platze, auch unter den Voraussetzung nicht, dass das Fehlen jeglicher Anschaulichkeit trotz aller sonstigen Vorzüge hierzu berechtigen würde." Brod and Weltsch, Anschauung und Begriff: Grundzüge eines Systems der Begriffsbildung (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff, 1913), p. 244.

22. Mosse, op. cit., p. 54. Cf. ". . . Wir befinden uns in einem Zeitalter, das aus der veräusserlichung der letzen Jahrzehnte heraus will, dem innere Freiheit und schöpferische Individualität wieder als Ideal vor Augen stehen, wir empfinden wieder die Kunst in ihrer Verwandtschaft mit der Religion, wir erkennen als Inbegriff unserer sozialen Ideale solche Lebensbedingungen die in jedem Menschen seine Anlagen ausreifen lassen. So manche Bücher diese Kataloges suchen bewusst den Weg zu einer neuen deutschen Kultur . . ." E. Diederichs, "Die Ziele des Verlages." In first catalog, 'Der Verlag Eugen Diederichs in Jena' (1904), cited in Ulf Diederichs, ed., Eugen Diederichs: Selbstzeugnisse und Briefe und Zeitgenossen. (Düsseldorf: Eugen Diederichs, 1967), p. 32.

23. Cf. "Erkenntnis ist Spaltung, Gliederung, Sonderung und nachherige Verbindung. Der Sonderung muss die Einheit vorausgehen, nicht mehr also indifferenter Zustand, sondern als bewusster erlebter, sich aufdrängender. Die Einheit des Seelischen und Sinnlichen, des Subjekts und Objekts wird erlebt im Gefühl. Aus der Schwellung, Überschwellung des Gefühls bricht die Spaltung der Erkenntnis auf. Wer vom Baum der Erkenntnis isst, scheidet aus dem Paradies des Gefühls." K. Joël, Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geiste der Mystik (Jena: Eugen Diederichs; 1903), p. VI. Joël, parenthetically, had studied with Dilthey. Also see A. Bonus, Religion als Schöpfung (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1902), passim and Hart, op. cit., passim.

24. Mystical intuition was viewed as a vehicle permitting men "to enjoy and behold the world as a whole once more, not as portrayed and dissected

by simplistic rationalism." Mosse, op. cit., p. 54. Cf. "Die Berühung mit der Mystic führte zur Beschäftigung mit dem Mythos . . . " Wust, op. cit., p. 65; cf. "Unsere moderne Kunstentwicklung besinnt sich jetzt darauf, dass sie nichts absolut Neues schaffen kann, und sucht Anknüpfung an die Tradition. Auch unsere geistige Entwicklung sucht diese Anknüpfung und will sich nicht mehr begnügen, die ewigen Menschheitsprobleme in zufällig subjektiver Stimmung zu sehen und nur über vergangene Denker etwas zu hören, sondern sie will an den Quellen der Vergangenheit selbst trinken. Darum gehe ich in einer Reihe Neuausgaben alter Denker . . . bis auf die grächische Kultur zurück." E. Diederichs, "Die Ziele des Verlages." op. cit., pp. 32f.

25. Buber, "Ekstase und Bekenntnis" (preface), Buber, ed., Ekstatische Konfessionen (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1909), p. XXV.

26. Cf. ". . . Buber suchte die Mystik im Judentum, und deswegen war er imstande, sie zu finden, das heisst wahrzunehmen, als er auf sie stiess . . . . Der tiefe Eindruck von Bubers ersten Schriften über den Chassidismus . . . kam eben daher, dass hier ein Mann von grosser Kultur und Sensitivität, am Judentum eine lebendige Schicht aufzuzeigen, von der bei Männern der Wissenschaft bis dahin kaum Rede gewesen war, ja deren Existenz, einem weitverbreiteten Vorurteil zuliebe, geradezu abgeleugnet worden war." G. Scholem, "Martin Bubers Auffassung des Judentums." Eranos Jahrbuch, XXV (1966), p. 25 f. Cf. "Chassidismus war Buber, der Sehnsucht der Zeit entsprechend, pantheistische Mystik, in der die Inbrunst der Ekstase entbrennt." Kohn, op. cit., p. 77.

27. Buber, "Ekstase und Bekenntnis," op. cit., p. XXVI.

28. For a discussion of the problematics of such an exercise, see G. Misch, "Dilthey versus Nietzsche," Die Sammlung. VII (1952), 378-395. Misch points to the philosophical incompatibility of Nietzsche's radical voluntarism

and Dilthey's historicism: ". . . so verschieden, bis zum Gegensatz, waren Erscheinung und Lehre dieser beiden Zeitgenossen . . . Dilthey hat bekanntlich gegen den von ihm bekämpften 'Subjektivismus' der zeitgenössischen Literatur, den er in Nietzsche verkörpert sah . . . gegen das Unterfangen, rein intuitiv 'unter Überspringung der Wissenschaften' vom Menschen und der menschlichen, geschichtlich-gesellschaftlichen Welt 'herauszubekommen, was der Mensch sei,' den Satz gestellt: 'Was der Mensch sei, erfährt er nur durch die Geschichte." Ibid., 378-387.

29. Buber, "Bewegung," Der neue Merkur, I, 10/11 (1915), 490.

30. Correspondence, Buber to Frederik von Eeden, 16 October, 1914 in Buber, Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahrzehnten, Grete Schaeder, ed. (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1972), I, letter no. 253, p. 378.

31. Ibid., pp. 377 f.

32. Ibid., p. 378.

33. Correspondence, Landauer to Buber, 12 May 1916, in Briefwechsel, I, no. 306, p. 434.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I

1. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Cf. Buber's Berlin *Abgangzeugnis,* Martin Buber Archive, A/4.

2. Cf. Correspondence, Simmel to Buber, 20 November 1905, Martin Buber Archive, S/19. This letter is discussed more fully in Chapter IV.

3. See Raymond Aron, German Sociology (1935), trans. Mary and Thomas Bottomore (London: William Heinemann, 1957). See Heinz Faus, "Simmel and German Sociology," Trans. Kurt H. Wolff in K. H. Wolff, ed., *Essays on Sociology, Philosophy and Aesthetics*: Georg Simmel (New York: Harper Torchbook Edition, 1959) - hereafter, *Essays*, pp. 180-200.

4. For a statement of Simmel's position at the time, Simmel's *Soziologie, Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt, 1908), will serve as our major reference. This work is largely a summary of lectures given at Humboldt University, Berlin. Undoubtedly many of these lectures were no doubt attended by Buber.

5. Kurt H. Wolff, ed. and trans. *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (New York: The Free Press, 1950), p. xxix f.

6. On his translation of *Geisteswissenschaften,* see H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey, An Introduction* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1944), p. 157.

7. Simmel's academic biography reveals a strong influence of neo-Kantian scholars. His philosophic training was guided by Friedrich Harms and Eduard Zeller, both Berlin professors of "neo-Kantian" persuasion. Simmel's dissertation, *Darstellung und Beurteilung von Kants verschieden*

Ansichten über das Wesen der Materie (Berlin, 1880) was written under the supervision of Zeller; likewise his habilitation thesis, a thesis dealing with Kant's doctrine of space and time. In general one may say that Simmel's epistemological realism vis-à-vis *Ding-an-sich* betrays Zeller's inspiration. (Cf. G. Simmel, *Kant. Sechzehn Vorlesungen* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt, 1904), pp. 1-19 (*Erste Vorlesung*). The overall thrust of Simmel's philosophic interest, however, indicates a greater affinity to the Baden school of neo-Kantianism, to wit Wilhelm Wildelband and Heinrich Rickert; cf. Simmel's letters to Rickert in K. Gassen and M. Landmann, eds., *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel* (Berlin, Duncker & Humbolt, 1958), pp. 90-119; in particular the correspondence dated 17 February, 1912: "Lieber Rickert, . . . Mir schien, als ob der Begriff der Soziologie, den ich gefunden zu haben glaube, eine Berücksichtigung innerhalf Ihrer Gedankgänge verdient . . . ," p. 110. On Simmel as a *Lebensphilosoph* see n. 8 below. We may note in passing that Simmel studied *Völkerpsychologie* with Moritz Lazarus - as did Dilthey!

8. "Ich [Georg Simmel] bin von erkenntnistheoretischen und Kantwissenschaftlichen Studien ausgegangen, mit denen geschichliche und sozialwissenschaftliche Hand in Hand gingen. Das erste Ergebnis davon war das . . . Grundmotiv: dass "Geschichte" die Formung des unmittelbaren, nur zu erlebenden Geschehens gemäss den Aprioritäten des wissenschaftbildenden Geistes bedeutet, genau wie "Natur" die Formung des sinnlich gegeben Materials durch die Kategorieen des Verstandes bedeutet." Simmel, "Anfang einer unvollendeten Selbstdarstellung," in *Buch des Dankes*, pp. 9 f.

9. Cf. Simmel, *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft* (Stuttgart und Berlin: O. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1904) revised edition, I, 1-12; "Die geistige Entwicklung der Menschheit hat eine Stufe durchgemacht, auf der man sich keines Unterschiedes zwischen den Vorstellungen, denen eine Wirklichkeit enspricht, und denen, die unwahr und rein psychologische

Vorgänge sind, bewusst war." Ibid., p. 1 "[Daist] kein verstandesmässiger Inhalte begleiten, zu der Vorstellung von deren Wirklichkeit führt." Ibid., p. 12.

10. Simmel's Lebersphilosophie is discussed in extenso in R. H. Weingartner, Experience and Culture. The Philosophy of Georg Simmel (Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1960) ". . . Simmel's career has often been seen as falling into two separate phases: it is said to have begun with Kulturphilosophie and ended with Lebensphilosophie. The aim of this essay is to show that the perspective from which Simmel reflected on the objects of culture . . . is precisely the view he started to make explicit in his last writings." Ibid., p. IX.

11. Simmel, "The Problem of Society," trans. K. H. Wolff in Wolff, ed. Essays, p. 340 (S. 30). This translation of the first chapter of the Soziologie. For stylistic reasons the English rendition will be quoted in the text, in the notes the corresponding locus in the German original will be indicated in parentheses, e.g., (S. 1).

12. Simmel, "How is society possible?" trans. K. Wolff, in K. Wolff, ed. Essays. This is a translation of the excursus which appears in Chapter I of Die Soziologie, p. 338 (S29).

13. Ibid., p. 340 (S30).

14. Renate Mayntz, "Simmel, Georg" in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1963), XIV, suggests this translation of Wechselwirkungen, "for the German . . . implies both," p. 225.

15. Wolff proposes this translation of Vergesellschaftung which is usually "misleadingly rendered as socialization . . . (or) societalization . . ." The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. xx.

16. Simmel, "The Problem of Society," pp. 326 f (S. 18); cf. "It is only a superficial attachment to linguistic usage (a usage quite adequate for daily practice) which makes us want to reserve the term 'societ' [Gesellschaft] for permanent interactions only." Simmel, Fundamental Problems of Sociology, trans. K. H. Wolff in K. H. Wolff, ed., The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 9; German original Simmel, Grundfragen der Soziologie (Berlin und Leipzig: Göschen, 1917), p. 12.

17. Ibid., p. 327.

18. Nota Bene: "Beziehungsformen der Menschen untereinander," or . . . zwischen den Menschen," Soziologie, pp. 11, 15. For a detailed discussion of Simmel's concept of "form" see Maria Steinhoff, "Die Form als soziologische Grundkategorie bei Georg Simmel," Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Sociologie, IV, 1924/25, 214-259. Also see F. H. Tenbruck, "Formal Sociology," in Wolff, ed., Essays, pp. 61-99.

19. Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," p. 315 (S. 5). Cf. "Ich bezeichne nun alles das was in den Individuen, den unmittelbar konkreten Orten aller historischen Wirklichkeit, als Trieb, Interesse, Zweck, Neigung, psychische Zustandlichkeit und Bewegung derart vorharden ist . . . als der Inhalt, gleichsam die Materie der Vergesellschaftung," Soziologie, p. 6.

20. Cf. Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," p. 315 f (S. 8).

21. Ibid., p. 319 (S. 10); cf. Simmel, Fundamental Problems of Sociology, pp. 21-23.

22. Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," p. 322 (S. 13).

23. Ibid., p. 319 (S. 11).

24. Simmel, "How Is Society Possible?" p. 255 (S. 45).

25. See, e. g., Fundamental Problems of Sociology, Chapter I, passim; see also Tenbruck, op. cit., p. 69 f, p. 95 n. 36; also H. D. Duncan, "Simml's image of society," in Wolff, ed., Essays, p. 108.

26. Simmel, "How Is Society Possible?" p. 399 (S. 30). ". . . das Gefühl des scienden ich . . . "

27. Ibid. However, it should be noted: "Dass dieses Für-Sich des Andern uns nun dennoch night verhindert, ihn zu unserer Vorstellung zu machen, . . . " Ibid.

28. Cf. "Unser Geist hat die merkwürdige Fähigkeit, Inhalte als von ihrem Gedachtwerden unabhänig zu denken . . . " Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, 4th ed. (Munich u. Leipzig: Dunker & Humbolt, 1922) p. 19.

29. Simmel, "How Is Society Possible?" p. 342 (S. 32). Cf. Dilthey, "In contrast to external perception, inner perception rests upon an awareness (Innewerden), a lived experience (Erleben), it is immediately given." "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive Psychology," trans. in Hodges, op. cit., p. 133.

30. Simmel, "How Is Society Possible?" p. 342 (S. 32). This distinction between Wissen and Erkennen is not standard in Kantian teminology - although there is indeed a tendency with Kant to reserve Wissen for knowledge of "apodictical certainty"; whereas Erkennen almost consistently refers to cognitive knowledge. Cf. R. Eisler, "Erkentnis," "Gewissheit," "Wissen" in Kant Lexicon (Berlin: Mitter & Sohn, 1930), pp. 135 ff, pp. 204 f, 609. What of course is crucial here is Simmel's appreciation of immediate, or what Dilthey calls lived experience. As Weingartner, op. cit., reminds us, for Simmel experience is not simply a mental act. Cf. Simmel Lebensanschauung, 2nd ed. (München u. Leipzig: Duncker &

Humbolt, 1922) "[Es] sollte nie vergessen werden, dass es der ganze Mensch ist, der denkt, fühlt, begehrt . . ." p. 206. For Kant feeling has (generally) but dubious epistemological value; see "Gefühl" in Kant-Lexicon, pp. 175-177.

31. Parenthetically, we may observe that whereas Dilthey was satisfied with but an admittedly quasi-Kantian solution of the problem of social knowledge, Simmel offers here what he believes to be a solution consistent with (neo-) Kantian epistemological canon. Cf. Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, pp. 14-29.

32. Simmel, Soziologie, p. 32.

33. Cf. Tenbruck, op. cit., pp. 66-68.

34. Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," p. 329 (S. 13).

35. Simmel, trans. K. H. Wolff, "The Field of Sociology," translation of the first chapter of Grundfragen, in Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, p. 11 (S. 15).

36. Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," p. 329 (S. 17).

37. Tenbruck, op. cit., p. 69. Nota Bene, Simmel's confession: "I have not been able to clarify the fundamental problem of this volume." "The Problem of Sociology," p. 336, n. 5 (S. 17, n. 1); cf. Simmel, "The Field of Sociology," written a year before his death, ". . . the absence of an exhaustive and undisputed definition of the nature of society [need not] render the cognitive value of this approach illusory." p. 18 (emphasis added). Duncan has characterized Simmel's struggle "to reach a clear definition of society . . . one of the great legacies of sociology"; op. cit., p. 108.

38. Ibid., p. 107 f.

39. Simmel, "How Is Society Possible?' p. 355 (S. 45). For a discussion of Simmel's "ontological induction," see Hans Joachim Lieber and Peter Fürth, "Zur Dialectik der Simmelschen Konzeption einer formalen Soziologie," in Buch des Dankes, pp. 39-52; also cf. Wolff, "Introduction," The Sociology of Georg Simmel, pp. xxx f.

40. Simmel, "How Is Society Possible?" p. 355 (S. 45).

41. Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," p. 355 (S. 27) (emphases added).

42. Buber, "Geleitwort zur Sammlung," p. 10.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

1. See Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Ernst Simon, "Martin Buber and German Jewry," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook,* III (1958), p. 18; Ronald Gregor Smith, "Martin Buber's View of the Interhuman," *Jewish Journal of Sociology,* VIII, no. 1 (June, 1966), p. 73 f.; Grete Shaeder, *Martin Buber, Hebräischer Humanismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), pp. 32 f; and Bernard Casper, *Das dialogische Danken, Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner, Martin Buber* (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Verlag Herder, 1967), p. 56-57.

2. See, for instance, Casper, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

3. Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

4. Casper, *op. cit.*, p. 57, n. 67, relying on Kohn's judgment relegates this observation to a footnote.

5. Schaeder, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

6. *Ibid.*

7. To be sure, Schaeder, *ibid.*, observes "nicht nur die sozial psychologische Betrachtung weist auf Simmel hin, auch der Begriff des Zwischenmenschlichen ist Bubers persönlich gefärbte Fassung dessen, was Simmel unter Vergesellschaftung versteht." This latter observation is not quite correct, however; cf. Buber, "Geleitwort," s. XII: ". . . die hier in Betracht kommenden psychischen Vorgänge [*des Zwischenmenschlichen*] [*sind*] erst dann möglich . . . , wenn das Individuum sich im Zustande der Vergesellschaftung befindet . . ." *Vergesellschaftung* makes possible *das Zwischenmenschliche*; thus they are not precisely

equatable. The significance of this is crucial for the meaning of _das Zwischenmenschliche_. As will be shown in detail in our text, _das Zwischenmenschliche_ corresponds not to the sociological fact of interaction, of being sociated (i.e., _Vergesellschaftung_), but to Simmel's realm of interaction or forms - here Buber's "Geleitwort" leaves sociology proper and entertains, like Simmel, questions of social ontology. In any case, Schaeder neglects to note the ontic character of _das Zwischenmenschliche_. Her interest in the "Geleitwort" is to establish the fact of Simmel's influence upon Buber, permitting her to introduce an exposition on the importance of Simmel's coinage "Religiosität" in the development of Buber's religious thought.

8. See Simmel, Über das Wesen der Sozialpsychologie," _Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik_ 26, 1908, S. 285-291; this essay is included in his _Soziologie_ (1908) as "Exkurs über Sozialpsychologie," S. 556-563. We shall quote from the "Exkurs." Pertinent comments on social psychology are also found in Chapter I of _Soziologie_, i.e., "The Problem of Sociology," pp. 329-336 (S. 26-27).

9. In his "Exkurs," Simmel actually expatiates more on the version of social psychology which he (implicitly) deems to be nothing but a new species of Völkerpsychologie; in the context of our present discussion this aspect of the "Exkurs" may be ignored. Also, cf. our reference to Vierkandt in n. 11.

10. There is a need fora critical philological history of social psychology; for an adumbrative history see H. Anger, "Sozialpsychologie," _Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften._ Neue auflage. XII, pp. 637 ff. For a particular focus on the vicissitudes of the science in Germany, see G. Roffenstein, "Der Gegenstand der Sozialpsychologie in der Soziologie," _Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie_ B1. 50, 1925, S. 18 ff.; also see L. H. Ad. Geck, _Sozialpsychologie in Deutschland._ (Berlin: Dr. W. Rothschild, 1929). It is of interest to note that as early as the summer semester of

1895, Simmel held a lecture course entitled "Soziale Psychologie"; cf. below n. 65. According to O. Thon, Simmel was the only docent in all of Germany at the time to have offered such a course. "The Present Status of Sociology in Germany, Part III," American Journal of Sociology, II, 6 (March, 1897), 799 f.

11. Cf. G. F. Stout, "Naturvölker und Kulturvölker . . . , von A. Vierkandt" - a book review - Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, New Series. VIII, 1899, p. 131: "This is a book of real importance . . . Its interest is essentially psychological rather than sociological or anthropological. Its aim is to analyse and illustrate the contrast and affinity between the savage and the civilized mind . . . . In the phraseology which he has adopted from Wundt, the contrast between the civilized and the savage mind is a contrast between apperception and association . . . " (emphasis added).

12. See Bericht über den III internationalen Kongress für Psychologie vom 12.-14. August 1896 in Muenchen (München, 1897), pp. 480 ff. This essay was later elaborated as a lecture delivered at the University of Leipzig on 16 May 1899; for a transcript of it see Eulenburg, "Über die Möglichkeit und die Aufgaben einer Socialpsychologie," Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, Neue Folge, XXIV (1900), Bd. 1-2, 201 f. Heinz Maus refers to this latter work as "the first sketch of a modern social psychology": "Simmel in German Sociology," K. H. Wolff, Essays, p. 196.

13. Rudolf Eisler, "Sozialpsychologie," Handwörterbuch der Philosopie (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1913), p. 626. Eisler also mentions as a founding document of German social psychology a treatise by R. Holzapfel, Panideal. Psychologie der sozialen Gefühle. Mit Vorwort von Ernst Mach (Leipzig, B. A. Barth, 1901). Holzapfel, a Kulturphilosoph, is not concerned with social psychology as a science per se but rather articulately employs the notion as a supportive idea for an ideological statement:

spiritual and aesthetic achievements are not the work of a _Geistesaristokratie_ born _ex nihilio_ and which thrives detached from and unaffected by society. _Kultur_ is rather a cumulative social phenomenon, that is, innumerable unknown efforts contribute to its development. In order that _Kultur_ be revitalized, this "social psychological" fact should be appreciated. It is therefore not sufficient to cultivate a "Geistesaristokratie," as Nietzsche and Renan suggest; rather a new aesthetic and "religious" sensibility must be inculcated among the masses. This thesis is reiterated by Holzapfel in his "Wesen und Methoden der sozialen Psychologie," _Archiv für systematische Philosophie,_ Neue Folge, IX. Band 1. Heft (1903), pp. 1-57. His significance for the theoretical development of social psychology is thus marginal.

14. Eulenburg, _op. cit._, p. 211.

15. _Ibid._, p. 218.

16. _Ibid._, p. 214.

17. _Ibid._ p. 212.

18. Cf. _Ibid._, p. 233: "Man kann wohl sagen, dass es ohne [Nachahmung] überhaupt kein socialpsychisches Geschehen und keine Ausbreitung eines einmal aufgetauchten seelischen Vorganges gäbe." Eulenburg acknowledges his indebtedness to Tarde: "Wir verdanken diese Einsicht im wesentlichen dem Werke von Tarde, _Les lois de l'imitation_. Paris, 1895." _Ibid._, p. 233, n. 56.

19. Cf. Anger, _op. cit._

20. Cf. Tarde, _Les lois de l'imitation_ (Paris: Alcan, 1890): "La société c'est l'imitation . . . ." (p. 97).

21. _Ibid._, pp. 1-40.

22. Ibid., pp. 158-163.

23. Les lois sociales (Paris: Alcan, 1898), pp. 172 ff; also cf. Tarde L'opposition universelle (Paris: Alcan, 1897).

24. Les lois sociales, p. 101.

25. Cf. Eulenburg, op. cit., p. 233, n. 56: " . . . von dem [Tarde's work] ich . . . abweiche allerdings in der Deutung des Principes, wie man sieht . . . " Cf. "Der Vorgang der Nachahmung selbst wird hier nicht erklärt . . . . Für gewöhlich begnügt man sich mit der Annahme eines 'Nachahmungstriebes' . . . . , womit man dann natürlich durchaus nicht weiter kommt. Für uns erübrigt sich einstweilen die Frage." Ibid., p. 233, n. 57. Despite his reservations, Eulenburg seems to have adopted at least some features of Tarde's scheme. He presents the notion of "opposing systems" as a "form" of imitation: "Eine vierte Form . . . ist der Vorgang, dass aus dem Zusammenstossen zweier Parteien beruht letzhin darauf." Ibid., p. 235. Simmel in his essay on fashion speaks of imitation - but here it is regarded as a form, rather than a generalized psychological description of interaction; cf. Philosophie der Mode (Berlin: Pan Verlag, 1905). Also cf. "Wenigstens auf ein Princip mag Lingedentet werden, das für die Wechselwirkung der Individuen ein ausserordentliche Rolle spielt, und dem vielleicht in der Socialpsychologie eine ähnliche Bedentung zukommt wie der Association in der individuellen: die Nachahmung." Eulensburg, op. cit., p. 233 (emphasis original).

26. Our understanding of "action system" follows F. H. Tenbruck's formulation. Cf. his "Formal Sociology" in Wolff, Essays, pp. 66 ff. According to Tenbruck, "the term action system refers to the totality of drives, motives, ends and other psychological characteristics which are the causes, potential and sufficient, of actions."

27. We employ "psychologistic" to characterize the functionalistic explanation of interaction which Simmel rejects; this we deem useful because Simmel's sociology is often described as functional - cf., for example, Mayntz, *op. cit.*, p. 254b. Tenbruck's graphic exposition of the type of functionalism rejected by Simmel is most valuable: "Given two actors, A and B, and two respective action systems, a and b, interaction consists of a series of changes occurring in these action systems . . . . The changes that occur in the action system of A are in some way correlated with the changes that occur in the action system of B. A will modify his ends and means upon perceiving B's course of action, and vice versa. Thus, b, changes to b' as, or after, a changes to a'. The entire interaction process thus consists of two sequences (a, a', a'', a''', . . . , and b, b', b'', b''', . . .) . . . . It is precisely this common understanding of interaction which Simmel rejects." *Op. cit.*, p. 66 f.

28. "The Problem of Sociology," p. 331 (S. 23).

29. "Exkurs über Sozialpsychologie," p. 561.

30. *Ibid.*

31. "The Problem of Sociology," p. 329 (S. 21).

32. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 332 (S. 23): "But these psychological categories . . . remain outside the purpose of sociological investigation."

33. *Ibid.*, p. 331; cf.: "Überhaupt gehören in die Sociologie . . . keinwegs nur die Associationen und Vereinigungen im engeren Sinne . . . ." *Das Problem der Soziologie* (1894), p. 275, n. 1.

34. "Psychologie," Dilthey states, "wird die Grunlage der Geisteswissenschaften werden, wie es die Mathematik die der Naturwissenschaften ist."

"Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie" (hereafter, "Ideen") (1894), *Wilhelm Diltheys Gesammelte Schriften*, V, 193. Psychology, as conceived by Dilthey, aims "to unfold universal propositions whose subject is the individual unit [viz., man by himself], and whose predicates are all the statements about him which can bear fruit in the understanding of society and history." *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883), G.S., I, 31. Translation from H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey. An Introduction* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1944), p. 129.

35. The essay first appeared in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich*, 1894, XVIII, no. 4, 1301-1307 f. The revision of the essay is included in *Soziologie*, Kapitel I.

36. Of the forty monographs of *die Gesellschaft*, twenty-five were published between 1906 and 1908.

37. "Ideen," *G.S.* V, 147, trans. by Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 130, German supplied by P.F.

38. "Geleitwort," p. XI.

39. *Ibid.*, p. XIV.

40. Professor E. Simon, oral communication, Jerusalem, March, 1971; confirmed by Professor N. Rotenstreich, oral communication, March, 1971, Jerusalem. Both of these scholars, who were close to Buber for many years, claim that he often noted his singular indebtedness to Dilthey. Cf. Buber, "Das Problem des Menschen" (1943), *Werke*, I, S. 317, where he refers to Dilthey as "meinen Lehrer." H. Kohn, however, reports in his 1929 biography of Buber: Simmel hat "von allen seinen Lehrern auf Buber den tiefsten Eindruck gemacht . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 21. According to Mrs. Margot Cohn, the director of the "Martin Buber Archive" and Buber's personal secretary for some eight years (1957-1965), Kohn's biography was written under Buber's active supervision.

41. "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften," G.S., I, 31-32; trans. from Hodges, op. cit., p. 129.

42. Cf. ibid., p. 56; cf. p. 47.

43. "Sozialpsychologie," ed. R. König, Das Fischer Lexikon: Soziologie. Neuearbeitung (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Buecherei, 1967), p. 297.

44. "Soziologie," G.S., I, 421 (B. Groethuysen, the editor of G.S., I, dates this essay between 1904 and 1906; it was intended by Dilthey as an appendix to a new edition of the "Einleitung" (published posthumously in the G.S.), trans. in Hodges, op. cit., p. 139 f.

45. Ibid., p. 141; ". . . diese Soziologie [ist] gar nicht wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis . . ." G.S., I, 423.

46. Ibid., 421; trans. Hodges, op. cit., p. 139.

47. "Einleitung," G.S. I, 85 f.

48. That Dilthey assigned Simmel's sociology to a non-psychological realm is instructive. Both "the outer organizations" and mutatis mutandis, the forms of interaction are structural features of social life. There are, however, serious and significant differences between these concepts which Dilthey failed to note.

49. See Ibid., 64-70; 83-6.

50. For Dilthey a social group is fundamentally a phenomenological fact, having as its root-source two psychological factors: "Bewusstsein von Gemeinschaft" and "das Verhältnis von Herrschaft und Abhängigkeit zwischen Willen," each of which are operative in a given group with varying "intensity." These two factors cause men to arrange themselves in

groups (Verbände). Ibid., 66-68. However, "Gemeinschaft [ist] nicht abhängig vom Bestand eines Verbandes." *Ibid.*, 69.

51. The compulsive aspect of group fidelity is never quite explained by Dilthey; there is no suggestion that "das Verhältnis von Herrschaft und Abhängigkeit zwischen Willen" is anything more than a contributing factor - for after all this factor may in a particular group be marginal (i.e., of minimal intensity). Dilthey does intimate that initially the "*Gemeinschaftsgefühl*" creates a sense that the group shares "a solidarity of interests," *ibid.*, 66. If these interests are indeed fulfilled or furthered by the group, the individual "will" identifies, may merge, as it were, with the evolving infra-structure of the group: "Objektiv angesehen, finden wir in der Gesellschaft die Individuen nicht nur durch Korrespondenz ihrer Tätigkeiten aufeinander bezogen . . . . sondern diese Gesellschaft bildet einen Zusammenhang von Verhältissen der Gemeinschaft und Bindung, in welchen die Willen der Individuen eingefügt sind, gleichsam eingebunden." *Ibid.*, 65. What has ensued here Dilthey refers to as a "Willenseinheit" - we have rendered this notion as *fidelity* in order to emphasize both the volitional and genetic character of the phenomenon - i.e. the initial spontaneity of the group feeling and loyalty.

52. *Ibid.*, cf. n. 57 below.

53. Hodges, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 174. Hereafter referred to as *Philosophy.* To differentiate, Hodges' *Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction,* will be cited as *Introduction*.

54. "Einleitung . . . " *G. S.* I, 84-86.

55. Cf. *Ibid.*, 46-48.

56. Dilthey recognizes the coercive aspect of political institutions; however, phenomenologically regarded it would seem that what we have called

fidelity is the ultimate factor dictating conformity to social convention; cf.: "Unter einem Verband vestehen wir eine dauernde auf einen Zweckzusammenhang gegründete Willenseinheit mehrerer Personen . . . . die Einheit in ihnen geht über das formlose Bewusstsein von Zusammengehörigkeit und Gemeinschaft . . . eine zolche Willenseinheit hat eine Struktur: die Willen sind in einer bestimmten Form zum Zusammenwirken verbundlen. Zwischen diesen Merkmalen eines jeden Verbandes besteht aber eine sehr einfache Beziehung. . . . Denn welchen Einfluss auch die Gewalt auf die Gestaltung einer solchen Willenseinheit habe: Gewalt ist doch nur eine Art und Weise, in welcher die Zusammenordung des Gefüges sich vollziehen kann: den Arm der Gewalt setzttein Wille in Bewegung, der von einem Zweck geleitet wird, und er hält den Unterworfenen fest, weil derselbe ein Mittel für einen von ihm herzustellendem Zweckzusammenhang ist. . . . Die Gewalt unterwarf, auch geschichtlich angesehen, nur, um die Geknechteten in den Zweckzusammenhang des eigenen Tuns einzvordnen. Ein davernder Zweckzusammenhang aber bringt in der Anordnung der Individuen, die ihm unterworfen sind, alsdann der Güter, deren er bedarf, eine Struktur hervor . . . . Ibid., 70 f.

57. Hans Liebeschütz suggests that the difference between Simmel and Dilthey here is ultimately a matter of their existential appreciation of "biological" community. Dilthey, a German nationalist, had a profound respect for the biological and political facts of race, family, Volk; Simmel, a son of converted Jews, was a deracinated cosmopolitan - emotionally bound to neither Judentum nor Deutschtum; cf. Liebeschütz, Von Georg Simmel zu Franz Rosenzweig (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1970), pp. 128-131. Parenthetically, during World War One Simmel, like many erstwhile liberal intellectuals, became rather nationalistic; see our discussion in Chapter V. Granted Liebeschütz's thesis, it nonetheless seems to us insufficient explanation of their differing positions on this question. We maintain that contrasting ontological and epistemological considerations separate Dilthey's political science and Simmel's sociology. This argument is elaborated below, cf. pp. 36 ff.

58. "The Problem of Sociology," p. 329 (S. 20) - emphasis added.

59. Cf. Eulenburg, op. cit., p. 216. Other contemporaries did as well, cf. Thon, op. cit. (Part I), p. 571; also C. A. Ellwood, "Prolegomena to Social Psychology" (Part II), American Journal of Sociology, IV, no. 6 (May 1899), p. 813, n. 1.

60. For example, see K. Young, Handbook of Social Psychology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1946), pp. 411-420. Also cf. Tenbruck op. cit., p. 97, n. 78.

61. "Philosophie der Mode," p. 28. Trans. "Fashion" (translator not indicated). American Journal of Sociology, LXII (May, 1957), p. 558.

62. Cf. Buch des Dankes, p. 345.

63. The course he presented in the summer of 1900 was entitled "Psychologie sozialer Erscheinungen"; the course given in the winter semester, 1905, bore the title, "Allgemeine Psychologie, mit sozialpsychologischen Ausführungen." Thereafter such a course was not repeated by him; cf. Buch des Dankes, p. 345.

64. Simmel's literary estate was confiscated from his family by the Nazis, see Buch des Dankes, p. 14.

65. This may be inferred from comparing the titles of his courses: e.g., in the academic year of 1894/95, he gave a course entitled "Soziologie, mit besonderer Berücksichtung des Sozialismus." Cf. also "Soziologie, mit Berücksichtung sozialer Probleme der Gegenwart," given in the summer of 1902.

66. See, for example, Über soziale Differenzirung. Sociologische und psychologische Untersuchungen. Leipzig, 1890, 4. Kapitel, S. 70-99, where Simmel discusses the psychological ground of all struggles for

equality. This exposition, one will note, quickly shuttles back and forth from a psycho-genetic to a "formalistic" discussion. Cf. "Die Methoden, nach denen die Probleme der Vergesellschaftung untersucht werden, sind dieselben wie in allen vergleichend psychologischen Wissenschaften. Zum Grunde liegen gewisse psychologische Voraussetzungen, jenen zugehörig, ohne die überhaupt keine Geschichtswissenschaft existieren kann: . . . primärer psychischer Vorgänge muss vorausgesetzt werden, damit man überhaupt versteht, das es zu Vergesellschaftungen . . . . kommt . . . . es [gibt] eine wissenschaft von der Gesellschaft, weil gewisse specifische Gebilde innerhalb jener geschichtlichen Komplexe auf psychische Verfassungen und Aktionen zurückführbar sind, die gerade nur aus gegenseiter Einwirkung der Individuen und Gruppen auf einander, . . . hervorgehen. Die Untersuchung hat nur zwei Richtungen: sie folgt zunächst der Längerichtung der einzelnen Entwicklung; . . . Es sind nur, zweitens, Querschnitte durch die Einzelentwicklungen zu legen . . . das Gemeinsame an ihnen: die socialen Konstellationen als solche, induktiv feststellen . . ." "Das Problem der Soziologie" (1894), p. 275 f. This is to say the psychogenetic explanation, as a methodological condition of sociological inquiry, is not always separable from sociology proper. In the 1908 revision of the above essay, Simmel emphasizes that these two aspects must remain procedurally distinct; this is perhaps the essay's principal theoretical revision.

67. "The Problem of Sociology", p. 335 (S. 27).

68. "Geleitwort," p. X.

69. Ibid., p. XIII.

70. Ibid., p. X. Cf. Simmel: "Gesellschaft im weitesten Sinne ist . . . , wo mehrere Individuen in Wechselwirkung treten," Das Problem der Soziologie," (1894), p. 273.

71. "Geleitwort," XIII.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. X.

74. Ibid. p. XI.

75. "The Problem of Sociology," pp. 314 (S. 5), 331 (S. 23).

76. "Geleitwort," p. XII.

77. Ibid.

78. "How Is Society Possible," p. 338 (S. 28).

79. Cf. above.

80. Cf. Hodges, Philosophy, p. 178.

81. Cf. "Einleitung," G.S., I., 70-5.

82. See Mayntz, op. cit., p. 256.

83. Cf. Simmel, "Das Problem der Soziologie," 1894, p. 273.

84. "Geleitwort," p. XI.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., p. X.

88. Cf. Simmel, "Fundamental Problems of Sociology," pp. 16-21 (S. 20-25).

89. *Ibid.*, p. 18 (S. 22f).

90. *Ibid.*

91. "Geleitwort," pp. XIII ff.

92. See Georg Misch, "Vorbericht des Herausgebers," *Wilhelm Diltheys Gesammelte Schriften*, V, pp. LXIX-LXXVIII.

93. Cf. Misch, *op. cit.*, p. LXXIII.

94. *Ideen*, 158-168; cf. Einleitung, *G.S.*, I, 30ff.

95. Cf. *Ideen*, 237-40.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. X, 151.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 170. "Im Gegensatz sur äusseren Wahrnehmung beruht die innere Wahrnehmung auf einem Innewerden, einem Erleben, sie ist unmittelbar gegeben."

98. Cf. "Die Philosophie muss den umgekehrten Weg einschlagen, als den die Vertreter der Konstruktions-methode gegangen sind. Ihr Gang muss ein analytischer, nicht ein konstruktiver sein. Sie muss vom entwickelten Seelenleben ausgehen, nicht aus elementaren Vorgängen dasselbe ableiten." *Ideen*, pp. 168 f.

99. Cf. "Reflektieren wir gar auf die Selbigkeit, welche gleichzeitig mehrere innere Vorgänge zusammenhält und das Nacheinander der Vorgänge zur Einheit des Lebens zusammenfasst, . . . So erleben wir beständig Verbindungen, Zusammenhänge in uns, während wir den

Sinneserregungen Verbindung und Zusammenhang unterlegen müssen. . . . Wir erfahren diesen Zusammenhang in uns nur stückweise; bald in diesem, bald in jenem Punkte fällt des Licht des Gewahrwerdens auf ihn; denn die psychische Kraft vermag nach einer wichtigen Eigentümlichkeit derselben stets nur eine beschränkte Zahl von Gliedern des inneren Zusammenhange in das Bewusstsein zu erheben . . . Ebenso sondern wir in anderen Fällen in einer aufmerkenden Konzentration der beobachtenden Tätigkeit aus dem Chaos von Vorgängen einen Einzelnen aus und suchen ihn in dauernder Wahrnehmung oder Erinnerung zu genauerer Erfassung festzuhalten. In dem raschen, ach nur zu raschen Flusse der inneren Vorgänse sondern wir so einen aus, isolieren ihn, erheben ihn zu verstärkter Aufmerksamkeit . . . . In all diesen logischen Arten sind mitenthalten Unterscheiden, Gleichfinden, Grade der Verschiedenheit bestimmen. . . . [Hence] alle psychologische Einzelerkenntnis ist nur Zergliederung dieses Zusammenhangs. . . . das psychologische Denken artikuliert und distinguiert von dem gegebenen Zusammenhang aus. In dem Dienste dieser beschreibenden Tätigkeit stehen die logischen Operationen . . . . der Zergliederung von einzelnen Vorgängen, der Einteilung." *Ibid.*, 170-174.

100. To be sure, Dilthey's descriptive psychology, as we have seen, can also be considered a social psychology. We should recall, however, that the label "social psychology" was only first introduced - in a few isolated instances - some years after Dilthey had begun to speak of a "descriptive psychology." Moreover, as social psychology eventually crystallized as a defined discipline its purview was much more limited than the comprehensive *Grundwissenschaft* that Dilthey intended by a descriptive psychology. It would then be both somewhat anachronistic and misleading to designate the latter social psychology.

101. "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften," *G.S.*, I, 32; cited passage translated in Hodges, *Introduction*, p. 130.

102. Cf. Anger, *Op. cit.*, p. 640.

103. Cf. Gordon W. Allport, "The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology," ed. G. Lindzey & E. Aronson, The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 23 f.

104. Cf. " . . . der erworbene Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens [enthält] gleichsam die Regeln, von welchen der Verlauf der einzelnen seelischen Vorgänge abhängig ist. Er bildet daher den Hauptgegenstand der psychologischen Beschreibung und Analysis innerhalb der drei grossen in der seelischen Struktur verbundenen Glieder des Seelenlebens, nämlich der Intelligenz, des Trieb- und Gefühlslebens und der Willenshandlungen." Ideen, G.S., V, 180.

105. Ibid., 180-186; cf. Dilthey, "Der logische Zusammenhang in den Geisteswissenschaften." (Probably written between 1907 and 1910, published posthumously), G.S., VII, 323-330. Translated excerpts in Hodges, Introduction, pp. 115-116.

106. "Ideen," G.S., V, 200-213.

107. Ibid., 180; cf. "Dieser erworbene Zusammenhang . . . [da er] nicht als ein Ganzes in das Bewusstsein fällt, ist er zunächst nur mittelbar in einzelnen reproduzierten Teilen oder in seinem Wirken auf seelische Prozesse für uns auffassbar. Hiermit vergleichen wir daher seine Schöpfungen, um ihm vollständiger und tiefer zu erfassen . . . . Diese Zergliederung der Erzeugnisse des menschlichen Geistes, welche in die Entstehung des seelischen Zusammenhangs, seine Formen und sein Wirken einen Einblick gewinnen will, muss nun aber mit der Analyse der geschichtlichen Produkte die Beobachtung und Sammlung jedes erhaschbaren Stückes der historischen Prozesse verbinden, in denen solcher Zusammenhang sich bildet. Eben auf der Verbindung dieser beiden Methoden beruht das ganze historische Studium von dem Entstehen, [den] Formen und [dem] Wirken des seelischen Zusammenhangs im Menschen . . . . " "Ideen," G.S., V, 180 f; articles in brackets added by G. Misch, editor of G.S., V.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

109. Cf. "Introduction," n. 7.

110. *Das Problem des Menschen* (1947), in *Werke*, I, 405; trans. by M. Friedman, *Between Man and Man*, (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 203 f. (German added).

111. *Ibid.*, p. 204 (S. 406).

112. Simmel, *Fundamental Problems of Sociology*, p. 12.

113. *Das Problem des Menschen*, p. 406.

114. *Ibid.*

115. Cf. "Buber strives for an ontological warrant for the ethical aspect of [dialogical] responsibility." N. Rotenstreich, "The Right and the Limitations of Buber's Dialogical Thought," in P. A. Schilpp and M. Friedman, eds., *The Philosophy of Martin Buber* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1967), p. 100.

116. Cf. "It must be recognized that this word, which is used in political discourse in France, has to German ears the same sound as our justice and equality." R. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

117. *Soziologie*, p. 20.

118. Cf. "Geleitwort": "Das Problem [des Zwischenmenschlichen] geht hinter die Tatsache der Individuation . . . nicht zurück, es macht sie nicht selbst wieder zum Problem . . . . " (X), and: "Selbstverständlich gibt es keine Sozialseele . . ." (XII); cf. Simmel: "Es ist jetzt nicht mehr möglich, die historischen Tatsachen im weitesten Sinne des Wortes, . . . aus dem Einzelmenschen . . . zu erklären. [Aben] es gibt niemals schlechthin 'Gesellschaft,' derart, dass unter ihrer Voraussetzung sich

nun jene einzelnen Verbindungsphänomene bildeten . . ." *Soziologie*, pp. 3, 11. For Simmel's most sustained critique of methodological individualism see his *Fundamental Problems of Sociology*, pp. 3-11.

119. Cf. "Buber": "Zwei oder mehrere Mensch leben miteinander; das heisst: sie stehen zueinander in Wechselbeziehung, in Wechselwirkung. Jede Wechselbeziehung . . . kann Sozietät oder Gesellschaft genannt werden. "Geleitwort," p. x. Cf. Simmel: "Gesellschaft [ist], wo mehrere Individuen in Wechselwirkung treten." "Das Problem der Sociologie," (1894), p. 273.

120. *Between Man and Man*, pp. 157 f., 199-203 (Se. 352 f, 401-405).

121. Michael Theunissen notes some suggestive parallels between Buber's philosophy of dialogue and Simmel's *Soziologie*. "Hier sei nur auf die Präfiguration einiger Motive der Buberschen Dialogik in der *Soziologie* Simmels verwiesen. Die Bedeutung dieses genialen Buches für die Entfaltung des dialogischen Prinzips liegt primär im ausdrücklichen Rückgang auf die vor-gesellschaftlichen zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen, die sich noch nicht zu 'objectiven Gebilden' verfestigt haben. Dadurch fördert Simmel fundamentale Phänomene des dialogischen Lebens zutage. Erwähnt seien nur die Explikation des Problems, welches das Zugleich der radikalen Selbständigkeit und der Ichbezogenheit des 'Du' aufgibt; die Beschreibung der Intimität, der Treue und Dankbarkeit sowie des Geschenks; die Herausarbeitung des spezifisch dialogischen, überempirischen Vertrauens als 'Grundkategorie menschlichen Verhaltens'; der Hinweis auf das Sich-anblicken als hoechste Konkretion dialogischer Unmittelbarkeit und Gegenseitigkeit sowie schliesslich die Definition des Sittlichen als 'Higabe des Ich an ein Du.' . . . Der dialogistische Ansatz seiner *Soziologie* ist nur einer unter vielen . . ." *Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1965), pp. 256 f., n. 22.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III

1. Cf. Buber, "Kultur und Zivilisation," Kunstwart, XIV, 15 (May, 1901), pp. 81-83.

2. The influence of Nietzsche on Buber's early thought has often been commented upon. Scholem, for example, observes: "Buber gehoert zu den Generation, die um 1900 von Nietzsche und seinen Losungen tief beeinflusst war. Nietzsches Rede von den 'Schaffenden' durchzieht alle seine fruehesten Schriften . . . " Scholem, op. cit., p. 15. Indeed there is prima facie evidence in his early writings pointing to Nietzsche's influence. Beyond noting this influence, no one has systematically analyzed the relationship of Buber's thought to Nietzsche. As regards Buber's early enthusiasm for the latter, Aaron Eliasberg reports in a reminiscence of a stroll he took with his cousin Martin Buber during the winter of 1898: "Wir gingen zusammen nach Hause. Auf der 'Promenade' wies Buber irgendwie auf die gegenueberliegende Seite der Strasse, worauf ich den Ausdruck brachte: 'Also jenseit von Gut und Böse.' Buber fragte: 'Haben Sie Nietzsche auch gelesen?' 'Nein.' Antworte ich schüchtern, 'und Sie?' 'Oh, vor zwei bis drei Jahren war ich ein leidenschaftlicher Nietzscheaner, aber jetzt sehe ich in ihm nur noch . . . " A. Eliasberg, "Aus Martin Bubers Jugendzeit" Blätter des Heinebundes I, 1. (April, 1928), p. 1 ff. Buber's reservations toward Nietzsche are perhaps elucidated by an unpublished essay, Zarathustra, which we date between 1898 and 1900 i. e., subsequent to the conversation reported by Eliasberg. (In the essay Buber refers to Nietzsche as still alive; Nietzsche died in 1900. Then the essay includes a number of sophomoric references to psychology; in the academic year 1897-98 Buber was an assiduous student of psychology and psychiatry. Cf. Buber's Collegium-Buch from Leipzig, Martin Buber Archive, A/6). The essay, intended as primer for the proper understanding of Nietzsche,

is written in an autobiographical vein: "Eine Krankheitsgeschichte mit ihrere Genesung und Erlösung . . . " *The Geburt der Tragödie* was Buber's first encounter with Nietzsche. "Das Buch machte mich zum Anhänger Nietzsches, zum kranken Anhänger." Buber accepted Nietzsche's thought as a system. "Einzwängen wollte ich deinen (i.e., Nietzsche) tanzenden Leicht- und Dichtsinn in leichendengraue Theorien. Das war meine Krankheit: nicht glaubte ich an *dich,* ich glaubte *dir.* Noch war mir deine Gestalt nicht erschienen. Und wie ich litt . . ." Nietzsche appealed to Buber's romantic discontent: "Es war in mir immer eine geraume Dosis Romantik . . .; ein wütiger Hass gegen die ganze ekelgeschwingerte Luft, in der ich lebte, eine grimmige Abneigung gegen die officielle Moral, die officielle Bildung, das conventionelle Lächeln, Weineln und Worteln . . . " Nietzsche's celebration of Wagner in the *Geburt* led Buber to regard the latter as the "apotheosis" of the new, anti-bourgeois man. In his "naivete," young Buber became an inebriated Wagnerian. Thus when he later read Nietzsche's critique of the prophet of Bayreuth, he sided with the latter. Feeling Nietzsche had betrayed his own system, Buber ceased to read him. - Perhaps this period of disillusionment with Nietzsche coincides with his colloquy with Eliasberg. - Then he chanced to read *Thus Spake Zarathustra* once again and discovered anew "die ewige Wiederkunft." This time Buber accepted Nietzsche's word not as doctrine but as poetic demand for a radical sceptism toward all systems: "Und dieser sein abgründlichster Gedanke von der ewigen Wiederkunft ist doch auch nur Dichtung . . . . Ein Hauptzweck Nietzsches . . . : die Erweckung des grossen Misstrauens . . . . Misstrauen gegen Alles und Jedes . . . gegen seine eigenen Worte, gegen sein eigenes Schweigen. Und nicht die Übermensch-Träumereien, sondern dieser mühselige Weg zur Wahrheit ist Nietzsches wahrer, grosser Idealismus." In summation, Buber notes "man muss von Nietzsche abfallen, um ihn liebgewinnen zu können." See *Zarathustra* (handwritten manuscript), Martin Buber Archive, B/7. In his "Autobiographische Fragmente," written in 1960, Buber recalls that Zarathustra and the principle of *die ewige Wiederkunft* "took possession" of him at "about the age of seventeen," that is, about 1895. Using this as the pivotal date to reconstruct the chronology of the above accounts we gain the impression that Buber composed his *Zarathustra* essay sometime before the winter of 1897/98 when he expressed to Eliasberg his disaffection with Nietzsche. This is to say, that between his seventeenth and nineteenth year Buber already experienced vis-à-vis Nietzsche a second crisis. This seems improbable. Moreover, the *Zarathustra* essay displays an erudition that would be an unlikely achievement for a lad of seventeen or eighteen, as Buber's 1960 recollection would oblige us to assume (*Zarathustra* reveals a wide reading in French and German literature, and a relatively sophisticated knowledge of philosophy). See Buber, *Begegnung* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960). In any case, Nietzsche's influence on Buber's pre-dialogical thought, as we shall presently see, proved singular and enduring. That Buber was familiar with Schopenhauer and his definition of das Individuationsproblem is testified to by the fact that Buber attended a seminar given by Paul Barth at the University of Leipzig, winter semester 1897/98, entitled "Einführung in die Philosophie, Ausgehend von Schopenhauers *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.*" Cf. Buber's *Collegium-Buch* from Leipzig, Martin Buber Archive, A/6. The latter work by Schopenhauer is his most elaborate statement on *das Individuationsproblem.*

3. Cf. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 29. Buber's formal relation to the circle ended when he left Berlin for Vienna in 1901.

4. Cf. "Introduction," p. 13, n. 20.

5. Cf. n. 70 below.

6. Cf. e.g., Joël, *op. cit.*, *passim*; also cf. Bonus, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

7. A. Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation,* trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), par. 2, p. 2. On the history of the problem of individuation see article "Individuation" in R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe,* I, S. 732-735.

8. Schopenhauer, *op. cit.*, par. 63.

9. Locutions borrowed from P. Gardiner, *Schopenhauer* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 17. That which permits time and space to measure relatedness is designated by Schopenhauer as "sufficient reason." The latter is the "logical ground" or necessary condition of cognitive knowledge, for perceptibility of discrete objects is possible only by the coefficiency or interrelatedness of time and space. This is to say that sufficient reason governs the content of time and space. Cf. *ibid.*, par. 2, p. 6, par. 4, p. 8 f.

10. Schopenhauer, *op. cit.*, par. 23, p. 113.

11. *Ibid.*, par. 18, pp. 99-103.

12. Cf. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-52.

13. *Ibid.*, par. 19, pp. 104 ff.

14. *Ibid.*, par. 22, pp. 109-110.
15. *Ibid.*, par. 23, p. 113.
16. *Ibid.*, par. 66, p. 370. By "illusion," Schopenhauer does not of course wish to intimate that the world of individuation is a visual fallacy or optical illusion; illusion is here meant philosophically - plurality and oppositeness are non-noumenal, that is, inauthentic. Cf. par. 63, p. 352. Schopenhauer cites approvingly the English scholar Sir William Jones: "The fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms": par 1, p. 4. Schopenhauer also ascribes a moral-theological character to individuation: " . . . the origin of [human] sin is to be inferred from the will of the sinner. This sinner was Adam, but we all existed in him . . . The doctrine of original sin, affirmation of the will, and of salvation,

denial of the will, is really the great truth which constitutes the kernel of Christianity . . . ": Ibid., par. 70, p. 405.

17. Cf. Ibid., par. 51, p. 253.

18. Only after they were acclaimed by Wagner and Nietzsche did Schopenhauer's writings really gain popularity. See R. J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche The Man and His Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 87 f. We further assume that Nietzsche's increased popularity during the *fin de siècle* redounded to Schopenhauer as well. Furthermore, although Schopenhauer frequently discussed the problem of individuation, his comments are desultory and tedious (cf. Josiah Royce, "Individual," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology [New York: 1925], I, p. 537.) Nietzsche's restatement of the problem is succinct and popular.

19. Nietzsche, "The Birth of Tragedy," in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. Clifton P. Fadiman (New York: The Modern Library, 1927). Ch. IX, p. 227. German reference are to Nietzsche's Werke (Leipzig: Alfred Kröner, 1917-1926), 20 volumes.

20. "The Birth of Tragedy," Ch. XVIII, p. 287.

21. Werke, I, 1.K, 171.

22. "The Birth of Tragedy," Ch. 4, p. 186.

23. Ibid., Ch. VIII, p. 210.

24. Werke, I, 34.

25. "The Birth of Tragedy," Ch. 1, p. 171.

26. Ibid., Ch. 16, pp. 271-272.

27. Ibid., Ch. 1, p. 172. It is of interest to note how Nietzsche conjoins the epistemological with the normative: In Dionysian enthusiasm, "all the hostile barriers, which necessity, caprice and 'shameless fashion' have erected between man and man, are broken down": Ibid., Ch. 1, p. 173.

28. Ibid.

29. Gardiner, op. cit., Ch. 4, passim; also ibid., pp. 54-55; also see Schopenhauer, op. cit., II, pars. 23 and 24.

30. Cf. W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, third edition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 178 f, 253-276.

31. "The Birth of Tragedy," Ch. 17, pp. 278-279.

32. Ibid., Ch. 16, p. 278.

33. Ibid., Ch. 10, p. 231.

34. Werke, X, 5-100. These are notes of lectures held at the University of Basel in 1872, 1873 and 1876. They were first published in 1895 in Volume X of the first edition of Nietzsche's collected writings issued by C. G. Naumann of Leipzig.

35. Werke, X, 182.

36. Ibid., 37-38.

37. Ibid., 31 f.

38. In his Die Götzen-Dämmerung - written in 1888, i.e., in one of his last works - we read: "Ich hehme, mit hoher Ehrerbietung, den Namen Heraklit's bei Seite. Wenn das andre Philosophen-Volk Zeugniss der

Sinne verwarf, weil dieselben Vielheit und Veränderung zeigten, verwarf er denen Zeugniss, weil sie die Dinge zeigten, als ob sie Dauer und Einheit hätten": Werke, VIII, 77. Also see Ecce Homo, like the aforementioned title written in 1888 (but, first published posthumously in 1908): "Ein Zweifel blieb mir zurück bei Heraklit, in dessen Nähe überhaupt mir wärmer, mir wohler zu Mute wird als irgendwo sonst . . . " Werke, XV, 65.

39. "Meine Vorfahren: Heraklit, Empedokles, Spinoza, Goethe," in "Gedanken und Plaene aus der Zeit der Entstehung des Zarathustra," (1882-85), Werke, XIV, S. 263. Or even more pointedly: "Die Lehre von der 'ewigen Wederkunft,' das heisst vom unbedingten und unenlich wiederholten Kreislauf aller Dinge - diese Lehre Zarathustra's koennte zuletzt auch schon von Heraklit gelehrt worden sein . . ." "Ecce Homo," Werke, XV, 65. R. J. Hollingdale observes that the "self-portrait" contained in The Gay Science (sect. 380) is an allusion to Heraclitus' doctrine of fire: "Yes, I know when I have sprung! Insatiable as a flame I burn and consume myself! Whatever I seize hold of becomes light, whatever I leave, ashes: certainly I am a flame." Hollingdale, op. cit., p. 94. Nietzsche also, according to Hollingdale, profoundly identified with Heraclitus, whom he considered a "proud and lonely truth finder."

40. Nietzsche himself refers to "die dionysische Weltanschauung" - as a title of an 1870 essay; cf. Werke, IX, 49-62.

41. On the "Neue Gemeinschaft" see Kohn, op. cit., S. 28-31: also see E. Friedell, Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit (München, C. H. Beck, 1929-31), III, 411. Nietzsche's neo-Heraclitean world-view found an equally strong echo in the work of Karl Joël (1864-1934). Joël, a professor of philosophy at Basel since 1897, maintained a correspondence with Buber from 1913 until his death; these letters, although largely reticent in regard to matters philosophical, indicate a mutual respect; cf. Martin Buber Archive, 336. Joël also contributed to the Festschrift in honor

of Buber's fiftieth birthday. Joël's Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geist der Mystik (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1903) is an obvious allusion to Nietzsche's Die Geburt der Tragoedie aus dem Geist der Musik. Joël's thesis: A mystical "Einheitsgefuehl" - which transcends phenomenal knowledge and the inflexible law of individuation - is a conditio sine qua non for understanding the world correctly - i.e., as an organic whole, possessing infinity: "Erkenntnis ist Spaltung, Gliederung, Sonderung . . . Der Sonderung muss die Einheit vorausgehen . . . Die Einheit des Seelischen und Sinnlichen, des Subjekts und Objekts wird erlebt im Gefuehl," (p. VI) "Und immer wirdermuss die mystische Ureinheit erlebt oder nachgefuehlt werden, um in aller fortschreitenden Sonderung die Einheit der Erkenntnis wachzuhalten, die organische Ganzheit des Menschen, der nicht bloss erkennend ist (pp. VI-VIII) . . . das Gefühl ist ja nicht nur ein Gegensatz zur Erkenntnis, es ist gerade auch das Anregende, Treibende für die Erkenntnis, die ja voraussetzt, dass die Gegenstände reizen, interessieren, also irgendwie gefühlsmässig ansprechen," (p. 14). As one of the first Naturphilosophen, Heraclitus in particular receives Joël's approbation; cf. pp. 77-82. In his Nietzsche und die Romantik (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1905), Joël explicitly expresses his indebtedness to Nietzsche for his "organische Weltauffassung," p. 89.

42. Heinrich and Julius Hart, "Unsre Gemeinschaft," Das Reich der Erfüllung (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1900) I. Heft, p. 93. - In addition to this annual journal, of which only two issues appeared, the "Neue Gemeinschaft" also sponsored public lectures and discussions. In the two issues of the journal, aside from contributions by Gustav Landauer and Felix Holländer, all the articles were written by the Hart brothers. Landauer in a letter to Hedwig Lachmann, dated June 8, 1900, describes a meeting of the "Neue Gemeinschaft," Gustav Landauer. Sein Lebensgang in Briefen, I, 55-56.

43. From the introductory essay to the first issue of Das Reich der Erfüllung, inside cover, signed by Heinrich and Julius Hart, and by their publisher, Eugen Diederichs - the Maecenas of German neo-romanticism.

44. "Vom höchsten Wissen," ibid., p. 16. None of the essays in volume one are signed; presumably they were written either by Heinrich or Julius Hart.

45. Ibid., p. 14.

46. "Eingang," ibid., p. 1.

47. Ibid., p. 2.

48. Ibid.

49. "Vom Leben im Licht," ibid., p. 78.

50. "Vom höchsten Wissen," ibid., p. 28.

51. "Eingang," ibid., p. 3.

52. "Vom höchsten Wissen," p. 33.

53. Ibid., p. 25.

54. Ibid., pp. 49 f.

55. "Vom höchsten Wissen," pp. 5, 28; Heinrich Hart, "Die neue Gemeinschaft, Das Reich der Erfüllung, 2. Heft (1901), p. 9.

56. Ibid.

57. Julius Hart, "Der neue Mensch," *Das Reich der Erfüllung,* 2. Haft, (1901), p. 21.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Julius Hart, "Von der Überwindung der Gegensätze," *Das Reich der Erfüllung*, 2. Heft (1901), p. 40.

60. Cf.: "Wir aber kennen eine Harmonie, aus der ewig neue Anregung stroemt, eine Freude, die unendliche Wechsel bietet . . . In uns und um uns ist Unendlichkeit." "Vom Leben im Licht," *ibid.*, p. 83.

61. Nietzsche's *Weltanschauung* can also be referred to as monistic, indeed Kaufmann (*op. cit.*, p. 241) calls Nietzsche a "dialectical monist." Kaufmann is here alluding to Nietzsche's will to power, which is as we have seen, a correlate of the Heraclitean logos; cf. *ibid*. The Hart brothers also refer to Heraclitus as a source of their *Weltanschauung;* cf., e.g., Julius and Heinrich Hart, "Von festlicher Lebensführung," *Das Reich der Erfüllung*, 2. Heft (1901), p. 72, n. 1.

62. Nietzsche, "Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen," Werke, X, p. 55, n. 1. Nietzsche was wont to explain the "Vieleinheit" by an analogy: "Ich begreife nur ein Wesen, welches zugleich eins ist und vieles, sich verändert und bleibt, erkennt, füllt will - dies ist meine Urtatsache . . . ": "Aus des Zeit des Zarathustra," *Werke,* XII, p. 304; cf. ". . . unser Leib ist ja nur ein Gessellschaftsbau vieler Seelen." *Jenseits von Gut und Böse,* *Werke,* VII, par. 19, p. 30. The French scholar Jean Granier aptly summarizes Nietzsche's position vis-à-vis individuation: ". . . Ce que Nietzsche récuse, c'est toute détermination de l'Etre qui autoriserait la croyance en une resorption possible du fini dans une unité originellement immobile et autorcique, et dispenserait l'Etre de se faire pluralité *hic et nunc.* La pluralité n'est pas le signe d'une détérioration de l'Etre, mais sa manifestation même . . . Le concept de la Volonté de Puissance assume ainsi, par rapport à l'antinomie de l'un et du multiple, le même rôle qu'assume

le thème de l'Eternal. Retour par rapport à l'antinomie de l' "être" et du devenue. En forgeant la notion du *Wille zur Macht,* Nietzsche cherche à penser la co-appartenance fondamentale de l'unité et de la pluralité. *La Volonté de Puissance est le jeu de l'un et du multiple.*" Jean Granier, *Le problème de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p. 360 (Granier's emphases).

63. Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo," par. 10, p. 49.

64. Julius Hart, "Die Überwindung der Gegensätze," p. 36.

65. Schopenhauer als Erzieher, *Werke,* I, 387.

66. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo,* p. 212.

67. Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

68. Nietzsche, *Schopenhauer als Erzlehrer,* p. 388.

69. Julius Hart, "Der neue Mensch, *Das Reich des Erfüllung,*" 2. Heft (1901), p. 27 (original emphasis).

70. Landauer was soon to break with the "Neue Gemeinschaft," apparently because of a growing dissatisfaction with what he felt to be the Hart brothers' uncritical optimism. In his *Skepsis und Mystik* (1903), Landauer includes a long critique of a monograph by Julius Hart. What piques Landauer is Hart's tendency to dismiss facelely all polarities - no matter how existentially painful and unjust they may be, - as illusions of the perceiving mind. He sarcastically remarks: "Das Zauberwort, mit dem Julius Hart alle geistigen und körperlichen Schmerzen behandelt, heisst: Verwandlung . . . Wenn ein Schaf von einem Loewen gefressen wird, so hat Schaf wie Mensch unrecht, das Tod zu nennen, und unrecht, sich darüber zu beklagen: das Leben des Schafes hat sich in das Leben des Loewen verwandelt." (p. 69) " . . . [Wenn] ein Kapitalist seine

Arbeiter ausbeutet, da wird eben Menschenfleisch in Tafelgueter verwandelt . . . "(p. 78). Change *qua* constant flux has been hypostasized and treated as if it were independent of material and spirit (pp. 71 f). The error here lies in the unquestioned credence Hart, in his anxiety to circumvent the difficulties inherent in the "Anschauungswelt," - places in the "Begriffswelt." But concepts, Hart fails to realize, are no more than arbitrary linguistic constructs - and language, as the philosopher Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923) has demonstrated, is almost totally bereft of epistemological value. "Was immer [die Erkenntnis] von der Welt sagt; es sind Worte. Das heisst: es ist nicht wahr," (p. 98). This criticism of Hart does not necessarily imply that Landauer abandoned the problem of individuation. To overcome the limitations of phenomenal knowledge and, especially, the separation of the "I" from the world, still remains his principal concern: "Die Deutlichkeit und Bestimmheit unserer Wahrnehmungen kommt eben von dem Zustand der Vereinzelung und Abgrenzung der Individualiserung, in den wir den Strom der Aussen welt versetzem müssen, um seiner auf Umwegen habhaft zu werden . . . Weil die Welt in Stücke zerfallen und von sich selbst verschieden und geschieden ist, muessen wir in die mystische Abgeschiedenheit flüchten, um mit ihr eins zu werden" (p. 39). In mystical seclusion - in the non-verbal world of introspection - one realizes that the "Individuum ist ein Starres und Absolutes als Ausdruck für ein sehr Bewegliches und Verbundenes" (p. 29). "Das Sein muss in Werden verwandelt werden, wie Nietzsche im *Wille zur Macht* sagt, *dessen Gedanke berühen sich vielfach mit diesen Ausführungen* . . . " (p. 127, emphasis added). "Die Ausgabe für den, der ein einheitliches Weltbild formen will" (p. 115) is not to devise new conceptions of the world - but to create a new language which will give expression to the "Pantheistic" truths we experience in mystical silence (cf. pp. 100 ff). To this end, Schopenhauer's (and the early Nietzsche's) notion of music as a noumenal language is an effective beginning (pp. 48, 127). This new language will "[alles] Räumliche zeitlich ausdrücken, . . ." (p. 33), for space is "die Annahme eines Äusseren, Dinghaften, Bleibenden, dos nicht zu uns gehört, das nicht bei uns, nicht unser ist." (p. 116); all language hitherto has been "Raumsprache" (p. 33). The "Zeitsprache," which brings "Pantheismus und kritische Erkenntnistheorie in Harmonie . . . " (p. 103), does not seek to deny complexity and existential pain. "Ich bin nicht nur dieses Hirn, nicht nur dieser Organismus, ich bin auch mein Gesch utes. Dies nicht um der Wonneseligkeit . . . willen - denn die Welt wird wahrhaftig nicht schoener . . . , wenn ich sie bin . . . . - , sondern um des Sinnbildes der Wahrheit willen . . . " (p. 120). One suspects that Landauer's break with the "Neue Gemeinschaft" was not entirely a question of epistemological differences - which were after all, not so great to be irreconcilable; nor perhaps was the break due entirely to the Hart brothers' apparent lack of existential (i.e., social) sensitivities. Landauer seems to have disliked Julius Hart's imperious and sanctimonious manner: ". . . wenn die Menschen, wie Hart kündet, fühlen und denken, gottgleich und göttlich werden . . . ; nur ist es mir nicht ganz sicher, ob wir nicht aus [his next book] erfahren werden, der neue Gott sei Julius Hart . . . " (p. 68). In a letter to Hedwig Lachmann, dated 28 August 1901, Landauer voices his displeasure with the Hart brothers' superficiality and lack of social concern. But he still refers to them as "meine Freunde": Landauer. Sein Lebensgang in Briefen, I, p. 73. In another letter (28 November 1901) addressed to Fritz Mauthner, Landauer exclaims, "dass ich mit der Überschätzung der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen in Harts Schriften nicht mitgehe, . . . Eine innere Geschichte hat aber nur, dass ich den praktischen Bestrebungen seit einigen Monaten kühl gegenüberstehe; oder eigentilich nicht den Bestrebungen, die ja mindestens auf mich ebenso zurückgehen wie auf die Harts, als den Personen, die sich damit abgeben. Ich habe die Harts am werk gesehen und weiss daher, dass sie nichts zuwegebringen, und dass sie gegen die Eitelkeit, sich für Auserkorene zu halten und sich darum mit ganz ertlosen Menschen intensiv abzugeben, nicht gefeit sind": ibid., I, pp. 100-102. In any case, contrary to the impression one may receive from reading Kohn (op. cit., pp. 29-31), Landauer's withdrawal from the "Neue Gemeinschaft" and the publication of his Skepsis und Mystik was probably of marginal significance for Buber's philosophical development, that is if we see "das Individuationsproblem" as the leitmotif of the latter's pre-dialogical thought. Moreover, as our brief note on Karl Joël indicates, the problem of individuation was not confined to the "Neue Gemeinschaft." On the other hand, Landauer's (i.e., Mauthner's) theory of language did exercise an influence on Buber; see n. 131 below.

71. G. Landauer "Durch Absonderung zur Gemeinschaft," Das Reich der Erlösung," 2. Heft (1901), p. 65.

72. Ibid. On Landauer's enthusiasm for Heraclitus, see his correspondence with Constantin Brunner, Ludwig Berndl, Rafael Seligmann and others in Landauer. Sein Lebensgang in Briefen, letters numbered 119, 177, 187, 198, and 201.

73. Buber, "Alte und neue Gemeinschaften," lecture held at the Berliner Architektenhaus, circa 1901; it was to appear in the third volume of Das Reich der Erfüllung, which, however, was discontinued after the second issue; cf. Kohn, op. cit., p. 294. In our discussion we shall consult Buber's handwritten manuscript, Martin Buber Archive, 47/B; cf. Kohn, op. cit., pp. 29 f: "Siegfried Jacobson, der spätere Herausgeber der Schaubühne, hat damals Buber 'entdeckt' und begeistert über den Vortrag in der Welt am Montag referiert." I should like to record my gratitude to Marcel Marcus of Berlin for his assistance in deciphering Buber's manuscript.

74. Cf. ". . . auch im einzelnen Menschen gibt es Gemeinschaft und Harmonie der nebeneinanderbestehenden Gegensätze." Alte und neue Gemeinschaften, p. 2.

75. Ibid., p. 6.

76. Ibid.; cf. Buber's autobiographical recollection from his fifteenth year: "A necessity I could not understand swept over me: I had to try again and again to imagine the edge of space, or its edgelessness, time with a beginning and an end or a time without beginning or end, and both were equally impossible, equally hopeless - yet there seemed to be only the choice between the one or the other absurdity." Between Man and Man, p. 136. In another place Buber notes that two books served to relieve his anxiety with regard to time, Kant's Prolegomena and Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra. The former taught him that time and space, as functions of our perception, "are no real properties that adhere to the things themselves . . . " "This philosophy exercised a great quieting affect on me." Nietzsche's teaching of the "eternal return," on the other hand, inspired him. "This conception . . . [of "the manifest uniqueness of all happening"] is no teaching at all but the utterance of an ecstatically lived-through possibility of thought . . . The 'Dionysian' pathos has by no means been transformed here into a philosophical one, . . . [it] remained Dionysian, as its modern variant, produced by the enthusiasm of the Dionysian man over his own heights and depths." Autobiographical Fragments, p. 12.

77. "Alte und neue Gemeinschaften," p. 6 (emphasis added).

78. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

79. Ibid., p. 7.

80. Ibid., S. 9.

81. "Ich glaube: sie werden es (das Ideal) leben können," Ibid., p. 7 (Buber's emphasis).

82. Submitted in 1904 to Professors Friedrich Jodl and Laurenz Müllner; approved in July of that year.

83. M. Buber, Zur Geschichte der Individuationsproblems (unpublished, unbound, 39pp), Martin Buber Archive, 2/A, p. 1.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid. p. 2.

86. Ibid. Both also sponsor "eine Mikrokosmoslehre": "Es ist hier natürlich nicht jene Lehre gemeint, die im Einzelwesen lediglich dieselben Grundeigenschaften oder Grundmächte wie im Kosmos auffindet und die von Heraklit bis Schopenhauer sich hinzieht, sondern die neoplatonische Idee des Allumfassens jedes Individuums," ibid., p. 3.

87. Ibid., p. 9.

88. Ibid., p. 9 f.

89. Ibid., p. 11.

90. Cf. Heinrich and Julius Hart: "Seit drei Jahrhunderten is die Forschung am Werke, ein neues Weltbild zu schaffen . . . Die Grundzuege des neuen Weltbildes hat Kopernikus . . . gegeben. Für ihn blieb jecoch der 'Himmel' der feste Deckel . . .. Erst Giordano Bruno wagte den Deckel zu heben, . . . mit ihm durchbrach . . . der menschliche Geist die Eierschalen, in denen er wie ein Voegelein gesessen hatte . . . ," "Eingang," Das Reich der Erfüllung, 1. Heft (1900), pp. 1 f.

91. Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems, p. 11.

92. Ibid., p. 12.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., p. 13; cf. "Dem Pantheismus Bruno's [which Cusanus shares] geht hier ein relativerer Pantheismus voraus, der wohl Gott in allem sieht, aber doch ausser allem; die Natur wohl als den erfahren Gott, aber doch nur als Hinweis auf die Transscendenz des unerfahrbaren . . . "; ibid., p. 13. Cf. Boehme vacillates "zwischen Theismus und Pantheismus . . . " ibid., p. 28. Franz Rosenzweig, in his discussion of Buber's dissertation, observes that Buber's "Problem nur in dem geistigen Raum zwischen der mittelalterischen Theologie und einem konsequenten pantheistischen Monismus vorhanden ist; dort vor lauter Transzendenz, noch nicht, hier, vor lauter Immanenz, nicht mehr." "Aus Bubers Dissertation," in Wilhelm Michel, et. al., eds., Aus Unbekannten Schriften. Festgabe für Martin Buber zum 50. Geburtstag (Berlin: Lambert Schneider, 1928), p. 244; cf. n. 98 below.

95. Zur geschichte des Individuationsproblems, p. 13.

96. Ibid., p. 17. The apparent difference between beings is merely "Grade in Potentialität": Ibid., p. 19.

97. Ibid., pp. 24-27.

98. Buber finds this similarity in their theological approach to the problem of individuation hardly coincidental. Bracketing the question of a mutual source of influence - which there certainly was (ibid., pp. 24 f) - Buber argues that given a concomitance of a belief in a providential, monotheistic God and of a sensitivity to the existent individuation of the world, an assumption of God's immanence is practically inevitable. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

99. Ibid., p. 30; cf. Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation, I, par. 22, pp. 110-112. Buber suggests that Schopenhauer may here have been influenced by Boehme, "Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems," p. 31.

100. Ibid., p. 21.

101. _Ibid._

102. _Ibid._, p. 32.

103. _Ibid._

104. Cf. Schopenhauer, _The World as Will and Representation_, par. 4, _passim._

105. "Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems," p. 36.

106. In his dissertation, Buber does not refer to Boehme's actualized God as "energy"; however, in a contemporaneous essay he does: "Über Jakob Boehme," _Wiener Rundschau,_ Vol. 12, June 15, 1901, p. 251. Energy of course is implied by "movement."

107. _Ibid._, p. 252; For Boehme, it is "genug, dass das Ich sich mit der Welt vereint. Das Ich is die Welt." Hans Kohn reports that Buber read a paper on Jacob Boehme before the "Neue Gemeinschaft," _op. cit._, p. 29; it is not unlikely that the published essay on Boehme, if not a reproduction of this lecture, is based on it.

108. _Zur Geschichte des Individuationsproblems_, p. 37.

109. _Ibid._, p. 36.

110. _Ibid._, pp. 37-38.

111. _Ibid._, p. 38f, n. 1. This is Buber's sole reference to Heraclitus in the dissertation. Perhaps not unrelated to Buber's operative assumptions is a statement by his friend Gustav Landauer. In a letter to Ludwig Berndl, discussing Leibniz's treatment of the _principium individuationis_, Landauer refers to Nicolaus of Cusa as "der Urvater dieser ganzen Betractungsart . . . , der nach meiner Überzeugang

unterirdisch mit Heraklit und damit dem Orient verbunden ist": Landauer. Sein Lebensgang in Briefen, letter no. 201 (2.3.1911), p. 343.

112. Schaeder, op. cit., pp. 37-41. Previous to Schaeder, only Franz Rosenzweig (op. cit.) had examined Buber's dissertation. All subsequent references to the dissertation in scholarly literature have relied on Rosenzweig's essay - which, incidentally, is confined to a few remarks on Buber's analysis of Boehme.

113. Handwritten manuscript found among Buber's notes to his dissertation, Martin Buber Archive, B/7. Only pages 2-12 of this document are extant. That this is actually a part of a draft of the dissertation is perhaps to be doubted by the fact that sections of pages 4-10 are parallel, in both content and language, to Buber's essay "Über Jacob Boehme," op. cit. This would suggest that the manuscript may have been the lecture mentioned in n. 107. However, without additional evidence - other than that Buber included it among his dissertation notes - we are obliged to assume that the manuscript was a draft, more precisely, preliminary notes. It is not improbable that Buber first composed these notes - he started to work on his dissertation in 1900 - and then drew upon them to prepare his lecture for the "Neue Gemeinschaft." In any case, the manuscript and its apparent relation to his Jacob Boehme lecture suggest a correspondence between his dissertation and the interests of the "Neue Gemeinschaft."

114. Ibid., p. 12. The sentence interestingly continues: " . . . dass er, der das Wort zu sagen wagte: 'Der Mensch ist den Schöpfe sein selbst,' seine Sehnsucht nach freien persönlichen Bewegungen unter . . . " (unfortunately, the continuation of the text is missing).

115. Ibid., p. 5.

116. Ibid., p. 5 f.

117. Ibid., p. 2.

118. Ibid., p. 3.

119. Ibid., p. 4. Buber also speaks of "der Erfüllende" - an individual who unlike the mystic does not require a dionysian experience to overcome individuation. The body of Buber's discussion concerning this type of individual, however, is on the missing page one of the manuscript. Apparently "der Erfüllende" - associated typologically with the personality of Jesus - must endure death for his achievement. "In den Erfüllenden stellt [das Ideal] sich in seiner ganzen Reinheit dar, mit der Eindeutigkeit der Tat, sich vollendend und vernichtend." Ibid., p. 3.

120. Ibid., p. 4.

121. As regards Buber's interest in theatre, Kohn notes: "So handelt es sich im Theater um die ewige Spannung von Ich und Du, um das Problem der Individuation, das in volkhafter Verbundenheit sich entspannt und in dem letzten Abgrund des Individuums wieder in voller Tragik ersteht," op. cit., p. 72. The problem of individuation was likewise, according to Kohn, that which chiefly engaged Buber in his early studies of Hasidism (ibid., p. 73 f). Unfortunately, Kohn's discussion here is fleeting and consequently exiguous.

122. M. Buber, ed., Ekstatische Konfessionen (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1909). Buber's introductory essay is entitled, "Ekstase und Bekenntnis," pp. XI-XXVI.

123. The expression "time and space" is our interpolation. Buber says that ecstasy "wird und vollendet sich jenseits des Getriebes . . ." (p. XIII). By "das Getriebe" or, more precisely "das menschliche Lebensgetriebe" (p. XI), Buber wishes to refer to the perceptual mech-

anism which orders impressions received from the external world. This mechanism is structurally incapable of grasping "the unity" (ibid.). The world presented to man by this mechanism is thus characterized by multiplicity (p. XVIII). Moreover, ". . . Erkenntnis der Nähe und der Ferne, der Empfindung oder der Idee . . . ist das Werk des Getriebes, in ihren grössten Wundern ein gigantisches Koordinatensystem des Getriebes" (p. XVIII). Cf. "The orienting or the classifying" relation to experience makes it into a thing in space, [fixes] it in its place . . . with an unshakably fixed relationship to each other point in the world." Orientation renders an experience "into an event in time, expand it into experience . . . shove it between a before and an after . . . " Buber, trans. M. Friedman, Daniel. Dialogues on Realization (1913) (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 64 f .

124. "Ekstase und Bekenntnis," p. XIV.

125. Ibid., p. XVII.

126. Ibid., p. XV.

127. Ibid., p. XIV.

128. Ibid., p. XV.

129. Ibid., p. VI f.

130. Ibid., p. XX.

131. Buber is here undoubtedly relying on Fritz Mauthner's "critical theory" of language, to which Landauer probably introduced him, see n. 70 above. Also cf. Mauthner's letter to Frau Clara Levysohn, dated 31 May 1906. Mauthner relates that Buber had paid him a visit, ostensibly to solicit a contribution to Die Gesellschaft. (Mauthner did eventually

oblige Buber with the monograph Die Sprache.) This meeting lasted a number of hours. ". . . Dieser Dr. Buber hat mir stundelang aus einer Arbeit vorgelesen, die demnächst erscheint. 'Rabbi Nachman,' vor 100 Jahren gelebt, polnischer Jude, Vorgänger in sprachkritischen Ideen . . . Daneben freute mich auch die intime Kenntnis, die Dr. Buber von meinem Werke zeigt." Letter cited in appendix to Gershon Weiler, "Fritz Mauthner: A Study in Jewish Self-Rejection," Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, VIII (1963), p. 147 f.

132. "Ekstase und Bekenntnis," p. XXV.

133. Ibid. In addition to books and monographs on the Hasidic mythopoeic tradition, Buber published mythic materials from China, Finland, Flanders, and Wales. In Ekstatische Konfessionen, Buber presented the testimonies of Hindu, Islamic, Christian and Pagan "ecstatics."

134. "Ekstase und Bekenntnis," p. XXVI.

135. Cf. ibid., pp. XI ff; cf. Buber's comment, written in 1957, on the thematically related essay, "Die Lehre vom Tao" ("Nachwort" to his Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse, 1910): The intellectual stage to which "Die Lehre vom Tao" belongs "one may call . . . my 'mystical' phase if one understands as mystic the belief in a unification of the self with the all-self, attainable by man in levels or intervals of his earthly life. Underlying this belief, when it appears in its true form, is usually a genuine 'ecstatic' experience. But it is the experience of an all-absorbing unity of his own self. This self is then so uniquely manifest, and it appears then so uniquely existent, that the individual loses the knowledge, 'This is my self, distinguished and separate from every other self.' He loses the sure knowledge of the principium individuationis, and understands this precious experience of his unity as the experience of the unity . . ." Buber, trans. M. Friedman, Pointing the Way: Collected Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957). "Foreword," p. ix (Buber's emphases).

136. Daniel, p. 55.

137. Ibid. (S. 17). German citations are from the 1913 edition published by Insel Verlag, Leipzig.

138. Ibid., p. 53.

139. Ibid., p. 55.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid. That music is a noumenal language is one of Schopenhauer's principal contentions; cf. The World as Will and Representation, I, par. 52, pp. 255-267. In his Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music, Nietzsche celebrated this notion (cf. ibid., ch. 17). Landauer also subscribes to this epistemological evaluation of music in Skepsis und Mystik, pp. 48, 127; cf. n. 70 of this chapter.

144. Daniel, p. 51 (S. 11).

145. Ibid., p. 56 f. "Decision" or the act of choosing is for Buber synonymous with "direction." Both terms point to the uniqueness inherent in each individual; thus Buber speaks of one's "own, inborn, unique direction, belonging to [him] and no other." Ibid., p. 56.

146. Ibid., p. 53 (S. 15).

147. Ibid., cf. ". . . the unity that is meant is not, in fact, any comprehensive unity of a world or of a body of knowledge, not the established unity of the spirit or of being . . . . but the unity of this human life and this human soul that fulfils itself in itself, the unity of

your life and soul, you who has realized his direction." "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 34.

148. Ibid., p. 52.

149. Ibid., p. 54.

150. Ibid. (German edition), p. 12. M. Friedman incorrectly translates "so ist . . . vor das Erlebnis der Zusammenhang gesetz" as "set . . . before the experience of connection" (p. 53). Grammatically, however, this is an impossible rendition, for "das Erlebnis" - an accusative, governed by the preposition "vor" - is in a sequential relation to "der Zusammenhang," a nominative singular. That this is the intended meaning of the phrase is clear from the rest of the sentence: "wie vor die einfältige Wachen der vielfältige Schlaf, vie vor die einfältige Senkrechte die vielfältige Wagerechte, so ist vor das einfältige Eine das vielfältige Andere, vor das Erlebnis der Zusammenhang gesetzt." Friedman's translation, "the experience of connection," lends the text a mystical character - a celebration of the unico mystica - a position which Buber clearly seeks to eschew. This, of course, is not to deny that a mystical tone pervades Daniel - but this mysticism is one of a romantic Lebensphilosophie, not of a unico mystica; cf. n. 135 above.

151. Daniel, p. 95.

152. Ibid., p. 71.

153. By intimation, Buber explains, "Tao is related to the Heraclitean logos. Both transpose a dynamic principle of human life into the transcendent, though basically they mean nothing other than human life itself, which is the bearer of all transcendence . . . . All is becoming and change in the 'great house' of eternity. Tao is the unity of the change. . . . [Tao] verifies itself not only in the manifoldness of things, but also in the successive moments in the life of each thing. . . Tao is the path

of things, their manner, their peculiar order, their unity; but as such [Tao] exists in things only potentially . . . [The individual who has realized his personal Tao, the perfected or unified man] is . . . the creating man; for all creating means nothing other than calling forth the Tao of the world, the Tao of things, to make the latent unity living and manifest. [That is to say] the unity of the world is only a reflection of [the perfected man's] unity . . . But since the unity of the world exists for the perfected man, it is, in truth, his unity that sets unity in the world . . ." "The Teaching of Tao," pp. 45-50.

154. Cf. "Realizing men are few in our time": *Daniel*, p. 73. Direction is variously referred to by Buber as decision, Tao, *kavvana*, realization, and unconditioned, perfected or fulfilled action.

155. *Ibid.*, ch. 2, pp. 61-78, *passim.*

156. *Ibid.*, p. 56 (S. 20). For this realm of security Buber employs the image of the sea: As we contemplate the shoreless sea and "the familiar playing of the waves" we experience a "mild melancholy and all security." Ibid., p. 51 f. This is somewhat reminiscent of a passage in Schopenhauer: "Just as the boatsman sits in his small boat, trusting his frail craft in a stormy sea that is boundless in every direction, so in the midst of a world full of suffering and misery the individual man calmly sits, supported by and trusting the *principium individuationis* . . . " *The World as Will and Representation*, I, par. 63, pp. 352 f.

157. *Daniel*, p. 56. Cf. ". . . das Geheimniss, um die grösste Fruchtbarkeit und den grössten Genuss vom Dasein einzuernten, heisst: *gefährlich leben!*" Nietzsche, "Die fröhlichle Wissenschaft," *Werke*, V, par. 283, p. 215 (Nietzsche's emphasis).

158. *Daniel*, p. 95.

159. Ibid.

160. Buber, "Ein Wort über Nietzsche und die Lebenswerte," Die Kunst im Leben, I, no. 2 (December, 1900), p. 13. This essay was apparently written in memoriam of Nietzsche, who had died on August 25, 1900. Note the essay's last line: "Als er ging, war das Leben grösser und lebenswerter geworden . . . " (p. 13).

161. Ibid. Cf. the original motto to Daniel, removed from post-I and Thou editions of the volume: "Deus in creatura mirabili et ineffabili modo creatur - God is in a wondrous and ineffable manner created in the creature." The quotation is from Scotus Erigena.

162. For discussion of Nietzsche's influence on Rilke and George, see J. H. W. Rosteutscher, Die Wiederkunft des Dionysus. Der naturmystische Irrationalismus in Deutschland (Bern: A. Francke, 1947), pp. 223-242; also cf. E. Heller The Disinherited Mind (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959), pp. 123-176, a chapter on "Rilke and Nietzsche." Wolfskehl notes that the "George circle" draws inspiration from Nietzsche; see his essay "Die Blätter für die Kunst und die neuste Literatur," Jahrbuch für die geistige Bewegung, I (Berlin, 1910), pp. 4 ff. Parenthetically, Buber dedicated to Wolfskehl his essay "Kawwana: die Welterlösung im Chassidismus," Die Welt, XI, 23 (June 7, 1907), pp. 23-25; as regards Buber's relation to Rilke, see B. J. Morse, Martin Buber's Baalschem and Rilke's Ninth Duino Elegy (unpublished manuscript - Martin Buber Archive, 258). (Friedman in his introduction to Daniel incorrectly identifies Morse's discussion as a comparison of Rilke's "Duino Elegy" with Buber's Daniel. Cf. Daniel, "Translator's Introduction," p. 15.)

163. Ibid., p. 119 (emphasis added).

164. Ibid., p. 141.

165. "Knowing and feeling, acting and valuing man stands in the protean phenomenon of inner polarity in which the one pole is always directly present to him, the other indirectly, the one possessed by him, the other is known about." Ibid. "It is a fundamental psychological fact that the multiplicity of man's soul appears to him, recurrently as dualism . . . Man experiences the fullness of his reality and his potentiality as a living substance that gravitates toward two poles. No matter what changing meaning-contents or names the two opposites of man striving my have . . . the basic form itself remains unchanged." M. Buber, "Judaism and Mankind" (1911) trans. E. Jospe, in M. Buber, On Judaism, N. N. Glatzer, ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 25. In light of these statements Walter Kaufmann's dismissal of Buber's "I-Thou, I-It" dualism as simplistic is perhaps unfair. Kaufmann contends that Buber's dualism fails to acknowledge the "manifold" character of reality. To be sure, Buber's dialogical dualism is, ontologically speaking, fundamentally different from his earlier microcosmic dualism; epistemologically, however, they are similar. In both cases Buber wishes to point to the fundamental tension of reality. This is a serious argument. Thus to declare Buber a naive or "self-deluding" dualist seems rather facile. Cf. W. Kaufmann, "Prologue 'I and You'" in Buber, trans. W. Kaufmann, I and Thou (New York: Scribner, 1970), pp. 9-25, passim.

166. Daniel, p. 142.

167. Ibid., p. 142 f.

168. Ibid., p. 143.

169. Buber, trans. M. Friedman, "The Altar" (1914) in Pointing the Way, pp. 16-19. The altarpiece, executed by Mathias Grünewald (d. 1528), is in the Musée d'Unterlinden, Colmar, France.

170. Ibid., p. 16.

171. Ibid., p. 17.

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid., pp. 17 f.

177. Ibid., p. 18.

178. Ibid.

179. Ibid., pp. 17 f.

180. Ibid., pp. 17 f.

181. Ibid., p. 18.

182. Cf. M. Buber "Was ist zu tun?" (1904) in Buber "Die Jüdische Bewegung," I (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1916), p. 126.

183. M. Buber, trans. E. Jospe, "Jewish Religiosity" (1912) in On Judaism, p. 85.

184. "Das Judentum und die Juden," in Buber, Drei Reden über das Judentum (Frankfurt a. M., Rütten & Loening, 1911), p. 16.

185. M. Buber, trans. E. Jospe, "Judaism and Mankind," in *On Judaism*, p. 27.

186. "Jewish Religiosity," p. 80.

187. *Ibid.*

188. *Ibid.*, pp. 83 f.

189. *Ibid.*, pp. 93 f, (emphasis added).

190. "Judaism and the Jew," p. 25 (S. 42).

191. "World-image" is E. Jospe's translation. The expression is perhaps better rendered as "view of life," "theory of life," or even "image of the world"; however, for the sake of consistency, we retain Jospe's translation.

192. Buber, trans. E. Jospe, "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," in *On Judaism*, p. 58.

193. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

194. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

195. *Ibid.*, p. 59. German citations from "Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum," in Buber, *Vom Geist des Judentums* (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff, 1916), p. 15.

196. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 60.

197. Cf. Landauer's letter to L. Berndl cited in n. 111 above. Also see Buber's essay, "The Teaching of the Tao" - whose Heraclitean character we discussed in n. 153 above.

198. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 62.

199. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 25; cf. Daniel, pp. 138-140: ". . . that innermost wisdom (which cannot benefit the faithful) proclaims that the awakened man indifferentiates all opposites and antinomies in himself . . . . [But] he is independent of all, not at one with all."

200. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 65.

201. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 25. German supplied by E. Jospe.

202. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 65.

203. Ibid., p. 66.

204. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 33.

205. Ibid.

206. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 66.

207. Ibid.

208. Ibid., p. 67.

209. Cf. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 32. Cf. "Eins ist not. - Seinem Charakter 'Stil geben' . . . Denn Eins ist Not; dass der Mensch seine Zufriedenheit mit sich erreiche . . . ; nur dann erst ist der Mensch überhaupt erträglich anzusehen!" Nietzsche, "Die fröhliche Wissenschaft," Werke, VI, par. 290, pp. 291 f. "Eins tut not" is a recurrent expression in Buber; cf. "Ekstase und Bekenntnis," p. XX;

Daniel, p. 135; "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," pp. 62, 69; "Jewish Religiosity," p. 87; "Buddha" (1907) in Buber, Ereignisse und Bewegungen (Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1917), p. 4; "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 32.

210. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 33, (S. 55).

211. "Jewish Religiosity," pp. 82 f. (emphasis added).

212. Ibid., p. 83.

213. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 74.

214. Cf. Buber, trans. E. Jospe, "Myth in Judaism" (1914), in On Judaism, p. 100.

215. Cf. Judentums "Krankheit im Golus, das ist die Ohnmacht und die Entfremdung der Gestaltenden. Es geschah, dass jener ewige Prozess im Judentum nicht mehr zum Auftrag kommen konnte, weil . . . das Gestaltlose in den Bereich des Geformten einbrach und die Form zersetzte, das Gemeinschaftsgebilde seinem entstellenden Einfluss ausgeliefert . . ." "Das Gestaltende," in Die Jüdische Bewegung, I, p. 215.

216. Buber speaks of "Assimilationsfanatismus." "Das Zion der Jüdischen Frau" (1910) in Die Jüdische Bewegung, I, p. 33.

217. "Das Gestaltende," p. 215.

218. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 23 (S. 37).

219. Ibid., p. 25, German supplied by E. Jospe.

220. Ibid., p. 32.

221. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 65.

222. Although Buber never quite explicitly makes this connection between the destiny of Israel and that of the world, this is the unambiguous implication of both his rhetoric and thought. His fascination with the kabbalistic notion of kavvanah and in particular with the Lurianic myth of cosmic redemption only reinforces the above inference; cf. "Jewish Religiosity," p. 93.

223. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 31. The term "Zionism" does not appear in this lecture; nonetheless, when speaking of the renewal of Judaism, Zionism is Buber's obvious ideological reference. Moreover, this lecture was presented to the "Bar Kochba" Zionist student organization of Prague; cf. Kohn, op. cit., pp. 90, 314 f.

224. Cf. "Die Erneuerung des Judentums, die im Golus anheben muss, wird sich im Golus nicht vollenden können . . . Sie kann nur von einem ganz bestimmten Boden ausgehen: von dem Boden der Heimat. Er hat unsere besondere Art, unsere eigentümlichen Energien . . . erzeugt; er allein wird sie erneuen . . . können. [Buber, the cultural Zionist, quickly adds a caveat:] Vermeinen wir nicht, es sei genug, aus dem äusseren Golus hineinzukommen. Was uns mehr als alles nottut, ist dies, dass wir uns von dem inneren Golus reinigen . . . [nonetheless] Diese innere Befreiung vom Golus . . . muss sie auch, damit die Erneuerung anhebe, von dem Einzelnen mit aller Kraft für sich angestrebt werden, für das Volk muss sie hier Stückwerk bleiben: für das Volk kann sie nur an einem Orte der Erde gelingen . . . . Dort erst können wir wahrhaft zu uns selbst kommen. Hier sind wir ein Keil, den Asien in Europas Gefüge trieb . . . Kehren wir in Asiens Schoss . . . zurück und wir kehren zum Sinn unseres Daseins zurück. . . " "Das Land der Juden" (1910), in Die Jüdische Bewegung, I, pp. 192-195 (Buber's emphasis). Cf. "In the detachment and dissolution of [Jewry's] Western existence [the renewal of Judaism] will come into being only after the

continuity of life in Palestine, where the great concepts of [the] unitary drive once originated, has been re-established. . . . Once [the Jew's soul] comes into contact with its maternal soil, it will once more become creative. The Jew can truly fulfil his vocation among the nations only when he begins anew . . . " "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 77.

225. "Judaism and Mankind," p. 33.

226. That Buber was very deliberate in his choice of language is a fact often ignored. Landauer, contrary to most of Buber's commentators, did not permit Buber's highly affected and abstract style to obscure this fact; see: (Buber's) "Vertrautheit mit dem Abstrakten steht in unlöslicher Verbindung mit der Liebe zum gefühlsmaessigen Ausdruck und *seiner Bevorzugung vor dem logischen Bestimmten scharfer Terminologie.*" Gustav Landauer, "Martin Buber" in *Neue Blätter*, 3. Folge, 1. und 2. Heft, (1913), p. 96 (emphasis added).

227. See Chapter I.

228. *Daniel*, p. 64 (S. 32). In a contemporaneous essay Buber opposes productivity (*Leistung*) to creativity. The former is subjugation of the creative act to instrumental aims (*Zwecke*). This is "illegitimate creativity" for it has lost the requisite immediacy of a lived life - *die Unmittelbarkeit eines gelebten Lebens*. By cherishing a "deliberate intention of utilizing what he perceives [the producer] disturbs the experience (*das Erlebnis*), stunts its growth and taints the process of its becoming." "Productivity and Existence" (1914), in *Pointing the Way*, pp. 5-10. Translation of "Leistung und Dasein" in *Hinweise*, pp. 10-17. Both the expression "a lived life" and the use of the term "das Erlebnis" suggest Dilthey's inspiration. The same theme is pursued in his "With a Monist" - here the influence of Dilthey is strikingly and unambiguously apparent: "Jedes Ding und Wesen hat zweifache Beschaffenheit: passive,

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aufnehmbare, bearbeitbare, zerlegbare, vergleichbare, verknüpfbare, rationalisierbare, und die andere, die aktive, unaufnehmbare, unbearbeitbare, unzerlegbare, unvergleichbare, unrationalizierbare. Diese ist das gegenübertretende, das Gestalthafte, das Schenkende in den Dingen. "Mit einem Monisten" (1914), in Hinweise, p. 39.

229. Daniel, p. 64 f (S. 32). Friedman, in his translation does not alert the reader of the distinction between das Erlebnis and die Erfahrung; he translates both terms simply as 'experience.' Thus we are offered a somewhat incomprehensible reading of the text: "There is a two-fold relation of man to his experience . . . What you experience . . . you can register in the structure of experience . . . or you can grasp it for its own sake. . . insofar as you fit it (?) into experience, you elaborate it according to the forms and laws of experience." Ibid., p. 64. To avoid such unclarity, and to emphasize the epistemological intent of the text, all citations referring to "experience" include the German term; otherwise the translations remain Friedman's. Parenthetically, in his introduction to Daniel, Friedman does indicate an awareness of a distinction between Erfahrung and Erlebnis; thus he occasionally translates the latter term as "life-experience." But he is inconsistent in this practice and, moreover, ignores the special character of the term in its verbal form. Further, in his brief comment, Friedman fails to point to the epistemological contrast of the two terms in question; cf. ibid., p. 20.

230. Ibid., p. 65 (S. 33). Cf. "Die reinen Intellektuellen" (whom Buber opposes to "die Schaffenden") haben zu viel Logik und zu wenig Geheimnis. Sie stehen auf der Wahrheit, nicht auf der Wirklichkeit . . . Wahrheit [ist] nur Bearbeitung, aber nicht Sinn des Lebens." "Die Schaffenden" (1902), in Jüdische Bewegung, I, p. 68.

231. Daniel, p. 66 (S. 35).

232. Ibid., p. 69.

233. "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 33.

234. Ibid., p. 51 f (S. 72 f). Cf. "Wer ein Ding wahrhaft erlebt, dass dessen Selbst entgegensprang und ihn umfing, hat darin die Welt erkannt." "Mit einem Monisten," p. 39. The similarity of Buber's doctrine of realization to that of Henri Bergson's notion of "intuition" has been observed by Kohn. However, Kohn contends that Buber developed his thoughts independently of Bergson; the similarity he attributes to their common rooting in the philosophy of Nietzsche. Kohn, op. cit., p. 21. Interestingly, in a letter to Kohn (dated July 1, 1913), Buber attributed to Simmel the major role in the development of the notion of "the world as time." Ibid., cited in n. 62:3, p. 302. In contrast to Bergson's gnostic tendencies, Kohn notes, "Buber aber meinte die Vollendung der Welt und die Erfüllung des Ich. Er zielte nicht auf die Vernichtung und Aufhebung des Seins, sondern auf seine Erhebung"; ibid., p. 116.

235. "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 46.

236. Cf., ibid., p. 51.

237. Ibid., p. 46; cf. ". . . there are words of Heracleitus [sic] that could not be associated with any philosophy with the same justification as with the Tao teaching: words such as the unknowable logos that yet works in all . . ." Ibid., p. 58 (emphasis added).

238. Ibid., p. 46.

239. Ibid.

240. Buber emphasizes that ein Erlebnis is not real "for" the undivided, but real "with" him; cf. Daniel, p. 71 f; also cf. "This knowledge [possessed by the undivided man] is not knowing, but being." "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 52.

241. Ibid., p. 50.

242. Daniel, p. 91.

243. "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 49.

244. Ibid., p. 50.

245. Ibid., p. 58.

246. Ibid., p. 56.

247. Daniel, p. 119.

248. The expressions in the parenthesis are in substitute for the term "meaning (Sinn)"; cf. ". . . he who has direction and meaning (Sinn) celebrates an ever new mystery in his realizing": ibid., p. 95 (S. 79); and: ". . . Tao, 'the path,' [is] the ground and the meaning (Sinn) of the unified life, . . . the ground and meaning of all." "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 43 (S. 61); and: " . . . the secret of the personal kinesis [is] the meaning (Sinn) and deed peculiar to [the perfected one]." Daniel, p. 118 (S. 111).

249. Ibid., p. 119.

250. "The Teaching of the Tao," p. 52.

251. Ibid.; cf. Dilthey's theorem on the cognitive value of phenomenal vis-à-vis inner perception: "We know natural objects from without through our senses. However, we may break up or divide them, we never reach their ultimate elements in this way. . . . How different is the way in which mental life is given to us! In contrast to external perception,

inner perception rests upon an awareness (*Innewerden*), a lived experience (*Erleben*), it is immediately given." "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology," *G.S.*, V, pp. 169-73. Cited and translated in Hodges *Wilhelm Dilthey: An Introduction*, p. 133 (German supplied by Hodges).

252. Buber, "With a Monist" (1914), in *Pointing the Way*, p. 28. German: "Mit einem Monisten," in *Hinweise*, p. 40.

253. *Ibid.*

254. *Daniel*, p. 73 (S. 46); cf. Nietzsche: "Es giebt verhängnissvolle Worte, welche eine Erkenntniss auszudrücken scheinen und in Wahrheit eine Erkenntniss verhinderen; zu ihnen gehört das Wort 'Schein,' 'Erscheinung.'" *Nachgelassene Werke, Werke*, XIII, par. 121, p. 50. But Nietzsche - seemingly in contrast to Buber - quickly adds that "Schein" is not necessarily opposed to "Realität." The intent of this statement is polemical. The "logical" reality of the metaphysicians eager to transcend the phenomenal world is totally preconstituted, according to Nietzsche, in the imagination. *Schein qua Realität* for Nietzsche means an acceptance of the phenomenal world - however, not on the basis of their "ungraspable, fluid Protean nature," but rather as an affirmation of the "will to power." *Ibid.*; cf. *Fröhliche Wissenschaft, Werke*, V, par. 110 ("Ursprung der Erkenntniss"), pp. 149-152.

255. In *Pointing the Way*, pp. 11-14. German: "Der Daemon im Traum" (1914), in *Hinwiese*, pp. 18-24.

256. *Ibid.*, p. 12 (S. 19).

257. *Ibid.*

258. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

259. Ibid., p. 12.

260. Ibid., p. 13.

261. Ibid., p. 14.

262. Ibid.

263. Ibid., p. 15.

264. Ibid.

265. Daniel, p. 53 (S. 15).

266. Ibid., pp. 53 f.

267. Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft, p. 3; cf. Rudolf Stammler, Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Gesichtsauffassung (Leipzig, 1896), in which a similar thesis is propounded. That Buber was familiar with this work will be indicated below.

268. Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft, p. 3.

269. "Jüdische Religiosität," op. cit., p. 51.

270. Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft, p. 10.

271. Ibid., p. 1 f. (emphasis added).

272. Ibid., p. 2: ". . . eine Flut des Schenkens und der schaffenden Hingabe . . . "

273. Ibid.

274. Ibid., p. 6. Of course, Gemeinschaft as a sociological category need not always be defined by the propinquity of its constituents. Tönnies, for example, observes that a Gemeinschaft may be independent of neighborhood or kinship. It must, however, he contends, "be made and maintained through easy and frequent meetings . . . . A worshipped deity, created out of a common mentality has an immediate significance for the preservation of such a bond, since only, or at least mainly, this deity is able to give it living and lasting forms." - Which is to say a common symbolic center or focus. See F. Tönnies, trans. C. P. Loomis, Community and Society (New York: Harper Torchbooks Edition, 1963), p. 43. The notion of a common symbolic center, which implies for Tönnies shared customs and practices, is absent in Buber's concept of Gemeinschaft. In the first of his Drei Reden, Buber distinguishes between the environmental Gemeinschaft (Heimat, language, mores) - which he deems as ultimately superficial - and Gemeinschaft of blood, "the innermost stratum of man's disposition." "Judaism and the Jews," pp. 14-19. The latter Gemeinschaft - based on primal psychic energies ("constant elements" of Erlebnis - ibid., p. 16) which one shares with a transgenerational community - may be characterized as vertical; the horizontal , sociological community that may ensue from the vertical, Buber would no doubt say, is epiphenomenal. Parenthetically, in Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft Buber contradicts his later conception of "eine Blutgemeinschaft": "[Die Neue Gemeinschaft beruht] nicht mehr wie jene erste auf der Blutverwandschaft, sondern auf der Wahlverwandschaft . . . " p. 10. The contradiction is not to be explained as a philosophical shift. Firstly, in the latter instance "Blut" obviously refers to the environmental Gemeinschaft of kinship and, in particular, of the consanguineous nation-state. The concept Blutgemeinschaft was formulated by Buber as a supportive argument for his Zionism - the Jews should shun assimilation into the respective environmental communities of the diaspora and return to their "blood." In the formulation of this and similar notions, Buber relied considerably on Völkerpsychologie - the nineteenth-century discipline often considered as proto-sociology. In this monograph, we shall not have the opportunity to explore this im-

portant aspect of Buber's early thought. A study of Buber and Völkerpsychologie is surely a desideratum. Alois Schweiger in his review of Buber's Vom Geist des Judentums briefly discusses the problem; cf. Monatsheft für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, 61. Jhr. H. 1, 2, Jan.-Febr. 1917, pp. 72-78.

275. Buber here (Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft, p. 7) has the occassion to cite Landauer: "Wenn wir uns ganz gründlich absondern, wenn wir uns als Einzelne in uns selber tiefst hinein versenken, dann finden wir schliesslich im innersten kern unseres verborgensten Wesens, die urälteste und allgemeinste Gemeinschaft: mit dem Menschengeschlecht und mit dem Weltall." Buber fails to give the reference; however, the citation is undoubtedly Landauer, "Durch Absonderung zur Gemeinschaft," p. 48.

276. Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft, p. 6.

277. Ibid., p. 7.

278. Ibid., p. 3.

279. Unfortunately I am unable to trace the locus of this citation. The full citation as given by Buber compellingly suggests that it is from Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, which was first published in Berlin in 1887: "In einem bekannten sociologischen Werke wird die Gemeinschaft, 'deren ursprünglicher Regulator der natürliche Instinkt war, 'ihrem Wesen nach für präsocial erklaert,' während die Gesellschaft, welche ihre Regelung der Form des Zusammenlebens aus einer, wenn auch noch so rudimentären äusserlichen Konvention shöpft, mit vollem Recht ein sociales Gebilde heisst.'"

280. R. Stammler, Wirtschaft und Recht, p. 7.

281. Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft, p. 7.

282. Ibid. Parenthetically, in this essay Buber tends to blur any distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; this is despite his reference to Tönnies.

283. N.B., instrumental aims are synonymous with conditionality for Buber.

284. Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft, p. 8.

285. Ibid.

286. Ibid., p. 7.

287. Ibid., p. 10.

288. Ibid., p. 8.

289. Ibid., p. 10.

290. Ibid., p. 5. Parenthetically, Scholem has observed that Buber's concept of an Urjudentum betrays a "Misstrauen gegenüber historisch gewordener Struktur und Gestaltung," op. cit., p. 16. In light of this observation, we may compare Buber's attitude toward culture and history with Dilthey's dictum: "Was der Mensch sei, erfährt er nur durch die Geschichte."

291. Grete Schaeder brought my attention to this point: "Von grosser Bedeutung war für Buber vor allem Simmels Unterscheidung zwischen Religion und Religiosität." Schaeder, op. cit., p. 35. We may recall that Simmel's monograph Die Religion was published in Die Gesellschaft, edited by Buber.

292. Simmel, trans. W. W. Elwang, "A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion." The American Journal of Sociology, XI, no. 3 (Nov. 1905), p. 364. German: "Die Soziologie der Religion," Neue Deutsche Rundschau, (Sept. 1898), pp. 111-123.

293. Simmel, trans. Curt Rosenthal, with introduction by Feliks Gross, Sociology of Religion (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), pp. 23 f. German original: Die Religion (1906), published in Buber's Die Gesellschaft.

294. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

295. Ibid., p. 14.

296. Ibid., p. 24.

297. Ibid., p. 23.

298. "Das Judentum und die Juden," op. cit., p. 13 - trans. P. F. Buber later replaced the term "das Absolute" with "das Unbedingte"; cf. ibid. in Buber, Der Jude und Sein Judentum (Köln: Joseph Meltzer, 1963), p. 10.

299. Cf. Simmel's response to Buber. Cf. also correspondence of Simmel to Buber, 10 April 1916; "Lieber Herr Doktor! Ich danke Ihnen herzlich für die Zusendung Ihres Buches (Vom Geist des Judentums) mit dem ich mich eingehend beschäftigt habe. Allerdings kann ich nicht überall zustimmen. . . . Auch gegen Ihre Darstellung der Religiosität des Judentums, so schön und tief sie ist, habe ich insofern einen Vorbehalt, als mir dies als Wesen aller Religiosität überhaupt erscheint, es hat zu allen Orten bestanden, ist mit keinem Stamm und keiner "Religion" solidarisch, und alle diese (die jüdische eingeschlossen) sind, von ihm aus gesehen, eben nur - Religion. . . . " Briefwechsel, I, letters no. 301, pp. 426 f.

300. "Jewish Religiosity," op. cit., p. 80.

301. Ibid.

302. With regard to the Jewish religion in the diaspora, Buber does allude to its function of preserving the Jewish people; however, this might be a special case. Buber does not speak of the function of religion in general.

303. Sociology of Religion, p. 72.

304. "A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion," p. 364.

305. Sociology of Religion, p. 11.

306. "A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion," p. 364.

307. Ibid., pp. 368 f.

308. Sociology of Religion, p. 39.

309. "A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion," p. 369.

310. Cf. "Thus, for example, the social life of the ancient Arabians, . . . foreshadowed monotheism; among Semitic peoples, like the Jews, Phoenicians, and Canaanites, the method of their social unification and its transformations was plainly reflected in the character of their gods." Ibid.

311. Ibid., p. 368.

312. Sociology of Religion, p. 37.

313. Ibid., p. 118.

314. *Ibid.*

315. "A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion," p. 369.

316. *Sociology of Religion*, p. 39.

317. In his pre-dialogical writings, Buber occasionally refers to the "Jewish" god by His early tribal title, Jehovah; cf. "Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum," p. 28. In later editions of this same essay, "im Licht Gottes" replaces "im Lichte Jahwes," *op. cit.* in *Der Jude und Sein Judentum*, p. 55. The reference to Jehovah has an effect of relativizing the specific theological content of the biblical faith. That this was Buber's intention is rendered explicit from a passage in "Das Judentum und die Juden," (1909), cited in n. 321 below.

318. Cf. "Every man whose soul attains unity, who decides . . . for the pure against the impure, for the free against the unfree, for the creative against the uncreative . . . participates in the great process of Judaism." "Judaism and Mankind," *op. cit.*, p. 31.

319. At the meeting Troeltsch had delivered a paper entitled "Das stoisch-christlich Naturrecht und das moderne profane Naturrecht," (19 October, 1910). His lecture and Buber's remarks appear in *Schriften der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1911), 1. Band, pp. 166-211.

320. *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207; cf. "Die Ekstase steht jenseits des gemeinsamen Erlebnisses": "Ekstase und Bekenntnis," p. XIX.

321. A full discussion of the pre-dialogical Buber's conception of God is a desideratum. Whatever conception he may have had, it was definitely not theistic; there is even evidence that he was a non-believer. In the first of his *Drei Reden*, for instance, we read; "Denn wie die

Juden der Urväterzeit, um sich aus der Entzweiung ihrer Seele . . . zu befreren, sich ganz an den nichtentzweiten, den einen einheitlichen Gott hingaben, so sollen wir, die wir in einer, besonderen Zweiheit stehen, uns daraus befreien, *nicht durch Hingabe an einen Gott, den wir nicht mehr wirklich zu machen vermögen,* sondern durch Hingabe an den Grund unseres Wesens, an die Einheit der Substanz in uns . . ." "Das Judentum und die Juden," (1909) *op. cit.*, p. 30 f. (emphasis added). This passage was deleted from all post-1923 editions of that essay (i.e., after the appearance of *Ich und Du*). Cf. *ibid.* in Buber, *Reden über das Judentum* (Frankfurt a. M., Rütten & Loening, 1923), p. 16 where the above passage is omitted.

322. Cf. "Der Gegensatz," [i.e., the creative vis-a-vis the uncreative], von dem ich spreche, ist . . . in seinem letzen Grunde . . . *kein zwischenmenschlicher*, sondern ein Gegensatz in jeder einzelnen Menschenseele." Buber, "Das Gestaltende," p. 206 (emphasis added).

323. *Draft of Buber's Dissertation,* p. 8. This passage, in abridged form, reappears in "Über Jakob Boehme," p. 252.

324. *Daniel,* p. 82 (S. 56 f). In addition to the sociological motifs we have discussed, there are numerous other instances in which Buber introduces sociological concepts: cf. "Kultur und Zivilisation" (1901) in *Jüdische Bewegung*, I, pp. 81-83; "Das Zion der jüdischen Frau" (1901), pp. 29-36; "Ein geistiges Zentrum" (1902), p. 90 - culture is here socialpsychologically defined; "Zwiefache Zukunft" (1912), in *Jüdische Bewegung,* I, pp. 217-221, discusses cultural change in a quasi-sociological manner; "Die hebräische Sprache" (1909) in *Jüdische Bewegung* I, pp. 174-190, employs Simmel's methodological distinction between "form" and "content" in discussing the phenomenon of language; in "Jüdische Wissenschaft" (1901) in *Jüdische Bewegung*, I, 51-55, Buber urges that Jewish studies incorporate the "new scientific disciplines," viz., "Anthropologie" and "Sozialwissenschaft"; in

"Judaism and Mankind" (1909), Dilthey's hermeneutic method is clearly alluded to: "Whether we observe [the Jewish] people itself . . . or reconstruct its experiences, as it found expression in its history, or search its literature, which is its essence-become-opus . . . ", p. 24 (emphasis added); and others.

325. "Alte und Neue Gemeinschaft," p. 9.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV

1. On Behrens, see R. G. Köhler, "Programmatische Künstlerschriften," in H. Seling, ed., Jugendstil. Der Weg ins 20. Jahrhundert (Heidelberg: Keysersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1959), pp. 424-427, 431.

2. On Kirchmayr, see H. Vollmer, Allgameines Lexikon der Bildenden Künstler (Leipzig: E. A. Seemann, 1927) XX, 357.

3. R. Schmutzler, trans. E. Roditi, Art Nouveau (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1964), p. 276.

4. S. T. Madsen, Sources of Art Nouveau (New York: George Wittenborn, 1956), pp. 134 ff.

5. Ibid., p. 436.

6. Ibid., p. 81.

7. Ibid., p. 433 f.

8. Cited in ibid., p. 134.

9. Ibid., p. 414.

10. Cf. Friedrich Ahlers-Hestermann, Stilwende. Aufruch der Jugend im 1900 (Berlin: Gebr. Mann., 1941), pp. 5-10.

11. Franz Schoenberner, Confessions of a European Intellectual (New York: McMillan, 1946), p. 20.

12. _Ibid._, p. 21.

13. _Ibid._, p. 296; cf. H.S. Hughes, _op. cit._, p. 32. "Im Jahre 1903 übernahm [Heinrich] Oswalts Sohn Wilhelm Ernst, der beim Ableben seines Vaters erst vierzehn Jahre alt gewesen war, die Leitung der 'Literarischen Anstalt Rütten und Loening . . ." A. Frommhold, ed., _Hundertundzehn Jahre Verlag Rütten und Loening: 1848 bis 1954_ (Berlin: Rütten and Loening, 1954), pp. 69 f.

14. _Ibid._, p. 71.

15. _Ibid._, pp. 74-76.

16. _Ibid._, p. 75.

17. Circa 1911, review of "Rütten und Loening," signed A. Pinckernelle; found in Martin Buber Archive, uncatalogued.

18. 21 March 1907.

19. 6 June 1908.

20. Von Haus zu Haus, XIV, 23 (June, 1906).

21. 28 November 1911.

22. 8 March 1908.

23. 17 October, 1910.

24. 24 September, 1909.

25. Between 4 September 1905 and 14 April 1912, Buber exchanged with Harden at least twenty-three letters and post-cards; all concern Buber's request for a monograph on "die Diplomatie." Cf. Martin Buber Archive, 294.

26. Schoenberner, op. cit., p. 55. Regarding Tönnies, like Simmel a professor extraordinarius for many years, Rudolf Herble observes:

> Most of his articles were intended for an educated though not professional public of people interested in fundamental questions of social life or in social problems of the day.
>
> This manner of publication was and still is quite usual among university professors [especially of Gesellschaftslehre] in Germany: some of Max Weber's most important political articles first appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung, and Simmel contributed to many journals.
>
> To this kind of literature belongs also the series Die Gesellschaft . . .

R. Merble "Introduction," Tönnies, Custom. An Essay on Social Codes, trans. A. Farrell Borenstein (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1971), pp. 12 f. Also cf. L. A. Coser, "The Stranger in the Academy," L. A. Coser, ed. George Simmel (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 29-42.

27. L. Coser, "Introduction," L. Coser, ed. Georg Simmel, p. 5.

28. Cited in Coser.

29. Cited in Coser, "The Stranger in the Academy," pp. 37-39 (trans. Herbert Menzel).

30. Briefwechsel, I, p. 234.

31. The journal was to be called Die Erde; cf. correspondence, Buber to Alexander Ular, 26 June 1906, Martin Buber Archive, 832.

32. Cf. Martin Buber Archive, 68/B.

33. 11 March, 1907.

34. Tönnies, Custom, p. 136.

35. Cf. Die Neue Zeit, XXV, 25 (1907), 853-55.

36. Buber, "Geleitwort zur Sammlung," p. VIII.

37. Ibid., p. VI.

38. Der Kunstwart, XXI, 3 (May, 1908), p. 188.

39. Ibid.

40. "Geleitwort zur Sammlung," p. XIV.

41. Ular, Die Politik, p. 11.

42. Ibid., p. 41.

43. Ibid., p. 42.

44. Ibid., p. 66.

45. Ibid., p. 31.

46. Ibid., p. 99.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 83.

49. Ibid., p. 86.

50. Tönnies, Custom, p. 35.

51. Ibid., passim.

52. Ibid., pp. 133-135.

53. Ibid., p. 125.

54. Ibid., p. 122.

55. Ibid., p. 125.

56. Cf. A. B. Mitzman, Sociology and Disenchantment in Imperial Germany: Tönnies, Sombart, Michels and the Social Question. (Brandeis University. Ph.D. dissertation, 1963), pp. 6 - 109.

57. Tönnies, Custom, pp. 135 ff.

58. Ibid., p. 136.

59. F. Oppenheimer, The State, trans. J. M. Gitterman (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Co., 1914), p. 1.

60. Der Staat (1907 ed.), p. 5; this expression appears only in the German edition.

61. The State, p. 4 (S. 6).

62. By 1913 Oppenheimer's monograph was translated into Hungarian, French, Rumanian and Italian, in addition to English; cf. translator's "Preface" to The State, iii. In 1911 Adolf Wagner spoke of the significant new historical approaches to the study of the state: " is ist die

von hervorregenden Soziologen, neuerdings namentlich von gumplovicz und jetzt am charakteristischsten und tiefgreifendsten von Franz Oppenheimer ('Der Staat') vertretene, . . . " A. Wagner, "Der Staat (in nationalökonomischer Hinsicht)." Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 3rd ed. (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1911), VII, 730.

63. Ibid., p. 180 (S. 63).

64. Ibid., p. 275 (S. 159).

65. Ibid., pp. 275 ff.

66. Ibid., p. 275 (S. 160).

67. Ibid., pp. 277 f.

68. Landauer, Die Revolution (1907 ed.), p. 10.

69. Ibid., pp. 20 f.

70. Ibid., p. 55.

71. Ibid., p. 30.

72. Ibid., pp. 108 ff.

73. Ibid., p. 29; cf. p. 12.

74. Ibid., p. 52.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 108.

77. Ibid., p. 110.

78. Ibid., p. 109.

79. Ibid., p. 117.

80. Cf. Wolf Kalz, Gustav Landauer. Kultursozialist und Anarchist (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1967).

81. Buber, "Geleitwort zur Sammlung," p. IX.

82. Cf. P. Behrens, Feste des Lebens und der Kunst (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1900); cf. Buber, "Feste des Lebens," Die Welt, V, 9 (1901).

83. F. Ahlers-Hestermann, Stilwende, p. 17.

84. Kohn, Martin Buber, pp. 180 f.

85. Frederik van Eeden, trans. into English, Erich Gutkind, "The Realization," Ein-Blut-Bund (December, 1913), p. 5 - mimeographed circular - Martin Buber Archive, S/146.

86. Erich Gutkind, "Memorandum bez. das Projekt der Stiftung eines Internationalen 'Ordens des Geistes,'" p. 1. Martin Buber Archive, S/146.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V

1. Cf. Chapter IV.

2. Correspondence, Buber to H. Kohn, 30 September 1914. Martin Buber Archive, 376/I. Buber's essay, "An das Gleichzeitige," Autumn 1914 - seems to allude to similar "eschatological" emotions vis-a-vis the war: "Gewalt, einbrechende Gewalt des Gleichzeitigen! . . . so ist je und je, wo die Zeiten sich vereinigen, das Zeitlose nahe . . . . jetzt stuerzest du dich auf mich, Raubadler, Verhängnis, einbrechende Gewalt des Gleichzeitigen, die Zeiten entfliehen vor deinem Sausen, und du wirfst den Erdraum dieses Augenblicks wie einen Feuerbrand an meine Brust. Aus deinem Feuerbrand geisst sich das Geschehen in mein Blut. Stosswuckt une Starrkrampt. Ruf und Röcheln, und das lächeln eines Mundes über dem zermalmten Leibe . . . Wie halte ich der Unendlichkeit dieses Augenblicks stand? - Aber nie wieder, o Augenblick, o einbrechende Gewalt des Gleichzeitigen, nie weide ich dich gehen heissen . . ." Buber, *Ereignesse und Begegnungen* (Berlin, 1917), pp. 93, 95.

3. Cf. In Germany "the overaged, the adolescent, the unfit, volunteered with pure joy and went to death filled with their mission. The war offered 'purification, liberation, and enormous hope'; it 'set the hearts of poets aflame' with a sense of relief that 'a peaceful world had collapsed,' a world of which 'one was so tired, so dreadfully tired.' Only 'victory at any price' could give life meaning; the Germans had at last united as a *Volk*. . . . These are not, as they might seem to be, imaginary effusions; they are the words of Thomas Mann and Friedrich Gundolf, and there were thousands of others, young and old, who sounded precisely like them." Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture, The Outsider as Insider* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), pp. 11 f.

4. According to Franz Schoenberner, Simmel personified the liberal spirit, "The spirit of more or less open opposition," of Wilhelmian Germany. "The brilliant and in every sense 'extraordinary' professor Georg Simmel . . . teaching philosophy from eleven o'clock to one o'clock two days a week in a lecture room facing the street Unter den Linden, always abruptly stopped even in the midst of a masterly and highly complicated phrase, as soon as the first sound of military music accompanying the relieving of the guard at the imperial castle met his ear. He stood motionless at his pulpit in an attitude of arrogant disgust and stoical suffering until the barbaric noise had faded away." _Confessions of a European Intellectual,_ pp. 55 f.

5. From Georg Simmel's letter, dated September 21, 1914, to Margarete Susman, criticizing her "attitude of distance toward the war," see Manfred Schloesser, ed., _Auf gespaltenem Pfad. Eine Festschrift zum neunzigsten Geburtstag von Margarete Susman_ (Darmstadt: Erato-Presse, 1964), pp. 308 f.

6. Van Eeden, a member of the aborted "Forte" circle, was angered by the sudden nationalism the war had evoked in some of the German members of the circle. With elliptical reference to his errant friends, he published an "Offener Brief an unsere deutschen Freunde" (September, 1914), castigating German intellectuals for abetting the current war psychosis. In addition, he expressed his dismay in two unpublished circular-letters addressed to members of the circle. Unfortunately, van Eeden's personal letters to Buber concerning the matter are not extant. Copies and drafts of Buber's replies to van Eeden are in the Martin Buber Archive, however. These letters in particular are relevant to our discussion. Moreover, Buber published two rebuttals of van Eeden's arguments.

7. F. van Eeden, "Offener Brief an unsere deutschen Freunde," 'De Amsterdammer' (Weekblad voor Nederland), 6 September 1914.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. F. van Eeden, "An die Mitglieder des Forte-Kreises, 10 August 1914," unpublished circular, Martin Buber Archive, p. 146.

11. Most important of these letters to van Eeden is an undated one that Buber included with a letter from 16 October 1914, addressed to the same person. In the letter, Buber explains: "Der beiliegende Brief an Sie ist vor zwei Wochen geschrieben worden und dann, weil meine Frau schwer erkrante, liegen geblieben." Two drafts of this "enclosed letter" (from September 28 and October 8, 1914) suggest that the delay in the letter's despatch may have also been a result of the great care Buber took to formulate his reply to van Eeden. We shall refer to this letter as "Der beiliegende Brief." Other letters by Buber to van Eeden relevant to their controversy are those dated 16 September 1914 (plus two drafts) and 31 October 1914. Cf. Martin Buber Archive, 184/I. The letter dated 16 October 1914, along with "des beiliegende Brief" is contained in Briefwechsel, I, 373-380.

12. M. Buber, "Bewegung: aus einem Brief an einen Holländer," Der Neue Merkur, I. X, 10/11 (Jan. - Febr., 1915), 489-492; Martin Buber, "Richtung soll kommen"! Masken, X, 11 (1914-1915), 173 f. The former essay is a much abbreviated adaptation of "Der beliegende Brief." The second article is likewise based on the same essay.

13. "Der beiliegende Brief," Briefwechsel, I, 374 f.; also see draft of this letter from 28 September 1914. This argument hints at a nationalistic bias. On occasion Buber Germanophilia was rather explicit; cf. draft of Buber's letter of condolence to Hermann Stehr upon the loss of his son Wilhelm who was killed on the battlefront:

". . . Wir haben ihn den jungen Helden, der Ihnen genommen worden ist, ja alle herzlich lieb gehabt und ich kann aus eigenem Gefühl ermessen, was dieser Verlust den Seinen bedeutete. Aber ich weiss auch, dass über ihren Häuptern wie über denen der Hundrettausende, die das gleiche Joch betroffen hat, ein gewaltiger und wundersamer Trost schwebt: mit ihrem Schicksal ist das Schicksal des Vaterlandes unlöslich verwoben, das neue, grosse Deutschland ersteht aus diesem Blut und diesen Tränen. Wie bei den Griechen die geweihte Schau der bewaffenten Juenglinge genannt wurde, die in den Zeiten hoechster Not hinauszog, sich eine neue Heimat zu suchen, so werden uns fortan die Juenglinge heissen, die sich heute der Deutschen Sache dargebracht worden: der heilige Fruehling. Ihr Opfertod schafft aus der alten Heimat eine neue, . . . Diese teueren jungen Leben sind die Grundsteine, auf denen der Bau der deutschen Zukunft . . . errichtet wird. Moege diese erhabene Gewissheit Ihr Herzleid lindern." Buber to Stehr, draft, circa June - July, 1915; Stehr's reply dated 9 July 1915. Martin Buber Archive, 764/I; apropos see Buber, "Dem Faehnrich W. S(tehr) ins Stammbuch," Zeit-Echo, 13 (1915), 186.

14. "Der beiliegende Brief," Briefwechsel, I, 373.

15. "Bewegung," op. cit., p. 491.

16. Van Eeden, "An die Mitglieder des Forte-Kreises," 19 September 1914, pp. 1, 5.

17. "Der beiliegende Brief," p. 377.

18. In his letter to van Eeden from 16 October 1914, Buber argues that both the German Florens Christian Rang - whom van Eeden censures for his nationalism - and the Frenchman Roman Rolland - whose essay "Au dessus de la mêlée," van Eeden praises - express a similar under-

standing "von dem grossen Opfersinn, der in diesem Krieg lebendig wird . . . " Briefwechsel, I, 374. The war's metaphysical significance is universally understood. Nonetheless, Buber argues that the German people demonstrate a greater metaphysical sensitivity and awareness: "Wir hier in Deutschland haben es staunend und mitten im tausendfachen Grauen beglueckt erkannt, dass wir in ein Zeitalter der Kinesis getreten sind," *ibid.*, I, 378.

19. "Bewegung," *op. cit.*, p. 489.

20. "Der beiliegende Brief," *Briefwechsel*, I, 378.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*, I, 377. The distinction between the war's "elemental feeling" - an unrestrained belief in an absolute value - and "religiosity" is not absolutely clear. Cf. "Religiosity is . . . an ever new articulation and formulation of [man's] feeling that, transcending his conditioned being . . . there is something that is unconditioned." "Jewish Religiosity," p. 80.

23. *Daniel*, p. 115 f.

24. "Bewegung," p. 490.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 491.

26. "Der beiliegende Brief," p. 1.

27. Cf. "Alle boesen Kraefte und Antriebe sind entfesselt - aber auch die edelsten . . . " Buber to van Eeden, October 31, 1914.

28. "Der beiliegende Brief," p. 378.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 372.

31. "Richtung soll kommen!" pp. 173 f.

32. "Der beiliegende Brief," p. 374.

33. Buber to van Eeden, October 31, 1914, p. 1.

34. Ibid.

35. "Nur die Richtung laesst sich durch einen Gegenstand definieren . . . ." 'Der beiliegende Brief,' p. 377 (emphasis added).

36. "Nur das Bewusstsein laesst sich durch einen Gegenstand definieren. . . , " "Bewegung," p. 490 (emphasis added).

37. Van Eeden, "An die Mitglieder des Forte Kreises," August 10, 1914: Ich würde gegen Deutschland kämpfen, nicht weil ich Holländer bin, sondern weil Holland für mich eine Rechtsordung vertritt die höher ist als die deutsche . . . Wenn Holland mit der Schweiz kämpfen könnte, so würde ich für die Schweiz kämpfen," p. 2.

38. "Bewegung," p. 491.

39. Cf. ". . . dass es sich für (eine höhere Rechtsordnung) zu sterben lohnte, kann ich nicht finden"; ". . . so stirbt der Revolutionär nicht für eine höher Rechtsordnung, sondern für die Freiheit [i.e., für, das Absolute, das Unbedingte]."

40. "Bewegung," p. 491.

41. Ibid., pp. 491 f.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 492.

43. Cf. "Gott wartet in allen Dingen als ein Keim und ein Werden können, er wird verwirklicht durch die Inbrunst, mit der er erlebt wird...," *ibid.*

44. "Der beiliegende Brief," p. 378.

45. "Bewegung," p. 490.

46. "Der beiliegende Brief," p. 378.

47. Buber speaks of "the profound *Gemeinschaft*" that is opened to man by "the kinesis of the age." "Bewegung," p. 491.

48. Buber, "Zum Gedächtnis" (1915), *Die Jüdische Bewegung*, 1st ed., I, 248. This essay omitted in the second edition (1920) of *Die Jüdische Bewegung*. Cf. "Hunderttausende von Judenkämpfen . . . ; und das Entscheidende ist: sie kämpfen nicht aus Zwang, sondern aus Gefühl der übermächtigen Pflicht. Auch von denen, die in Russlands Heere stehen, sind sehr viele nicht als Getriebene anzusehen." M. Buber, "Die Losung" (March, 1916), *Die Jüdische Bewegung*, II, 7.

49. Buber, "Zum Gedächtnis," *op. cit.*, p. 248.

50. Buber, "Die Tempelweihe" (1914), *Die Jüdische Bewegung*, I, 232. Contextually, *Judentum* clearly means Jewishness; cf. "Die Juden sind in [the war] hineingemischt, duldend und handelnd, aber das Judentum ist ihm entrueckt und unzugaenglich." Buber, "Die Losung," *op. cit.*, p. 12.

51. On December 19, 1914, Buber delivered a Chanukah address, "Die Templeweihe," before the Berlin "Zionist Federation."

52. Buber, "Die Tempelweihe," p. 236 f.

53. Ibid., p. 237.

54. Ibid., p. 238.

55. Ibid., p. 242.

56. Ibid., p. 241.

57. Ibid., p. 238.

58. Ibid., p. 240. Cf. "Der heutige Jude weiss nicht zu leben, weil er in sich den Zusammenhang nicht hat. Alles, was in ihm, alles was aus ihm gestaltet, ist ein Bruchstück. Ein Bruchstück sein Gedanke, ein Bruckstück die Sehnsucht, sein Werk ein Bruchstück . . . Jeder blicke in sich. Fast jeder wird in sich . . . eine Ohnmacht zum wahrhaften Leben finden . . . [Here, however, the reference is to the galut Jew in general]; Die Fesseln des Golus verwundeten, verwüsteten unsere Seele." Buber, "Was ist zu tun?" (1904), Die Jüdische Bewegung, I, 131, 128.

59. Buber, "Die Tempelweihe," op. cit., p. 241.

60. Ibid., p. 240.

61. Ibid., p. 241 f.

62. Buber, "Die Losung," op. cit., p. 7.

63. Buber, "Die Tempelweihe," op. cit., p. 242.

64. Ibid.

65. Cf. Correspondence, Erich Gutkind to Buber, 19 October, 1914, Martin Buber Archive, 259. In this letter Gutkind apologizes for his inability to express himself during a recent telephone conversation and then proceeds to defend profusely his position toward the war. Aside from an elliptical reference to that discussed on the telephone, the reasons prompting the letter remain unclear. From Buber's letter to Landauer of 18 October 1914 (Martin Buber Archive, 62/I), we gather that Gutkind was chagrined by the accusation of aestheticism which Landauer directed at him - and Buber. Presumably this was the topic of the telephone conversation.

66. Buber to Landauer, 18 October, 1914.

67. Buber's motivation for writing this letter was ostensibly to apologize for an apparent impropriety of his fourteen-year old daughter; however, this was clearly a pretext to broach the matter of a strain in their relationship.

68. Buber to Landauer, 18 October, 1914.

69. See Landauer, Sein Lebensgang in Briefen, II, 14-16, letter no. 289.

70. Ibid., II, 1, n. 1.

71. Buber, "Die Losung," Der Jude, March, 1916; reprinted in Die Jüdische Bewegung, II, 7-15.

72. Viz., "Bewegung"; "Richtung soll kommen."

73. Landauer published an anti-war essay, "Aus unstillbarem Verlangen," in the same issue of Zeit-Echo, 13. Heft, 1915, which contained Buber's poem, "Dem Faehrich W.S. ins Stammbuch,"

eulogizing Hermann Stehr's "heroic" son who fell in battle. We have no indication that this rhapsodic version of Buber's Kriegsmetaphysik particularly annoyed Landauer.

74. Landauer, Sein Lebensgang in Briefen, II, 63 f., letter no. 323.

75. According to Buber's son, Raphael, his family left Berlin for Heppenheim in mid-March, 1916. Oral communication, Jerusalem, April, 1972.

76. Raphael Buber reports that Landauer was a frequent visitor at their home in Berlin and would often stay overnight. The Buber children referred to Landauer as "uncle Gustav." Oral communication, Jerusalem, December, 1972. Buber had first befriended Landauer in 1899, when they were both members of the Neue Gemeinschaft. Their friendship became more intense when in 1906 Buber moved to Hermsdorf an der Mark, a suburb of Berlin where Landauer had his residence; a year later Buber moved to near-by Zehlendorf where he lived for the next nine years. Kohn, op. cit., pp. 29, 89 f.

77. See Landauer's postcard to Buber, 29.4.1916, in which he confirms his scheduled visit of May 7 to Heppenheim. Martin Buber Archive, G.L./169.

78. Correspondence, Landauer to Buber, 12 May, 1916, Briefwechsel, I, 433 (emphasis added).

79. Landauer says that he read this essay even before Buber left Berlin, but then just put it aside in disgust, ibid. Apparently something Buber had said or the tone of Buber's words during his visit to Heppenheim, had triggered Landauer's indignation. Unfortunately, Landauer makes no direct reference to their Heppenheim conversation.

80. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," p. 57.

81. Landauer to Buber, 12, May 1917, p. 434.

82. "Der Geist des Orients und das Judentums," p. 47. In the postwar editions of this essay, the phrase "diese weltgeschichtliche Mission" refers to "Europa," instead of "Deutschland." Cf. *ibid.*, 2. Auflage (Leipzig: Kurt Wolff, 1919), p. 47.

83. "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," *op. cit.*, p 77.

84. "Der Geist des Orients und das Judentum," *op. cit.*, 1st ed., p. 46. This sentence is deleted from subsequent editions of the essay; cf. *ibid.*, 2nd ed., p. 46. In the first edition of this essay, Buber argues that because of its special relationship to Jewry, Germany is well suited for its mission of renewing the Asian, and thus also the human soul: "Für diese weltgeschichtliche Mission bietet sich Deutschland ein Mittelvolk dar [die Juden] . . . . Unter allen Nationen Europas hat die deutsche am staerksten auf den wandernden Juden eingewirkt, sie hat seine Sprache und seine Lebensformen dauernd beeinflusst, unverlierbar gehört ihr seine Liebe; und unter allen Nationen Europas hat die deutsche die stärksten Eindrücke vom Judentum empfangen: die Bibel ist einzig in Deutschland, durch Luthers unerhörtes Werk, wie ein autoehthones Werk angenommen worden, Spinoza wurde einzig in Deutschland ein tiefer und fruchtbarer Besitz der entscheidenden Geister, und der Sozialismus Marxens und Lassalles konnte nirgendwo sonst so völlig assimiliert werden. Das ist nicht Zufall, sondern sinnvoller Zusammenhang. Der Augenblick scheint mir nahe zu sein, wo er sich in einem Zusammenhang der Aktivität erproben kann." "Vom Geist des Judentums," *op. cit.*, 1. Auflage, pp. 47-48. This passage - which also provoked Landauer's ire - was dropped in all editions of the essay subsequent to the first.

85. Landauer to Buber, 12 May, 1916, p. 433.

86. Cf. correspondence, Buber to Hermann Stehr, 4 January 1915, Briefwechsel, I, 386.

87. Landauer to Buber, 12 May 1916, p. 435.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., pp. 435 ff.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., p. 437.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., p. 434.

94. Ibid., p. 436.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid, p. 437.

98. Margot Cohn - Buber's personal secretary for some eight years prior to his death and ever since director of the Martin Buber Archive - distinctly recalls learning of this fact, but is unable to confirm its source.

99. Correspondence, Buber to Landauer, 25 June 1916. Martin Buber Archive, 62/I.

100. Cf. correspondence, Buber to Landauer, 2 and 7 July 1916 (postcards). Martin Buber Archive, G.L./169. In these cards Buber announces to Landauer the itinerary of his forthcoming Berlin visit.

101. Correspondence, Landauer to Buber, 22 August, 1916, in Briefwechsel, I, 451. The August, 1916 issue of Der Jude published as its lead-article Herman Glenn's "Imperialismus und Judentum." This article undoubtedly pleased Landauer; cf. e.g. Glenn's statement: "Irgendwie überwunden ist der von jeglichen Moralkriterien freigelöste Imperialismus: ungebändigter Wille zur Macht auf der einen, unterwürfige Anbetung der blossen Macht auf der anderen Seite, im Leben der Völker der Erde jedenfalls nicht. Solange dies aber der Fall ist, spielt das Judentum- ungewollt, ungedankt, ungeduldet - die strenge und quälende Rolle des Gewissens der Menschheit." p. 211 (original emphasis).

102. See Landauer, Testament-Brief, 22 February, 1918, addressed to Siegfried Landauer. Martin Buber Archive, G.I./169; ". . . In allen Angelegenheiten, die diese Vertraege betreffen, bitte ich meinen Freund, Dr. Martin Buber, Heppenheim a.d. Bergstrasse, um seine Hilfe. . . . Ich bitte ferner, sich meines und meiner Frau literarischen Nachlasses anzunchman. All Papiere, die dazu gehören, sollen ihm übergeben werden. . . . Ich bitte Martin Buber, die an mich und meine Frau gerichtete Briefe, die sich wahrscheinlich in grossen Stössen ungeordnet allenthalben vorfinden werden, zu ordnen . . . Martin Buber bitte ich ferner, durch Umfrage meine und meiner Frau Briefe zusammenzusuchen. Soll davon etwas veröffentlicht werden, so wünsche ich ganz gemeinsames Vorgehen Buber's, der Kinder und des Vormunds. In allem literarischen geht Bubers Stimme voran. Wird mein Wunsch respektiert, so wird kein Brief veröffentlicht, durch den sich ein Lebender oder unmittelbarer Nachkomme oder Ehegatte eines Toten verletzt fühlen koennen."

103. The handwritten notations (footnotes, code-number) are not identifiable as Buber's script; these notations do, however, bear a resemblance to specimens of Mrs. Britschgi-Schimmer's script.

104. Kohn, Martin Buber, p. 163.

105. Correspondence, Kohn to Buber, 9 July, 1929. Martin Buber Archive, 376.

106. Buber, Vom Geist des Judentums 2nd ed. (München: Kurt Wolff, Verlag, 1919) n. p.; cf. n. 84 above.

107. Buber, "An die Prager Freunde," Die Jüdische Bewegung, II, 74.

108. Ibid., p. 74.

109. Ibid., p. 75.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 76.

112. Buber, "Ein Heldenbuch," (Dec. 1916), Die Jüdische Bewegung, II, 77-81.

113. Ibid., p. 78.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid., p. 79.

117. Ibid., p. 80.

118. Buber, "Unser Nationalismus," (April, 1917), Die Jüdische Bewegung, II, 98-103.

119. Ibid., p. 100.

120. Ibid.

121. Buber, "Ein politischer Faktor," (August, 1917) Die Jüdische Bewegung, II, 114.

122. Cited in Kohn, Martin Buber, p. 170.

123. "Ein Politischer Faktor," op. cit., p. 115. The essay was originally published in Der Jude, II, 6 (August, 1917), 289-291.

124. Correspondence, Buber to Moritz Goldstein (b. 1880 -) Briefwechsel, I, 469 f.

125. "Ein politischer Faktor," op. cit., p. 111.

126. Ibid.

127. Buber, trans. Eva Jospe, "Herut: On Youth and Religion (1919)." On Judaism, p. 159.

128. "Ein politischer Faktor," op. cit., p. 113 f.

129. Ibid, p. 114.

130. Ibid.

131. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in Schilpp and Friedman, eds., The Philosophy of Martin Buber,. p. 711 f.

132. Ibid.

133. Die Jüdische Bewegung, II, pp. 104-110.

134. Ibid., p. 104.

135. Ibid., p. 108.

136. Ibid., p. 106.

137. Ibid., p. 107.

138. Ibid., p. 106.

139. Ibid., p. 107.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid., p. 108.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid., pp. 108 f.

144. Buber, trans. M. Friedman, "On the Psychologizing of the World," in Buber, A Believing Humanism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 151; German: "Von der Verseelung der Welt - Entwurf zu einem frei gehaltenen Vortrag im Psychologischen Klub Zürich, 1923," in Nachlese (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1965), p. 156. This lecture was held 1 December, 1923; Ich und Du was published during the first months of that year.

145. "Herut," On Judaism, p. 153; German: Cherut: eine Rede über Jugend und Religion (Wien: R. Löwith, 1919), p. 8.

146. "Herut," p. 153.

147. Buber, Reden über das Judentum: Gesamt-Ausgabe (Frankfurt a. M.: Rütten & Loening, 1923), pp. IX-XVIII.

148. Buber, trans. Eva Jospe, "Preface to 1923 Edition," On Judaism, pp. 7-8.

149. Buber, "Religion als Gegenwart," protocol of 8 lectures delivered between 15 January and 12 March, 1922. Martin Buber Archive, B/29; lecture III, p. 8. I wish to thank Dr. Rivka G. Horwitz for bringing this manuscript to my attention.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. Cited in Kohn, Martin Buber, pp. 331-32, n. 156:1.

157. Buber, trans. E. Jospe, "The Holy Way: A Word to the Jews and the Nations," On Judaism, pp. 109 f; German: Der Heilige Weg: Ein Wort an die Juden und an die Völker, (Frankfurt a. M., Rütten & Loening, 1919). The term "earthly" is placed in parentheses because it does not appear in the first German edition of the essay; cf. ibid., p. 16.

158. Cf. Martin Buber Archive, H/23. The lecture was first delivered in Vienna, May, 1918; it was repeated in Berlin, October 1918, and in Munich, December, 1918. For a contemporary response to this lecture, see H. Loewe, "Zionistischer Jugendtag," Neue Jüdische Monatshefte, III, 25. X. 1918, pp. 44 ff.

159. This title parallels that of J. G. Fichte's famous essay, Reden an die deutsche Nation (1807/8); cf. "In his Reden . . . , which after long having been forgotten had become fashionable among German youth, Fichte proclaimed the German mission to realize the ideal national community. . . . Martin Buber was the man who brought us [Jews] the new German thought (à la Fichte) and widened our intellectual horizon." Hans Kohn, Living in a World Revolution (New York: Pocket Books, 1965), pp. 64 f.

160. With reference to Landauer's death Buber had noted "ich habe seinen Tot als den meinen erlebt." From a conversation with G. Schaeder; cited in Schaeder "Einleitung," Buber; Briefwechsel, I, p. 63.

161. Excerpts of Der Heilige Weg were expressly published as a commentary on Landauer's thought; see H. Bergmann, H. Kohn, ed., In Memory of Gustav Landauer (in Hebrew). (Tel Aviv: Ha-poel Ha-tzair, 1929), pp. 42-48.

162. On Buber's relationship to Landauer see E. Simon, "Der werdende Mensch und der werdende Jude," Der Jude, VI, 8. H. (1921-2), 457-75; also see H. Kohn, Martin Buber, pp. 195-205; cf. Landauer "hat auf Bubers Sozialphilosophie einen entscheidenden Einfluss ausgeuebt." Ibid., p. 195.

163. Cf. Landauer, Die Revolution, pp. 43-52; For an excellent summary of Landauer's social thought, see Julius Bab, Gustav Landauer. Dem Gedächtnis eines einsamen Revolutionärs (Frankfurt a. M.: Rütten & Loenig, 1929); also see Heinz-Joachim Heydorn "Geleitwort" to Gustav Landauer, Zwang und Befreiung. Eine Auswahl aus seinem Werk. (Köln: Verlag Jakob Hegner, 1968), pp. 9-44.

164. This understanding of "Geist" - central but not unambiguous in Landauer's thought - is offered by Bab; op. cit., p. 11. Cf. "[Geist] ist die magische Chiffre in Landauers Sozialismus, aber wann haette sich je 'Geist' kinkret erklaeren lassen?" W. Kalz: Gustav Landaue Kultursozialist und Anarchist. (Meisenheim/ am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1967), p. 109. Landauer is indeed unspecific, but nonetheless, it is not difficult to understand what he means by the term: "Geist ist Gemeingeist, Geist ist Verbindung und Freiheit, Geist ist Menschenbund." Landauer, heraus gegeben und eingeleitet von Heinz-Joachim Heydorn, Aufruf zum Sozialismus (Frankfurt a. M.: Europäische Verlaganstalt, 1967), p. 59.

165. Cf. Landauer, Die Revolution, p. 43.

166. Correspondence, Landauer to Max Nettlau, 7 June 1911. Landauer. Sein Lebensgang in Briefen, I, 363 f.

167. Op. cit.: Sozializmus - "der Kamf für neue Zustaende zwischen den Menschen." Aufruf zum Sozialismus, p. 139.

168. Landauer, Aufruf zum Sozialismus, p. 174. Landauer refers to a socialism that retains the legal structure of the state as "Polizeisozialismus"; ibid., p. 167.

169. Cf. Bab, op. cit., p. 15.

170. Landauer, Die Revolution, p. 108. Landauer is wont to speak of the "Wiedergeburt der Völker aus dem Geist der Gemeinde." Aufruf zum Sozializmus, p. 130.

171. Ibid., p. 180.

172. Landauer, Die Revolution, p. 105.

173. Landauer, Aufruf zum Sozialismus, pp. 144 ff; *Die Revolution,* p. 108.

174. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-93.

175. Buber, *The Holy Way,* p. 124 (S. 43).

176. *Ibid.*, p. 124 f (S. 44).

177. *Ibid.*, p. 145 (S. 85 f).

178. *Ibid.*, p. 146 f.

179. Cf. Buber, "Der heimliche Führer," *Die Arbeit,* II, 6 June 1920, 36-37; Buber, "Landauer und die Revolution," *Masken,* XIV, 18, 19 (1919), 282-291.

180. Buber, "Begriffe und Wirklichkeit. Brief an Herrn Geh. Regierungsrat Prof. Dr. Hermann Cohen," *Der Jude*, I, 5. Heft (August, 1916), 281-289; Buber, "Zion, der Staat und die Menschheit Bermerkungen zu Hermann Cohens Antwort," *Der Jude*, I, 7 (Oct. 1916), 425-433. Both these essays were reprinted in Buber, *Die Jüdische Bewegung*, II, 27-67. Cohen's statements in the debate first appeared in the *K. C. Blätter* of May and June, 1916; they were reprinted in H. Cohen, *Jüdische Schriften* (Berlin: C. A. Schwetschke, 1924), II, 302 ff.

181. M. Buber, "Zion, der Staat und die Menschheit," *Die Jüdische Bewegung*, II, 52-70; *passim*.

182. *Ibid.*, p. 60 f.

183. *Ibid.*, p. 64; cf. Buber, "Begriffe und die Wirklichkeit," *op. cit.*, II, 41-44.

184. Martin Buber Archive.

185. Buber, Völker, Staaten und Zion (Wien: R. Löwith, 1917).

186. Martin Buber Archive, 184/I.

187. Buber, "Noten zu Völker, Staaten und Zion," (Autumn, 1916), Die Jüdische Bewegung, II, 222.

188. Aside from his involvement in the Forte-Kreis, Buber's pre-War relationship seems to have been confined largely to literary and personal matters; on social and political issues there was apparently minimal cooperation between them. Landauer does record, however, that Buber was one of the few faithful readers of his journal, Sozialist; cf. Correspondence, Landauer to M. Fass-Herdegger, 1 April 1910, Lebensgang, I, 247. Buber, however, despite his intense literary activity, never contributed to Landauer's journal - although he once did promise Landauer an article, a translation of some Asiatic legends; cf. ibid., I, 337. On another occasion - in January 1910 - Buber did endorse the fight of Landauer's Sozialistische Bund for community control of the local schools. The public statement, composed by Landauer, to which Buber lent his signature reads in part: "Fort mit Einmischung und Staat und Kirchen in unseren Schulen . . . . Selbstbestimmung der zu Sculgemeinden vereinigten Eltern über ihre Kinder." Ibid., p. 287, n. 1.

189. Ibid., p. 127.

190. Ibid., p. 128.

191. Ibid.

192. Schaeder, "Einleitung," Buber, Briefwechsel, I, p. 63.

193. Martin Buber Archive, B/8, a.

> Dear Landauer:
>
> Among my friends you are the only one for whom Daniel was always there. Hence it is more than a mere expression of sentiment when I dedicate to you this first testimony of [Daniel's] life.

194. Landauer, "Martin Buber," Neue Blätter, 3 Folge, 1.2. Hefte, 90-107.

195. See letter dated 11 September 1912 - Buber to Landauer; in Buber, Briefwechsel, I (galley proofs), entry number "186", n. p.

196. Ibid., pp. 96 f.

197. Ibid., p. 90.

198. On Landauer's personal Jewish problem, see Paul Breines, "The Jew as Revolutionary - The Case of Gustav Landauer," The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, XII (1967), 75-84. Landauer denigrated the "Börsenjuden," the Jewish journalists and generally identified the despised bourgeois culture with the middle class Jew; thus he vigorously supported Eugen Duehring in his critique of Jewry's role in modern capitalism. On the other hand, Landauer celebrated - so Buber reports - the "primal Jewish spirit" which he found within himself "pressing for realization; he felt himself linked to his forebears, the Jewish prophets and martyrs." Buber, "Landauer und die Revolution," op. cit., p. 290.

199. Cf. "Es ist die Grundlage unseres Zionismus, dass eine jüdische Völlkultur, eine wahrhafte und vollständige judische Kultur im Galuth unmöglich ist und dass wir deshalb mit aller Kraft unserer Seele dahin verlangen, wo allein sie erstehen kann. Aber damit wir dahin gelangen, brauchen wir eine jüdische Kulturpolitik: weil . . . Palästina nur

aufgebaut werden kann durch ein aus dem Geist aus lebendiger Tätigkeit und Wirkung des Geistes geeinigtes und gefestigtes Judentum . . . . Wir können Palästina nicht aufrichten, wenn wir nicht durch die jüdische Kulturarbeit eine Macht im Geiste geworden sind . . ." Buber, "Bericht über den ausserordentlichen Delegiertentag der Zionistischen Vereinigung für Deutschland (25. und 26. Dez., 1916) Jüdische Rundschau, XXII, Jhr., 5 January 1917, p. 10.

200. Cf. "Der gute aesthetische Wille reicht nicht aus. Es tut eine Veraenderung im Menschen und zwischen den Menschen not." Buber, "Martin Buber-Abende" - a series of 5 unpublished lectures held in Zurich 24 November through 6 December, 1923 - Martin Buber Archive, B/47d; lect. IV, p. 7.

201. Landauer, Aufruf zur Sozialismus, p. 178.

202. Buber, "Gemeinschaft," Worte an die Zeit. Eine Schriftreihe von M. Buber (München: Dreiländer-Verlag, 1919).

203. Buber, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 168.

204. Buber, "The Holy Way," p. 136.

205. Ibid., p. 147.

206. Buber, "The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism," (1914), op. cit., pp. 67 f.

207. Cf. Buber, "Gemeinschaft," pp. 7-9.

208. Ibid., p. 11.

209. Ibid., p. 12.

210. Ibid., p. 16.

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid., p. 26; cf. "Each man you meet needs your help." Buber, "What is to do?" (1919), Pointing the Way, p. 110.

213. Ibid.

214. Buber, "Gemeinschaft," op. cit., p.

215. Buber, "The Holy Way," op. cit., p. 211; cf. "Wir wollen Zion aufbauen, das ist, wir wolden ein reines, schönes und unbefangenes Zusammenleben, ein Miteinanderleben und Ineinanderleben, eine lebendige Unmittelbarkeit zwischen Menschen . . . stiften." M. Buber, "Zion und die Jugend" (May 1918), op. cit., p. 169.

216. Buber, "Martin Buber - Abende," lect. 1, p. 4.

> Gemeinschaft arises when several individuals have something [spiritual] in common which is Other (Anderes) than the sum of the parts. This Other - Gemeinschaft - is not a result, not a product, it is not derived from the constituent facts - it is far more that which is primary (das Primäre).

217. Buber, "The Holy Way," p. 110.

218. Cf. Buber, Der Heilige Weg, p. 16.

219. Cf. Buber, "Das Problem des Menschen," *Werke,* I, 405.

220. Cf. Buber, "Martin Buber Abende," lect. I, 5.

> *Gemeinschaft* is an event about a living Center . . . . [As] a circle is drawn by virtue of the factuality of the radii, [so] *Gemeinschaft* is established - that is, not through the mere relationship of individuals to one another . . .

221. Buber, "The Holy Way," p. 109 f (S. 16); cf. M. Buber, "Grundsätze" *Worte an die Zeit* 1. Heft (1919), p. 5, where this statement is repeated almost *verbatim*.

222. Buber, "The Holy Way," p. 113.

223. Buber, "Gemeinschaft," p. 17.

224. *Ibid.*, p. 26; cf. lect. V, p. 5.

225. Buber, "Gemeinschaft," p. 24.

> No one is capable of [effecting the renewal *Gemeinschaft*] but the eternal spirit of turning, the conqueror of [ineluctable] Development. When extreme necessity beckons him, this spirit alone is the one that can make the wayward return: the human willing of God (*das menschliche Gottwollen*).

226. Buber, "Grundsätze," p. 8.

227. Buber, "The Holy Way," p. 110.

228. Buber, "Grundsätze," p. 8.

229. Cf. "Denn reifen will das Göttliche in der Menschheit . . . , endlich senkt es sich in das Mögliche ein, das zwischen Wesen webt, will sich nur noch aus dessen Verwirklichung, aus der wahren Gemeinschaft offenbaren." Buber, "Gemeinschaft," p. 26.

230. Ibid., p. 25.

231. Op. cit.

> . . . the human willing of God and the divine willing of man (das göttliche Menschwollen) are not to be separated. If the human will proclaims the freedom of God in the midst of the world of determination, then God's freedom hovers above men. Turning has a double countenance.

232. Buber, I and Thou, p. 168.

233. M. Buber, "Afterword. The History of the Dialogical Principle," Between Man and Man, p. 215.

234. As of May 1919, Buber was still discussing with the publisher, Kurt Wolff (1887-1963) the plan of the series "Worte an die Zeit" - the series in which "Gemeinschaft" was to appear; see their correspondence - Wolff to Buber, 10 May 1919; Buber to Wolff, 12 May 1919; Martin Buber Archive, 911. Wolff rejected Buber's plan, intimating that it was too ideological. Buber was then obliged to seek another publisher, Dreiländerverlag of Munich. The correspondence between Buber and this latter publisher is unfortunately not extant. In any case, since the Wolff-Buber correspondence makes no reference to any manuscript prepared by Buber, it seems reasonable to assume that the essay "Gemeinschaft" - the second item published in Worte an die Zeit - was not yet written when Buber broached his plan to the Leipzig publisher.

235. The pagination of the manuscript, in Buber's script, of "Gemeinschaft" starts at 46; furthermore, the manuscript begins and ends with fragments which are not part of the published essay; cf. Martin Buber Archive, 66, b.

236. Cf. R. Horwitz, "Some Manuscript Discoveries Concerning the Development of Buber's I and Thou" (in Hebrew) lecture presented to

The Israel Academy of Sciences, 18 January 1972 (unpublished), p. 8. After a textual analysis and comparison of Buber's lectures entitled "Religion als Gegenwart," presented to the *Frankfurter Lehrhaus* in December 1921 and January and March, 1922, Dr. Horwitz concludes that these lectures served as a decisive draft for the third section of *I and Thou*. Further, she notes, that from the lectures there is neither textual nor conceptual evidence that the other sections of *I and Thou* were yet written at the time of these lectures. (Horwitz then proceeds to suggest that the first sections of *I and Thou* - where Buber presents his dichotomy of the I-Thou and I-It attitude and adumbrates his notion of dialogue - were formulated under the influence of Rosenzweig. Dr. Horwitz is to publish shortly a detailed exposition of this thesis.)

237. Namely, "Grundssätze" and "Gemeinschaft." In addition to those two essays, the following monographs were advertised, although never actually published: "Jensits der Politik," "Die Problematik der Kultur," "Die religiöse Kraft," "Über den Völkern," "Vom Wahn der Einrichtungen," "Herrschaft und Führung," "Das Prinzip der Revolution," "An die Jugend"; cf. fly-leaf to "Gemeinschaft." The above list is introduced by: "In Vorbereitung sind u.a. folgende Hefte." Another list, under the heading *Worte an die Zeit*, found amongst Buber's papers, reads in part: "Grundsätze," "Von menschlicher Gemeinschaft," "Das Zwischenmenschliche" (N.B.), "Der Aberglaube on die Institution," "Kulturproblematik . . . ," "Volksvertretung und Volksbetätigung . . ." Martin Buber Archive, 911. Still another penciled reads: "Das Wort," "Die Gemeinschaft," "Das Recht," "Die Geschichte," "Der Glaube," "Die Erzehung." *Op. cit.*; cf. this last list with the early outline of *I and Thou* found by Walter Kaufmann: "I. Ich und Du 1. Wort. 2. Geschichte. 3. Gott . . . ." Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 50.

238. Fly-leaf to Buber's "Gemeinschaft," *op. cit.*

239. Cf. Buber, "Jewish Religiosity," pp. 84-87.

240. Buber, "Gemeinschaft," p. 26; cf. ". . . God is truly present when one man clasps the hand of another." Buber, "Herut," p. 151.

241. Buber, "The Holy Way," p. 116.

242. Buber, "Martin Buber - Abende," lect. I, p. 4.

243. Buber, "The Holy Way," pp. 110 f; cf. "Die Menschen, die nach Gemeinschaft begehren, begehren nach Gott. Alle Begier nach wahrer Verbundenheit geht nach Gott; und alle Begier nach Gott geht nach der wahren Gemeinschaft. Aber Gottbegier is nicht Gottwollen. Die Menschen suchen Gott, aber er ist nicht aufzufinden, denn er ist nicht 'vorhanden.' Der Menschen möchten Gott haben, aber gibt er sich ihnen nicht, denn er will nicht besessen, sondern verwirklicht werden. Erst wenn die Menschen wollen werden, dass Gott sei, werden sie die Gemeinschaft tun." Buber, "Gemeinschaft," p. 26.

244. Cf. "Gemeinschaft ist das Geheimnis der Objektivität, etwas wirkliches geschieht zwischen den Seelen, es begiebt sich etwas zwischen ihnen. Gemeinschaft ist nicht mehr seelisch, sondern ist das Faktum zwischen den Seelen . . . " Buber, "Martin Buber - Abende" lect. II, p. 1.

245. Ibid., lect. V, p. 5.

246. Cf. Franz Rosensweig, "Atheistische Theologie" in F. Rosenzweig, Kleinere Schriften (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1937), 278-290. Rosenzweig directs his criticism at the pseudo-theological Volksjudentum of contemporary thought: "Staet . . . das Menschliche unter des Gewalt des Goettlichen zu zeigen, versucht man, umgekehrt das Goettliche als die Selbstprojektion des Menschlichen an den Himmel des Mythos zu

verstehen. Das Volk ist hier die menschliche Wirklichkeit, die sich schon als solche einem positivisch gewissenhaften Geschlecht zum Glaubensinhalt empfiehlt"; ibid., p. 238 f. What Rosenzweig objects to is that this "atheistic theology" fails to take divine revelation seriously. Since Buber's early concept of revelation - which Rosenzweig does not discuss in this essay - disregards, indeed opposes Revelation, Rosenzweig's charge of "atheistic theology" may be extended to Buber's teaching of God's realization. The implicit atheism of Buber's pre-dialogical thought is explicitly testified to by the statement in his first Prague "Rede" (1909) in which he observes that "we" contemporary men are no longer capable of "devotion" to the God of the Bible; cf. Buber, "Das Judentum und die Juden" Drei Reden, pp. 30 f. This passage was deleted from the edition of the essay which appeared in 1923; cf. Buber, Drei Reden über das Judentum, op. cit., p. 16; also p. 104 (Chapter III) n. 321 above, where this passage is cited in full. Buber's turn to a positive view of Revelation is first marked by his 1919 booklet "Herut."

247. Buber, "Preface to 1923 edition," pp. 8 f.

248. Cf. "Man could do justice to the relation to God that has been given to him only by actualizing God in the world (in der Weit verwirklicht) in accordance with his ability and measure of each day, daily." Buber, I and Thou, p. 163 (S. 135); cf. ibid., pp. 57, 61, 68, 77, 84, 98, 100, 101, 109, 130, 155, 162, 164.

249. Buber, "Preface to 1923 Edition," p. 9.

250. Buber, Religion als Gegenwart, lect. VIII, p. 12; cf. Buber, "Preface to 1923 Edition," p. 6.

251. Buber, *Religion als Gegenwart*, lect. IV, pp. 10, 14; lect. V, p. 9; cf. "Kann man also die Du-Relation, kann man also die Beziehung durch Erkenntnis erfuellen? Nein. Nur durch Verwirklichung;" *ibid.* lect. V, p. 6.

252. Buber, "Preface to 1923 Edition," p. 9 (emphases added).

253. Buber, "Foreword," *Pointing the Way*, pp. XV f; cf. "I know not only of one but two kinds of events(*Zweierlei Geschehniss*) in which one is no longer aware of any duality. Mysticism sometimes confounds them, as I, too, did at one time. First the soul may become one (through bracing itself for unconditional immediate response). Concentrated into a unity, a human being can proceed to his encounter (with the everyday world) . . . . The other event is that unfathomable kind of relational act itself in which one has the feeling that Two have become One . . . . I and You drown; humanity that now confronted the deity is absorbed into it; glorification, deification, universal unity have appeared. But when one returns into the wretchedness of daily turmoil, transfigured and exhausted, and with a knowing heart reflects on both, is one not bound to feel that Being is split, with one part abandoned to hopelessness? . . . " Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 134; German: *Werke*, I, 103.

254. Cf. p. 159 f., above.

255. Buber, "Preface to the 1923 Edition," p. 8 (S. 23); cf. "The moment of encounter is not a 'living experience' (*Erlebnis*) that stirs in the receptive soul and blissbully rounds itself out: something happens to man." Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 157 f.

256. Buber, *Martin Buber - Abende.*

257. *Ibid.*, lect. V, p. 3.

258. Buber, "Preface to the 1923 Edition," p. 8.

259. Buber, "What is Man?" op. cit., p. 176 - German: "Das Problem des Menschen," Buber, Dialogisches Leben (Zürich: G. Müller, 1947), p. 116.

260. Buber, "Preface to 1923 Edition," p. 8.

261. Buber, I and Thou, p. 84 (S. 43).

262. Ibid., p. 128.

263. Cf. ibid., p. 63 f.

264. Ibid., p. 63.

265. Ibid., p. 81.

266. Ibid., p. 125.

267. Ibid., p. 59.

268. Ibid., p. 82.

269. Ibid., p. 83 (S. 41).

270. Ibid., p. 54.

271. Ibid., p. 62 (S. 18).

272. Buber, Martin Buber - Abende, lect. I, p. 5.

273. Buber, I and Thou, p. 130.

274. Ibid.

275. Ibid.

276. Buber, Religion als Gegenwart, lect. VIII, pp. 10-12.

> Revelations are according to nature nothing other than the eternal, ever present revelation of the here and now. Never and nowhere has something happened which did not also occur in the here and now. There is, of course, history; there is qualitative differences in historical time. I shall try to explain this [paradox] . There is revelation, eternal revelation and there is the freedom of man - man is placed in freedom. This is the insoluble paradox in which we live, in which our life takes place, indeed which bears our life; the paradox that God determines the world and yet man is free . . . . The eternal source of power flows, the eternal voice resounds (tönt), nothing more . . . . The voice is not different, only he who hears and the [juncture in time] are.

277. Buber, I and Thou, p. 83.

278. Ibid., p. 68 (S. 24).

279. Ibid., p. 89. Buber also speaks of "Kraft" becoming "Inhalt"; cf. Buber, Religion als Gegenwart, lect. VIII, p. 4.

280. Buber, I and Thou, p. 68.

281. Buber, "What is Man?" p. 204.

282. Buber understands marriage to be paradigmatic of the I-Thou relation. "Das Verhältnis zu einem Dritten ist constituierendes Element der Ehe. Das Dritte, das Göttliche ist für den Menschen kündbar als Einheit und Geist und Natur. Dieses Eine erscheint der Frau wesenhaft als Geist, dem Mann wesenhaft als Natur. Ehe ist Gemeinschaftsform, in der naturhaftes und geistiges Element zusammen wirken müssen and die nur durch dieses Zusammenwirken entsteht. Beide offenbaren einander das Du, das nicht ich ist . . . . Dies Ungeheure

trägt dazu bei, dass Ehegemeinschaft notwendiges Element aller Gemeinschaften . . . . Hier besondere Gemeinschaft zweier fundamental verschieden Menschen." *Martin Buber - Abende*, lect. V, pp. 1-2. *Mutatis mutandis*, Landauer also saw marriage as the *Urform* of the authentic union (*Bund*) between men. Each Gemeinschaft "entstammt doch immer dem Element der Liebe. Die Liebe aber hat sich unlöslich mit der Ehe verbunden und hat sie, die ja auch nur ein gesellschaftliches Zweckgebilde zu praktischem Behuf ist, mit der Notwendigkeit tierisch-göttlicher Natur erfüllt. All unser Innigkeit, all unser Heiliges, all unser Phantasie und Mystik, all unser Religion wohnt in diesem Bund der beiden Geschlechter mit der aus ihrer Vereinigung erwachsenen Nachkommenschaft . . . Die Liebe erfüllt von der Ehe aus all unsere Gesellschaftseinrichtungen." "Von der Ehe," (1910) in *Swang und Befreiung*, pp. 210 f.

283. Buber, *Martin Buber - Abende*, lect. V, p. 1 f.

284. Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 113 (S. 76).

285. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

286. Cf. "Erneuerung ist nur möglich aus neuer, wirklicher Verbindung mit der Mitte des Seins." Buber, *Martin Buber - Abende*, Lect. V, p. 4.

287. Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 84.

288. *Ibid.*, p. 74; cf. "Der Beziehungsakt besteht in der Einsamkeit, in der Person, des Ich mit dem Du." Buber, *Religion als Gegenwart*, lect. VIII, p. 5.

289. Buber, *I and Thou*, p. 74.

290. Buber, "Comments on the Idea of Community," (1931) in A Believing Humanism, p. 88.

291. Robert E. Wood, Martin Buber's Ontology. An Analysis of I and Thou (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 76. Buber's "notion of the Center sounds like relation to God, but Buber relates it to the zaddik, or holy man, of the Hasidic community.

292. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Buber, Martin," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), II, 162.

293. Paul E. Pfuetze, Self, Society, Existence (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1954), p. 155: " . . . Buber seems to say . . . work at the building of organic communities, and a sense of the metaphysical Thou will follow."

294. H. Kohn, Martin Buber, pp. 186 f. Gemeinschaft "ist nicht ein Chorgesang vielfach verschlungener Stimmen, aie ist die Zwiesprache von Ich und Du, wobei das Du vielen Ichs gemeinsam ist. In dieser Gemeinsamkeit des Du findet sich die Gemeinsamkeit der Ichs."

295. Buber, "Wie kann Gemeinschaft werden?" in Buber, Worte an die Jugend (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1938), p. 54.

> When individuals really have something to do with one another, when they share an experience (Erfahrung) and together existentially respond to that experience - that is, when men have a living Center about which they are constellated, then Gemeinschaft is established between them.

296. Buber, "What is Man?", p. 176.

297. Ronald G. Smith in his translation of I and Thou (1937) capitalizes the term "Center." Walter Kaufmann, on the other hand, consistent with his intention of correcting what he believes to be Smith's overly theological translation, renders the term with a small letter. Kaufmann

thus obscures the ontological character of the term. We shall retain Smith's rendition of the term, since it does point to the special philosophical status Buber ascribed to it.

298. Buber, I and Thou, p. 94 (S.56). Buber seems to make a strict and consistent distinction between the terms "Gemeinschaft" and "Gemeinde." This distinction parallels what we have called a Zwie - and Vielgemeinschaft; cf. "Kann [Gemeinschaft] aus einer Beziehung zweier oder weniger Menschen zur Grundlage des Zusammenlebens einer Vielheit werden, so sind dieser doch raumliche Grenzen gesetzt, bei deren Überschreitung der Unmittelbarkeitsgehalt sich zu verflüchtigen beginnt: die rechtmaessige Form der Gemeinschaft als eines sozialen Gebildes ist die Gemeinde."

299. I and Thou, p. 163 (S.136).

300. Cf. Buber, Religion als Gegenwart (1922), Lect. VIII, p. 7; cf. Buber, Martin Buber - Abende (1923), Lect. 1, p. 5; V., p. 4; cf. Buber, "Wie kann Gemeinschaft werden?" (1931) op. cit., p. 54 f.; cf. Buber in Philosophical Interrogations (1964), p. 68.

301. Buber, I and Thou, p. 166.

302. Ibid.,

303. Cf. "Realization of the idea of community, like the realization of any idea, does not exist once for all and generally valid but always only as the moments answer to a moment's question." Buber, "Comments on the Idea of Community," (1931) in Buber, A Believing Humanism, p. 88; cf. "Erneuerung [der Gemeinschaft] ist nur möglich aus neuer, wirklicher Verbindung mit der Mitte des Seins." Martin Buber - Abende, Lect. V, p. 4.

304. Buber, I and Thou, p. 103.

305. *Ibid.*

306. *Ibid.*

307. *Ibid.*

308. Buber, "What is Man?" p. 175; cf. Buber, "What is Common to All," (1956), in Buber, trans. M. Friedman, *The Knowledge of Man* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965), p. 106; "the genuine We."

309. Buber, "What is Man?", p. 176.

310. Buber, "What is Common to All," p. 106.

311. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

312. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

313. *Ibid.*, p. 89. German: "Dem Gemeinschaftlichen folgen" in Buber, *Logos, Zwei Reden* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1962), p. 31; cf. Hermann Diels' translation of the same passage from Heracleitus: "Drum ist's Pflicht, dem *Gemeinsamen* zu folgen. Aber obschon der Sinn gemeinsam ist, leben die Vielen, als hätten sie eigene Einsicht," Heracleitus, Fragment 2, in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, griechisch und deutsch von Hermann Diels (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1903), I, p. 151 (emphasis added). Diels retains this translation in all subsequent editions of *Die Fragmente*.

314. Buber, "What is Common to All," p. 90.

315. *Ibid.*

316. *Ibid.*

317. Ibid., p. 91 (S. 34). Heracleitus, according to all standard translations, usually speaks of Streit; cf. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, fragment no. 80, pp. 79 f.

318. Buber, "What is Common to All," p. 106 (S. 65).

319. Ibid.

320. Ibid.

321. Ibid., p. 107; cf. Buber, I and Thou, p. 103.

322. Ibid., p. 105.

323. Ibid., p. 90.

324. Ibid., p. 108 f.

325. Buber, "What is Man?" p. 175.

326. Ibid.

327. Buber in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 68 f.

328. Cf. "Gemeinschaft [ist] nicht dauernd, [sondern] nur situationshaft" : Buber, Martin Buber - Abende, lect. V, p. 2.

329. Ibid., Lect. I, p. 6.

> Gemeinschaft comes into being not when it is willed: as an epiphenomon it is not intended, it is not caused. Willing, intending Gemeinschaft excludes [its very possibility].

330. Pfuetze in _Philosophical Interrogations,_ p. 74.

331. Buber, _Paths in Utopia,_ p. 58 f.

332. _Ibid._, p. 79.

333. Buber in _Philosophical Interrogations,_ p. 76 (emphasis added).

334. _Ibid._, p. 75.

FOOTNOTES - APPENDIX

1. Frankfurt a. M.: Rütten and Loening, 1906. The "Geleitwort" which introduces the series appears in Volume One: Das Proletariat, by Werner Sombart; pp. v-xiv. The present translation is of pp. ix-xiv.

2. Cf. Georg Simmel, The Problem of Sociology, trans. K. H. Wolff in K. H. Wolff, ed., Essays, where Simmel speaks of "the embodiment of social energies into structures (Gebilde) that exist and develop outside the individual"; p. 312 (S. 18).

3. Cf. Simmel, "How is Society Possible?" , trans. Wolff, Essays; "The nexus by which each [individual] is interwoven with the life and activities of every other . . . is transformed into a teleological nexus as soon as it is considered from the perspective of the . . . individual" (p. 355).

4. Cf. G. Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes (Leipzig: Duncker and Humbolt, 1900), p. 7.

5. Cf. Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology": "Certainly there is no doubt that all societal processes . . . have their seat in minds . . . ." p. 329 (S. 17).

6. Cf. W. Dilthey, "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie," op. cit.

7. It is precisely because of this fact that Simmel deems the equation of social psychology and sociology as misleading. The prevalent understanding of social psychology at Simmel's time was based on a mechani-

cal-functional model - a model which Simmel rejects for it fails to explain the objective, meta-individual character observed in the forms of sociation: see Paul Honigsheim, "The Time and Thought of the Young Simmel," in Wolff, ed., Essays, pp. 192-193.

8. Cf. Simmel, Soziologie, p. 31.

9. Cf., ibid.